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l)CONTESTED COMMUNICATION
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL BANK SPEECH
The more important words become, the more difficult it is to say things. This is the
central message of this study on the communication by central bank presidents. Since the
end of the twentieth century, central bank presidents see communication as an important
means to influence expectations of their publics. In this book, we show how this happens:
central bank presidents rely on fixed settings, speak at specified moments, and repeat
certain words. Press conferences clearly illustrate this. This strict approach to communi -
cation, however, focuses attention on slips of the tongue and (speculative) interpretations
of statements, made at planned or unplanned moments.
In times of crisis, these communication ‘disturbances’ are enlarged – communication
becomes severely contested. A crisis casts doubt on the legitimacy of authorities. Must we
still listen to central bank presidents? Do central bank presidents say what they really
think? A detailed analysis of statements by central bank presidents on the British Northern
Rock and the Dutch/Belgium Fortis banks shows how central bank presidents communicate
by ‘trial and error’. Everything they say can be used against them. Remaining silent is
impossible, as silences can be dangerous as well. 
By combining philosophical and economic insights, this study not only sheds light on
how communication in financial markets evolves, it also explains why communication can
become contested. Instead of an instrumental understanding and usage of communi -
cation, this dissertation stresses the relevance of a critical-pragmatic perspective on
financial communication. 
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For Mirko 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of all the weapons in the Federal Reserve arsenal, words were the most 
unpredictable in their consequences. Their effect might be sudden and terrible. 
(John Kenneth Galbraith, 1954 [1997], p. 33)  
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PREFACE 
 
Five years ago, the world was a different place. Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve, was ‘larger than life’; Nout Wellink, the president of the Dutch central 
bank, was relatively unknown. In that period, around the end of 2004, the first thoughts on 
this dissertation’s main theme – central bank communication – took shape. The dissertation 
would be a continuation of my philosophy thesis (2002), later published as De Overspelige 
Bankier (2004), which analyzed the infiltration of daily life by bankers, including the risks 
involved. When I spoke to people about this subject, they often asked for further 
explanations. ‘Didn’t I make bankers seem more important than they really are?’ Usually, 
the subject was seen as an interesting intellectual phenomenon, and nothing more. Today, 
however, the subject needs no introduction, and people quickly come up with opinions, 
sometimes backed by strong emotions. Often, they blame bankers and central bankers for 
the current crisis. Alan Greenspan and his successor, Ben Bernanke, have been reduced to 
human proportions, and Nout Wellink has become a well-known figure. 
 The objective of this dissertation is not to look for scapegoats; the book is about 
central bank presidents and their struggles with words. This is not an innocent perspective, 
however. Central bank presidents try to use words in order to change our behaviour; in 
fact, to manipulate us. As they themselves put it, the aim of their communication is to 
manage our expectations (and as a result, our behaviour). Their motives for doing so are to 
ensure the stability of the financial system, as well as the effectiveness of monetary 
policies. The underlying thought is that if we all do what the central bank president says, 
we all gain from it. 
 This dissertation shows the paradoxical effect of using words instrumentally. By 
announcing their intention to manage expectations with words, central bank presidents 
greatly limit what they can say, because their words will be intensely scrutinised. This is 
true in normal times, and even more so in times of crisis. The central bank president finds 
himself on the witness stand, which – regardless whether he should be there – gives his 
words even greater weight. Why should we believe what he says? Will he be entirely 
honest this time? For the president, giving more information is not necessarily better than 
giving less, and silences can be just as dangerous as using words. In this dissertation I 
intend to clarify this, the language game, both in normal times and in times of crisis. 
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While writing this dissertation, it was not only the outside world that changed – my own 
world changed as well. Early 2005 I had one son, Thomas, and was expecting a second, 
Rutger. At the end of 2006 they were joined by sons three and four, Casper and Jeroen. 
This family expansion affected the writing and the content of my dissertation. My research 
which should originally be finished within two years would still effectively take two years, 
but had to spread out over a four year period. When I picked up the pace at the end of 
2007, the financial crisis was upon us, and it became an important part of my dissertation. 
But my children not only generated this new research topic. They also helped me to see the 
subtleties of communication, as well as the weak link between communication and action. 
Informing people not always means they will act in accordance with the information you 
give them.  
A few examples. In the third chapter, I show how Jean-Claude Trichet, the 
president of the European Central Bank, continuously keeps repeating his mandate when 
answering questions from journalists. One would expect that after a while journalists 
would know the answers to certain questions, but a parent knows that this is not self-
evident. At home I regularly feel like Trichet. Merely providing information is not enough; 
what matters is repeating and thereby disciplining. What also struck me is how messages 
can be interpreted in different ways. Like central bank presidents, I too found my words 
misinterpreted from time to time. In the household, this has surprising, funny and 
controllable effects. Central bank presidents, however, encounter bigger problems if this 
happens.  
Besides the similarities, there are large differences between running my household 
and running a central bank. It was and still is not easy for me to draw a line between work 
and spare time. But my children now dictate such choices: it is their daily rhythm that 
determines when I can work and when I definitely cannot. 
 
Writing a dissertation with four children means that your work is closely linked to your 
private life. Working in weekends requires a logistical juggling trick and additional efforts 
by other people. Especially when it becomes quite a few weekends, and also additional late 
nights during the week. The first people to thank for making this possible are my own 
parents, Ann Abbeel and Jan Eelens, and in particular my mother. While my children were 
playing in my parents’ garden, or when my mother took them swimming on her regular 
‘grandma day’, I could continue working on my PhD. ‘Oma Ann’ casually took the twins 
to their swimming lessons, even though many struggle with just one child. Similarly, my 
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parents-in-law, Til and Mar Noordegraaf, receive amazed looks and expressions of support 
whenever they entered Ikea with the ‘gang of four’ for ice creams. 
 The children also went to day-care, and still do. And though it might seem strange 
to thank nannies in a PhD, an exception is appropriate in this case. Karin Kokje and Sandra 
van der Klis have been taking care of our children for a couple of years now. They even 
did so at the inaugural lecture of my husband, Mirko Noordegraaf, and Karin was in charge 
during the last year’s book presentations as she will be during the public defence of this 
thesis. I never feel like leaving my children behind; instead, I am happy to bring them. 
 My two sisters, Barbara and Evalinde Eelens, were not babysitting regulars, but 
will assist me as ‘paranymphs’ during my defence. I read somewhere that paranymphs are 
similar to bridesmaids, originally meant to support the PhD student during the defence. I 
know their task will be mostly ceremonial now, but should they need to, their backgrounds 
make them perfectly suited to support me. Evalinde has worked as a financial journalist for 
Bloomberg, and Barbara works for ABN Amro, in a unit that once belonged to Fortis. 
Considering that parts of my dissertation are about how the media react to central bank 
speech, and that the rescue of Fortis is one of the main cases used, I will see them as back-
ups in case I black out. 
 
The public defence of my thesis is a milestone in my time at Erasmus University. In 1995 I 
started working there as a teaching assistant. At the time, writing a dissertation was not 
required to continue working there, but the fact that this changed was not an issue, as I 
wanted to write one anyway. Ten years later, I was offered the opportunity to do so. 
During that time I kept teaching and enjoyed working with several colleagues and students. 
Wouter van den Brink was always there when I needed him, and for the past two years 
Nelly Twigt, together with a team of teaching assistants, joined me in the challenge of 
developing a skills program for Bachelor-1 and Bachelor-2 students at the ESE. The large 
scale of this programme contrasts with the Bachelor Honours Class I coordinate. The 
Bachelor Honours Class gives me the opportunity to work with clever and highly 
motivated students, to whom excellent guest speakers are happy to give classes. 
Over the past years I have worked with many of these students, and some have 
directly contributed to this dissertation. Sander Wieman offered valuable editorial support, 
up until the final days of the research project. Kristiaan Glorie, Hans Hakkenberg Myrthe 
van Dieijen, Floor van der Kooy, Michiel Hartman and Frederik Hochberger worked 
things out when I was short on time. Raman Ahmed helped with the calculations in chapter 
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4. Pieter Schonebaum had the patience to help me get reacquainted with statistics. Being 
an exceptional econometrics student and a friendly soul, he was well suited for the task. 
Regrettably, Pieter chose to end his life on 11 January 2010. I will surely miss him when 
defending my dissertation.  
 Since about a year, I have also been working at the Nederlandsche School voor 
Openbaar Bestuur (NSOB) in The Hague. After being invited by Martijn van der Steen to 
join the NSOB and receiving the support of its deans, Paul Frissen and Mark van Twist, I 
did not have to think twice about my decision. Although I saddened by having to partly 
leave Rotterdam, I knew the NSOB would allow me to do the kind of research that suits 
me: reflexive, critical and practical. But aside from the research, my colleagues, the many 
interesting connections and the NSOB students make me happy to travel to The Hague a 
few times a week. 
 
Then there are some people to thank who contributed to my dissertation, each in his or her 
own way. Menko Noordegraaf, Barry van der Meijden and Quinlan Eddy for always 
showing an interest in my thesis. Tilly and Ben Beukenholdt for putting their home in the 
Ardennes at our disposal. Amanda Smullen for reading and commenting on my texts, the 
members of the AIO seminar of Philosophy who by now know chapter 4 by heart, my 
roommate Anita Vlam with whom I could discuss everything and anything (including the 
supervisor we share), Marike Schols as an example of cheerful unpredictability, Olav 
Velthuis as co-author of Op naar de volgende crisis!, Ellen Reuling – a surgeon in training 
– for giving me relaxing massages whenever I had worked too much, and Onno van Toor 
for providing his creative insights and advice. 
 
I also received much professional and specific advice from my supervisors. Being an 
economist and philosopher with a great love of the ‘French thinkers’, prof. dr. Jos de Mul 
was an obvious choice as a supervisor, but no one would have expected to see two 
econometricians – prof. dr. Philip Hans Franses and prof. dr. Dick van Dijk – as my other 
supervisors. The fact that they decided to take up this project shows their open-
mindedness. Nonetheless, it was sometimes hard for me to draw clear conclusions from 
our interdisciplinary discussions. Nevertheless, there was always confidence in the final 
outcome, even though I had my doubts at times. My doubts were never a match for my 
supervisors’ enthusiasm.  
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And then there is Willem Schinkel to thank. About ten years ago I met Willem at a 
seminar. After that, we started having extensive discussions about texts we had read, and 
other things. Because of ‘all those children’ we have been reading less – I have, anyway – 
and any visit from Willem is now first claimed by my boys to ‘fight’ or play soccer. We 
have spent many wonderful evenings, also with Marguerite, and I look forward to those 
that lie ahead. 
 
Finally, an acknowledgement for my husband Mirko. Just as central bank presidents often 
struggle with words, I do as well. Especially when facing the challenge of pursuing this 
doctorate did the meaning escape from my words, or did my words take on a different 
meaning. Even now that I have completed my dissertation, I again find how stubborn even 
words of gratitude can be. There are no words to describe how important and supportive 
you have been to me over the years. I therefore dedicate this thesis to you and no words are 
needed to tell you how much that means. 
 
 
Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens 
Rhoon, August 2010 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 From silence to speaking 
For a long time the relation between central banks and their public was characterised by 
silence and secrecy. The Secrets of the Temple is the title of a book that sheds light on this 
period (Greider 1987). Central bank presidents, being the most important representatives of 
central banks, never spoke. They let financial markets guess the meaning of their actions 
and the motivations on which they were based. According to the belief at the time, this was 
the most effective way of working. Since the 1990s, things started to change. Central bank 
presidents started to communicate more with their public, especially with financial 
markets. They did this primarily because of their growing independence, and they relied on 
communication to provide accountability. In the past there was less room for independent 
policies, because the first central banks were bound to the gold standard; and later pegged 
exchange rates regulated central bank behaviour, as laid down in the Bretton Woods 
agreement. Central banks may have had statutory independence, but at this stage there was 
‘no question as to the political accountability of the central bank’ (Dincer and Eigengreen 
2009, p.3). With the removal of pegged exchange rates and growing political independency 
came a need for accountability (Dincer and Eigengreen 2009). The paradigm change was 
also motivated by the fact that communication would contribute to realising policy. By 
communicating the policy, central banks are expected to be capable of managing the 
public’s expectations (see for example Blinder 2008, Woodford 2005). 
 With the increase in financial communication, the study of such communication 
has increased as well. This research mostly focuses on the contribution of communication 
to policy achievement. Most researchers see communication as a tool, a means to achieve a 
goal, and they study whether communication-as-tool improves policy effectiveness. 
Research outcomes are inconclusive, however. In fact, contrasting views upon 
communication are presented. Some research shows that  the words of central bank 
presidents are indeed effective (e.g. Berardi and Duffy 2006, Cruijssen e.a. 2008). Other 
research questions the effectiveness of communication (e.g. De Haan and Jansen 2004) or 
relates it to specific conditions under which communication takes place (e.g. Rudebusch 
and Williams 2007, Eusepi and Preston 2007, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005, 2007a, 
2007c, Berk and Bierut 2005). These contradictory views can be contrasted, in turn, with 
2 
other perspectives on financial communication (e.g. Toulmin 2001, Galbraith 1954 
[1997]). They critizise instrumental understandings of communication between actors like 
central bank (presidents) and their publics.  
From both empirical and theoretical angle this dissertation analyzes the contested 
nature of central bank communication, particularly to test the (scholarly) effectiveness of 
instrumental views. In order to do so, the following research question is posed:  
 
Why is communication between central bank (president)s and their publics contested? 
 
To illustrate the necessity of understanding contested communication between central bank 
(presidents) and their publics1, we discuss an example involving Alan Greenspan. 
Greenspan was the longest serving president of the U.S. Central Bank (Federal Reserve, 
Fed.). He held this position from 1987 to 2006. He was notorious for his ambiguous way 
of communicating, the so-called ‘Fed Speak’. Or, as he once said when speaking to 
Congress: ‘If I made myself too clear to you, you must have misunderstood me’. This 
example provides insight in Greenspan’s communication, also because Greenspan reflects 
on these words in his memoires (Greenspan 2007). He gave testimony to the Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate, nine days after 9/11.2 He held this 
speech at an exceptional time, because the markets were shut down soon after September 
11. This shutdown lasted until September 17, and the markets dropped by 7% the day they 
were opened again. This illustrates the high level of uncertainty in the market when 
Greenspan stressed his confidence in economic recovery in his speech (Greenspan 2001, 
September 20): 
 
I am confident that we will recover and prosper as we have in the past. […] For the longer 
term, prospects for continued rapid technological advance and associated faster 
                                                        
1 The public here is derived from the public as defined by Dewey (1927 [1954]). The distinction 
between public and private is: affect the persons directly, engaged in a transaction (private), affect 
others, beyond those immediately concerned (Dewey 1927 [1954], p.12). Later, he uses this 
distinction to define ‘the public’: ‘the public consists of those who are affected by the indirect 
consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those 
consequences systematically cared for’ (Dewey 1927 [1954], p.15-16). This book shows that the 
relationship between central bank president and public is different in times of crisis than in normal 
times.‘The public is not ‘out there’ waiting to be heard, it is continuously formed by the way in 
which it is allowed into, or forces itself into, the political process’ (Hajer 2010, p.43). 
2 Greenspan, A. (2001) Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
The Condition of Financial Markets, U.S. Senate, September 20. 
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productivity growth are scarcely diminished. Those prospects, born of the ingenuity of our 
people and the strength of our system, fortify a promising future for our free nation.  
 
Greenspan repeated these words a month later, on 17 October before the U.S. Congress 
Joint Economic Committee.3 In December 2001, the words proved to be true: the economy 
started to recover.  
Thinking about the communication of the Central Bank president (CBP) on a 
more abstract level, one could assume that his words worked because they were perceived 
to reflect the future. As the person representing the central bank he is positioned close to 
possible knowledge and this makes his position powerful. He knows things that no one 
else does, but which everyone is eager to know. With his ‘predictive’ speech he reduces 
uncertainty by sharing information. The limits of communication could then be related to 
the limits of his knowledge: the more someone knows, the more that person ‘has to say’. 
We must be careful however to embrace this perspective of speaking from knowledge. In 
his memoires ‘Age of Turbulence, Adventures in a New World’ published six years after 
9/11 (Greenspan 2007), Greenspan admits that he had no idea what the world would look 
like after 9/11, he contested his words himself. He had a different reason to say what he did 
(Greenspan 2007, p.8). 
 
Yet on the record I took a less pessimistic stance because if I had fully expressed what I 
thought the probabilities were, I’d have scared the markets half to death.  
 
Greenspan speaks to try and calm the public, or at least not add to the unrest. His words are 
limited by the situation he is trying to create. For this reason, he chooses to mention some 
things while leaving out others. This means that in the study of communication one should 
not only look at what is being said, but also to what is not said, and when and how things 
are said. Newspaper headlines like ‘ECB’s silence speaks volumes over shift’ and ‘the 
remarks add to the confusion on what the ECB’s real agenda is’4 reflect this position. 
Decisive in the choice of words is not just the situation aimed for, but also the possible 
reaction of the public. So there is no one-way communication in which the central bank 
                                                        
3 Greenspan, A. (2001) Testimony before the Joined Economic Committee, Monetary Policy and 
Economic Outlook, U.S. Congress. October 17.  
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-bux.html (retrieved September 
28, 2007). 
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president transfers his knowledge to the public, but rather interaction, in which Greenspan 
tries to persuade the public. Greenspan here plays a strategic game, which he does on more 
occasions, according to Toulmin (2001). Toulmin presents the example that if Greenspan 
tells Congress that there is inflationary risk, he does not want his prediction to come true. 
On the contrary, he hopes to convince Americans to change their financial behaviour in 
such a way that his prediction will not come true. Communication here informs with the 
intention to manipulate. The ability to manipulate with words, in the sense that the 
behaviour of the public is steered in a certain direction, shows how powerful 
communication can be. At the same time, however, this manipulation has a downside. 
Because when a central bank tries to steer the public in a certain direction, there are other 
directions as well. The words can always be contested. In this case Greenspan intends to 
calm the public, but he also knows it is possible that a panic will break out. In fact, his 
remarks could cause it. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith describes such a situation in 
The Great Crash, 1929 (1954 [1997], p.33):  
 
Always when markets are in trouble the phrases are the same: ‘The economic situation is 
fundamentally sound’ or simply ‘The fundamentals are good.’ All who hear these words 
should know that something is wrong. 
 
1.2 Research design 
This research is about studying the limits of speech. If we link this to the example above, it 
becomes clear that not just the central bank president’s words should be paid attention to, 
but also the interaction with the public.  
 Next, it is important to place this communication (inter)action in the right context. 
The example takes place in a time of great uncertainty. This has an impact on Greenspan’s 
message. Through communication, he intends to mitigate the uncertainty. And because of 
this uncertainty, Greenspan is unsure of what to say, he cannot use his regular knowledge 
to attack this problem. He tries to gain time by collecting information needed for taking a 
policy decision. To the committee, he stresses that ‘It’s better to be right than to be quick.’ 
He doubted that it would be possible to determine the long term effects of 9/11 (Greenspan 
October 17, 2001). In normal times the central bank president’s knowledge is likely to 
have a greater influence on his words, as he can then better judge their long term 
consequences. Still, the uncertainty that Greenspan is dealing with here is not unique, but it 
is extreme. According to his own words, he is faced with uncertainty in quiet times as well. 
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He calls it one of the defining characteristics of monetary policy (Greenspan 2004). In 
studying the limits of communication, there is a distinction between (the perception of) 
situations with more and situations with less uncertainty. 
 In this thesis the distinction between more and less uncertainty is operationalised 
by comparing communication in times of crisis with communication in normal times. The 
crisis referred to here is the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with 
speaking in normal times, chapters 4 and 5 deal with speaking in times of crisis. The 
differences in the central bank president’s communication, how the public reacts to it and 
how communication between the central bank and the public takes place are elaborated by 
using different perspectives within the chapters. These perspectives are based on ways in 
which communication is viewed. Luhmann (1996 [2000]) sees communication as a 
combination of utterance-information-understanding. First, there is an utterance. Then, 
information is selected from that utterance. And if the selected information is understood, 
we can speak of communication. ‘Communication only comes about when someone 
listens, watches and reads to the extent that further communication could follow’ 
(Luhmann 1996 [2000], p.4). That is what De Mul (2010, p.116) sees as the pragmatic side 
of information: ‘signs that contain the potential to modify the mental and/or physical 
actions or behaviour of the recipient in a particular way’. This follow-up can take a 
different turn than intended by the central bank president; it is after all the receiver who 
distils information from the words. The receiving party then is most important here, it has 
to see the words as informative and continue speaking about them.5 The importance of the 
receiver shows the relevance of the distinction between utterance and information. Are the 
words spoken by the central bank president seen as being informative? In chapter 2 we 
show that the academic literature on transparency largely ignores the importance of the 
receiver. We do this by using the process model of communication. The assumption seems 
to be that the words of the central bank president are by definition informative. The goal 
then is just to clearly communicate the message. This approach offers only limited 
possibilities for explaining the workings of communication, so we offer an alternative in 
chapter 3. Here we give insight into the way the distinction between utterance and 
information is made in normal times. In chapter 4 we again focus on utterances, this time 
not by central bank presidents, but by the media when speaking about central bank 
presidents. In chapter 5 we then confront the media with the central bank presidents (and 
                                                        
5 As Hartley (2002) says: ‘Interaction by mutually recognised signals’ (p.32). 
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with financial markets). The perspective moves from utterances (chapter 4) to 
communication (chapter 5).  
In this dissertation we study the speaking of four central banks (CB) and their presidents 
(CBP): the American Central Bank (the Federal Reserve) led by Ben Bernanke, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) led by Jean-Claude Trichet, the British Central Bank (Bank 
of England, BoE) led by Mervyn King and the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche 
Bank, DNB) led by Nout Wellink. In each chapter, reasons are given for choosing to 
discuss a certain central bank. What can be said beforehand is that the European Central 
Bank plays a major role in this dissertation. This is because the ECB communicates quite 
often, it communicates frequently about its communication, and its press conferences are a 
striking example of both action and interaction. Altogether, this results in the following 
overview. 
 
Context 
 
Research object 
Normal times 
(Weak perception of uncertainty) 
Times of crisis 
(Strong perception of uncertainty) 
Utterance 
(Words) 
 
Chapter 2:  
Disclosing transparency 
 
CB(P): ECB 
Perspective: CBP 
Chapter 4: 
Do central bank presidents receive 
more attention in times of crisis? 
CB(P): Fed, ECB, DNB 
Perspective: public 
Communication 
(Interaction) 
Chapter 3: 
Revealing the rules of central bank 
speech 
CB(P): ECB 
Chapter 5: 
Silencing speculation 
 
CB(P): DNB, BoE 
Table 1-1. Overview of chapters 
 
1.3 Structure of the book 
The specific content of the chapters is as follows. In the second chapter, ‘Disclosing 
Transparency’, we look for the motivation behind central bank presidents’ speaking. It is 
shown that the concept of transparency plays a central role here. Communication creates 
transparency (it creates openness) and that transparency is then a means to realise policy 
(goal). If the public knows the plans of the central bank, it will – according to rational 
expectations theory – adjust its own actions to them. Furthermore, transparency and 
accountability (another goal) go hand in hand. The remarks of a central bank president 
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about future policy are central in this, he is after all the one creating openness. The thesis 
of this chapter is: 
 
Communication works because communication creates transparency. 
 
Because of this (double) importance of transparency, in this chapter we look for the 
meaning of transparency related to central bank presidents’ communication. We do this by 
studying various articles related to this topic (e.g. Geraats 2002, Poole 2008, Carpenter 
2004). The result of this literature research is that there are varying views on what 
transparency is: what transparency is, is not transparent. One of the problems of the 
concept of transparency is the relation between transparency and communication. 
Communication cannot (always) be used instrumentally in order to create transparency. 
This puts into doubt the assumption that a central bank president creates transparency by 
communicating. This doubt is increased when looking at central bank presidents’ 
communication ‘in action’. For this, the monthly press conferences of the European 
Central Bank are used. The selected press conferences occur under normal circumstances. 
At first glance these press conferences seem transparent, but when looking at the press 
questions it becomes clear that communicating means making choices: what to say and 
what not to say. Communication then not only shows things – it makes them transparent – 
it also hides them. Communication can therefore always be questioned, which frustrates its 
intended effect. The conclusion of this chapter is that the presumed effect of 
communication cannot be attributed to transparency. Conversely, communication that is 
seen as transparent can create confusion and even uncertainty. If we look back at the 
Greenspan example, we can see that he did just that. Greenspan feared that openness 
would lead to panic, so he did not share his thoughts with the public. 
In the third chapter, ‘Revealing the Rules of Central Bank Speech’, 
communication is looked at from an interactive perspective, interaction between central 
bank president and public. Viewing communication as a game offers the opportunity to 
interpret strategic behaviour, such as the discrepancy between what a person (like 
Greenspan) thinks and says. Starting point here is the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault 
studied the interaction between power and knowledge in language (1966, 1972, 1975, 
1976). He looked for the words that work, the context in which they work and why they 
work. Foucault distinguishes three clusters of rules that give this game direction: rules of 
exclusion, rules of inclusion and rules of qualification (Foucault 1972). These rules are 
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guidelines in making the distinction between an utterance and information. They determine 
the effect and the value of the words. Because of them, one word can be different from a 
similar word, and it matters who utters it. This is comparable to soccer, where the rules 
determine which acts are allowed and/or successful. Based on this perspective, we 
formulate the following thesis: 
 
Communication is not about words, it is about the possible effects words can 
generate in the communication game. 
 
In this chapter, we make clear the rules of the communication game that central bankers 
play. The communication of the European Central Bank is used as a starting point here. 
The directors of the ECB have often communicated about communication since its creation 
(Duisenberg 1998). To map these rules, we study a range of communication used by the 
ECB, including meta-communication (communication by central bankers about 
communication).6 Furthermore, we pay attention to the way in which central bank 
presidents communicate. This means that not only the ‘what’ of communication is 
relevant, but also the ‘how’.7 A first result of this study, found by linking meta-
communication by central bankers to Foucault’s ideas, is that communication as a game of 
language offers insight into the effect of words. (In)formal rules are the basis for 
communication by central bank presidents. These rules provide insight into the effect of 
communication (or lack thereof). However, the research also shows that the rules 
themselves are not uncontroversial: discussion about the rules is possible. Seeing 
communication as a game and knowing the rules does not mean that the central bank 
president controls the effectiveness of his speech. That there will be effects is to be 
expected (speaking is productive), but which effects is sometimes hard to determine 
(speaking does not always create the intended effects). 
In the fourth and fifth chapter, communication in times of crisis is discussed. The 
crisis studied here is the credit crunch of 2007-2009. The fourth chapter, ‘Do central bank 
presidents receive more attention in times of crisis?’, is a transitional chapter, as it 
                                                        
6 Different moments of communication can be distinguished: press releases, interviews and speeches, 
press conferences, monthly bulletins, statistics pocket books, annual reports, convergence reports, 
financial stability reviews, weekly financial statements, quarterly financial statements, and (research) 
publications (e.g. Hämäläinen 1999, Blinder e.a. 2008). 
7 Compare Hajer (2009); he states that not only the discourse (the what) is important, but the 
dramaturgy as well (the how).  
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compares normal times with times of crisis. The goal of this comparison is to create an 
outline of the changing relations between central bank presidents and their publics in a 
crisis. Starting point is that a central bank president addresses a broader public in times of 
crisis. He uses mass media (like television) to convey his message. What he has to say is 
no longer relevant mostly to financial experts, but to the entire population. The discussion 
takes place mostly in the media. The thesis studied in this chapter therefore is: 
 
In times of uncertainty, like a financial crisis, more attention is given to remarks by central 
bank presidents, and attention is paid by a broader public. 
 
We measure this attention by counting the number of references to central bank presidents 
in newspapers. The newspapers used have various orientations: popular, intellectual and 
professional. This is because in creating an outline, we do not look at the content of the 
references (only at the attention that is generated). Besides references to central bank 
presidents, we count the number of references to the credit crisis. The results of this 
research are as follows. Firstly, the central bank presidents studied in this chapter are 
referenced more often in this crisis than in normal times. However, attention for this crisis 
has a larger relative increase than attention for central bank presidents. This indicates that 
the crisis is often discussed without referring (in)directly to a central bank president. We 
also see that the central bank presidents try to reach a broader public, but that these efforts 
only marginally pay off. This seems to confirm a loss of authority. Not only are there more 
people with something to say about the financial crisis, other people than in normal times 
are referred to. 
The changes in the relation between central bank presidents and the public are 
elaborated in the fifth chapter, ‘Silencing Speculation’. We do this by viewing these 
relations as a ‘contest for symbolic order’ (Boin 2005). This contest takes place in times of 
great uncertainty. The stakes are the definition of the situation. Whoever succeeds in 
defining the situation also gets the opportunity to create consequences, such as answering 
the question of who is to blame or what solution is best. Central banks, primarily 
represented by their presidents, take part in this contest. They have to fight, because they 
have lost some of their authority.8 After all, they were unable to prevent the crisis. Their 
                                                        
8 In addition to footnote 1 we can say that the public changes here, because not only the professional 
public is confronted with the effects on the financial world; these become clear to the lay public as 
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definition of the situation is therefore not automatically the accepted one, their words stop 
working or work differently. In a contest for symbolic order, communication of a central 
banker is of a different nature than in normal times. To realise something in normal times, 
one can manoeuvre within the rules of the game and explore their limits (see chapter 3). In 
times of crisis, however, redefining the rules of the game is what is important. The thesis 
of this chapter is as follows: 
 
In times of crisis, a central bank president communicates to regain control of his 
communication. 
 
This thesis is studied in this chapter using the cases of Northern Rock and Fortis. In 
studying these cases, focus is put on the action of the central bank president (‘What does 
he say?’ and ‘How does he do so?’). For the study of Northern Rock, we use a 
parliamentary inquiry. In the Fortis case, a reconstruction is based upon the media 
appearances of the central bank president. The communication of the CBP in these media 
appearances is compared to the reactions and behaviour in the markets and in the media. 
We see that central bank presidents use alternatives to temper speculation about their 
message. Examples are risky ways of communicating (such as holding press conferences), 
repeatedly and quickly (re)framing the message, trial and error in looking for solutions, et 
cetera. In both cases we see that in times of crisis, central bank presidents are confronted 
with the limits of their speech (not all utterances are seen as information). A central bank 
president is expected to speak, but it is difficult for him to control the meaning given to his 
words in the interaction. Therefore he not only adjusts his message, but his method of 
speaking as well. The conclusions of this chapter are that the method of communication 
offers more ways to temper speculation than the communicated information, and another 
way to temper speculation is to change to another communication game.  
When the aforementioned overview is filled in using the chapters, this is the 
result: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
well. A central bank president, responsible for the well-being of the financial world, therefore has to 
relate to different publics. The contest for symbolic order is also a contest for who – in the eyes of 
the public – should represent the public interest.  
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Context 
 
Research object 
Normal times 
(Weak perception of uncertainty) 
Times of crisis 
(Strong perception of uncertainty) 
Utterance 
(Words) 
 
Concept: Transparency 
Case material: press conferences 
of the ECB 
Concept: Attention 
Case material: referrals to the CBP (Fed, 
ECB, DNB) in newspapers 
Communication 
(Interaction) 
Concept: Game 
Case material:  
(meta-)communication by the 
ECB 
Concept: Contest 
Case material: Rescue of Northern Rock 
and Fortis 
Table 1-2: Overview of concepts in the chapters 
 
1.4 Situating the research 
This research studies a problem of financial economic relevance (managing expectations 
by a central bank president), but it does not primarily use the regular economic 
perspective. It uses a philosophical approach that fits existing economic approaches, but 
adds to them as well. First of all, this research underlines the importance of information. 
This fits economic theory development, in which information is assumed to be an 
important steering mechanism. An example of that is the role of prices as a coordinating 
mechanism in the market, as it is assumed that prices contain all information. The steering 
mechanism becomes clear in cases of information asymmetry (e.g. Stiglitz 2002). Then, 
the party with the most information has the ability to exploit the other party. The solution 
to this problem lies in creating information symmetry. Power plays are prevented because 
of the equality that has been created. The corresponding assumption is that people process 
information rationally (compare also rational expectations).  
In this dissertation we discuss this relation between power and information 
(chapter 3). We show how power and information are interwoven, but also that the power 
relations do not disappear when there is equality of information. The fact that parties have 
the same knowledge does not mean they act the same. Their institutional positions 
influence the value of the information they possess. The words of a central bank president 
are likely to have a different impact than the words of a layman. Sharing information is 
also the link to mechanism design theory (Hurwicz 2007, Meyerson 2007). This describes 
creating a mechanism (the design) to optimally distribute information. We see that in times 
of crisis, central bank presidents start using different mechanisms – such as live press 
conferences and television appearances – to convey their message. From that perspective, 
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the implications of this study fit those of mechanism design. In this research, however, we 
challenge an important assumption embraced by both mechanism design theory and 
theories regarding information asymmetries, which is that words work. There are times, 
such as times of crisis, when central bank presidents are hardly believed, if at all. When 
that point is reached, supplying information is no longer effective. This is why, in this 
research, we take a step back as it were, to explore the conditions under which information 
does or does not work (as expected or intended). In their own way, Kahneman and Tversky 
(e.g. 1981) also ask this question regarding the effect of information. They show that 
‘framing’ information has consequences for actions. In this dissertation, this ‘framing’ is 
further elaborated. We do this in an academic way by using Foucault’s work, and by 
relating communication not just to the process approach, but also to the semiotic approach. 
We also do this in a practical way by seeing how the words of central bank presidents work 
and fail to work in various contexts. 
 
1.5 Relevance of the research 
Looking at the relevance of this research a first thing that comes to mind is the question: 
‘Do central bank presidents really do what they say they will do?’ Central bank presidents 
claim that they want to be transparent, but looking at their communication we also find 
many silences. The research shows that their transparency is limited and conditional. It 
also shows that merely giving information is not sufficient. Central bank presidents are 
dependent on the (knowledge of) their public for their information to be effective. This 
puts into doubt the hope central bank presidents have to manage expectations through 
communication. Especially in times of crisis we see that communication fuels speculation 
and thereby unpredictability. The same words (utterances) can generate different effects in 
different contexts (can be informative in different ways). 
The scientific relevance is found in the embedding of communication. A lot of 
past research relates words of central bank presidents to market reactions. In this research 
we go in-depth by asking ‘Why is communication between central bank presidents and 
their publics contested?’ Words are only listened to if they are embedded within a certain 
context. This context offers meaning and status to the words (and to the silences). In times 
of crisis this context turns into a contest for symbolic order. That makes communication 
much harder and the effects it generates more unpredictable. When words are contested, it 
is both difficult to speak and to remain silent. 
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CHAPTER 2: DISCLOSING TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is everything but transparent 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In April 2003 the European Central Bank (ECB) selected 80 architects to submit a design 
proposal for the ECB’s new premises. According to former ECB President Willem F. 
Duisenberg, the new premises had to meet ‘the requirements of a modern central bank in 
the 21st century serving an enlarged Euro area’. He continues to write in the foreword of 
his competition letter, ‘The design of our future premises should reflect the values we 
regard as essential to our activities. We are committed to transparency, integrity, 
excellence and efficiency.’ In 2007 Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, board member of the ECB, 
awarded the project to the architects of Coop Himmelb(l)au. This was remarkable as the 
laureate, Prof. Wolf D. Prix of Coop Himmelb(l)au, deviated from the Competition Brief. 
He replaced two essential values – integrity and excellence – by two other values – 
communication and stability – to accompany efficiency and transparency.9 
This revaluation should not come as a surprise: nowadays communication can be seen as 
one of the core businesses of central banks. Within one year (2007), the ECB had at least 
613 official, mostly scheduled ‘communication moments’ with its public. Its executive 
board members gave 135 speeches and interviews, most of which were given by president 
Jean-Claude Trichet (49). They were supplemented by: monthly press conferences by ECB 
president Jean-Claude Trichet and vice-president Lucas Papademos (12), regular press 
releases (103), monthly bulletins (12), statistics pocket books (12), annual report (1), 
convergence report (1), financial stability review (1), weekly financial statements (52), 
quarterly financial statements (4), (research) publications (280).10  
However natural communication may seem today, it has not always been that 
way. Only in the 1990s did central banks start to communicate with their public. They 
                                                        
9 For remarks on the competition brief, see: press releases ECB; 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030407.en.html, April 7, 2003 (retrieved May 11, 
2010) and http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2002/html/pr021126.en.html, November 26, 2002 
(retreived on May 11, 2010) and Smaghi (November 20, 2007). For other ‘transparent’ architecture 
see Heald (2007) who mentions two other buildings that symbolize transparency: the Flemish 
Parliament with a convex glass roof and the building for the National Assembly of Wales.  
10 See: http://www.ecb.int/pub/html/index.en.html (retrieved May 11, 2010). 
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communicate to be transparent. And they desire transparency, because they assume that it 
contributes to the ‘effectiveness’ of monetary policy and that it provides the 
‘accountability’ required by the independency of central banks (Blinder e.a. 2008, 
Woodford 2005). The assumption is that if the central bank says what its goals are with 
respect to inflation and interest policy, the public incorporates this information and acts 
accordingly (expectations are anchored). That in turn should lead to a more predictable and 
therefore more efficient and effective monetary policy. Or as the European Central Bank 
writes: ‘Transparency helps the public to understand the ECB's monetary policy. Better 
public understanding makes the policy more credible and effective’.11 Today, there is a 
general consensus among central bankers that transparency is not only an obligation for a 
public entity, but also a real benefit to the institution and its policies (Issing 2005 p.66). In 
this chapter, communication by central banks and their presidents is studied. Linked to the 
importance of transparency, the following statement is examined: 
 
Communication works because communication creates transparency. 
 
This assumption will be studied in this chapter. We start in section 2 by studying the 
relation between transparency and effective communication on an abstract level. We show 
that the emphasis on transparency of central banks fits a societal trend that embraces 
transparency. The assumption that transparency has a disciplining and controlling effect is 
the basis for this. The expectation that transparency also influences expectations is 
however less common. It is rooted in the rational expectations approach. Both forms of 
transparency, providing accountability and managing expectations, are realised through 
communication. Based on this theoretical exploration it is concluded that realising 
transparency is based on three assumptions: transparency makes visible what must be 
made visible, transparency creates predictability and thereby anchors expectations, and 
transparency assumes the instrumental role of communication.  
Section 3 contains the research design. It describes how two sub-questions, 
derived from the statement posed in the introduction, are researched. The question: ‘Which 
demands does central bank communication have to meet in order to be transparent?’ is 
answered using academic literature on the subject. The question of whether central bank 
communication meets transparency demands is answered by studying a limited 
                                                        
11 http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html (retrieved June 9, 2010). 
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communication domain, the monthly press conferences of the ECB. In both cases, 
transparency and communication are related to visibility, predictability and 
instrumentality, as previously distinguished. In sections 4 and 5 the research results are 
presented, based on academic literature (4) and ECB press conferences (5). All this makes 
it possible to draw the following conclusions in section 6. First of all, what transparency is, 
is not transparent. Secondly, communication is not only used to create transparency. 
Communication also makes clear that central bank presidents do not want to talk about 
certain topics, and that they aim to discipline their public using communication in a non-
transparent way. The overall conclusion is that transparency offers no sufficient 
explanation as to how and why central bank presidents communicate. The process 
approach associated with it comes up short if we want to understand a central bank 
president’s communication. It is not only the case that transparency disciplines the public, 
the public needs to be disciplined in order for transparency to be effective. 
 
2.2 Theoretical exploration of transparency 
In this section, transparency is situated from a theoretical perspective. The aim of this 
section is to explore and explain the assumed relations between transparency and 
accountability and between transparency and the management of expectations.  
The link between transparency and accountability came up in the 1980s. In 
various mission statements, transparency is related to ‘good governance’ (Hood 2007). 
This call for transparency is situated in the supposed relation between transparency and 
surveillance: by making things visible, we can better monitor them. This connection is 
worked out by Jeremy Bentham. This 19th century philosopher is one of the founders and 
advocates of the current thinking about transparency: ‘The more closely we are watched, 
the better we behave’ is his motto (Hood 2007). Bentham illustrates what he means by 
using the panopticon. The panopticon is a round prison. In the middle of the prison is a 
tower, where a guard can monitor the behaviour in each of the cells. These cells are at 
some distance to the tower. The tower itself is blacked out, so the guard can see the 
prisoners, but they cannot see him. This physical infrastructure makes it easy to monitor 
everyone. But, and this is an important premise, it is not necessary to actually do so. The 
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continuous possibility of being watched is a control mechanism in itself (see also Foucault 
1975).12 
When it comes to the call for transparency of government institutions, we see that 
this is about visibility as a control mechanism as well: being transparent means (the 
possibility of) making visible what ‘should’ be seen (see also Meijer 2009). The point is 
that those who claim to serve the public interest can be monitored and disciplined by being 
visible. The citizens are – or should be – in the tower so to speak, the public organisations 
are in the cells. The visibility, the transparency, can be seen and organised in different 
ways. Hood and Heald (2007) distinguish four directions of transparency: 
 
- Transparency upwards means that the hierarchical/superior principal can observe 
the conduct, behaviour and/or ‘results’ of the hierarchical subordinate/agent. 
- Transparency downwards means that the ‘ruled’ can observe the conduct, 
behaviour and/or results of their ruler. 
- Transparency outwards occurs when the hierarchical subordinate or agent can 
observe what is happening ‘outside’ the organisation. 
- Transparency inwards is when those outside can observe what is going on inside 
the organisation.  
 
When it comes to accountability of monitoring institutions, like the central bank, 
transparency upwards seems to be the most appropriate category (Hood and Heald 2007, 
28-29). The central bank then serves society, and society can follow its behaviour.  
Transparency, as used by central banks, also has another goal: managing 
expectations in order to become predictable. This form of transparency does not fit the 
‘good governance’ use of transparency. Neither does it fit one of the four varieties of 
transparency, as it is not only about observing, but also about managing expectations. The 
idea is that by making expectations of the future transparent, the public will behave 
according to these expectations. The assumptions are based on the ‘theory of rational 
expectations’. Macesich (1987) works out the connection between the two in his book 
                                                        
12 ‘Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person should actually be in that 
predicament, during every instant of time. This being impossible, the next thing to be wished for is, 
that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and not being able to satisfy himself to the 
contrary, he should conceive himself to be so’ (Bentham 1787, p.3). 
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Monetary Policy and Rational Expectations (1987).13 He stresses that the theory of rational 
expectations does not assume that everyone has perfect foresight. What is important in this 
theory is that the expectations relevant to decision-making are not just formed based on 
adapted experience (as in the adaptive expectations model (Macesich 1987)). The 
expectations are also formed by the information received about future policy. 
Policymakers who want their expectations of the future to be incorporated in the 
expectations of the public will have to use simple policy rules and easily predictable 
policy. The consequences for monetary policy are clear, according to Macesich (1987) 
monetary authorities should act in a clear, predictable, and consistent manner. The 
consequence is that the public, which according to theory behaves rationally, contributes to 
more efficient and effective policy. Both the central bank and the public become 
predictable. 
To create visibility as well as predictability, communication is used: 
communication is a means towards transparency (the goal). This means that it is assumed 
that communication clarifies things and does not obscure them. If it obscured things, 
communication would not be a good way to create transparency. It is a vision of 
communication that closely fits the process approach of communication. This approach 
distinguishes (roughly) a sender, a message and a receiver. The sender has certain 
intentions, which he packages in a message (encode), which he puts forward to a public 
that then unravels it (decode). The act of communication itself does not add anything to the 
message. If the public ultimately does not act in accordance with the intentions of the 
sender, there is miscommunication. This can be explained by technical noise: the channel 
does not work properly. Another explanation is that there is misunderstanding. In that case 
the words were not chosen properly, whereas in the first case, the channel does not work 
the way it should. The solution is to package the intention better and differently, in word 
and technology, so that the misunderstanding and noise are removed.14 In this case the 
                                                        
13 This work was published in 1987, well before central banks actually put transparency high on the 
agenda. That only happened in the beginning of the 1990’s. This is why this literature is used to map 
the assumptions. In later oversights like Woodford (2005) and Blinder e.a. (2008) the link between 
rational expectations and transparency is also emphasised.  
14 This approach is different from the semiotic approach, which sees communication as producing 
meanings. The message then cannot be reduced to the intentions of the speaker. What the message is 
becomes clear during communication when various parties start to deal with the words. 
Miscommunication does not mean that the intentions of the speakers are deviated from. If there is 
‘miscommunication’ – as far as the word even applies here – it is because the various parties look at 
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central bank, often its president, is the sender of the message. The challenge for the central 
bank president is to communicate with the public as well as possible, so that the public 
understands what he says and behaves in a predictable manner. 
Concluding, based on the above, three assumptions can be defined that underlie 
the embracing of transparency. Firstly, transparency makes visible what should be visible. 
Secondly, transparency creates predictability of policy and thereby anchoring of 
expectations. Thirdly, communication is considered to be instrumental in achieving 
transparency. 
 
2.3 Research design 
The theoretical framework presented above offers a frame of reference to further 
investigate the statement of this chapter ‘Central Bank communication works as it makes 
transparent’. This is done by giving concrete meaning to visibility, predictability and 
instrumentality. 
A first step in doing that is studying academic literature on central bank 
communication. The overarching question that is asked here is how communication should 
be shaped to realise transparency. This question will be linked to the concepts mentioned 
above: 
 
- How can visibility be specified? 
- How can predictability be specified? 
- How can instrumentality be specified? 
 
A part of the literature is empirical (how things are in practice), a part is normative (how 
things should be) and a part is empirical-normative (how things are and how to improve 
them).  
Next, we study an example of communication by a central bank. The question 
asked here is whether communication by a central bank creates transparency. The starting 
points used for this are based on the study of academic literature. Using the example of 
communication, we check whether these points can be found in actual communication. We 
have chosen the press conferences of the ECB to do this. This choice was made this way 
                                                                                                                                            
the words from a different ‘cultural’ background. Possibly, this method of communication can best 
be understood by seeing it as negotiating, as Fiske (1990) does. 
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because the ECB has always considered communication and transparency very important, 
and because this central bank has opted for communication with its public through press 
conferences. This choice implicitly shows how the ECB prefers to see communication. 
Giving a press conference also makes clear that not only the ‘what’ of communication is 
important, but the ‘how’ as well. Furthermore, press conferences make communication 
researchable by giving the public the opportunity to immediately respond to the central 
bank president’s words. Finally, press conferences are seen as an effective method of 
communication (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2008). The press conferences are first studied 
based on their general characteristics. For this, we use all ECB press conferences since its 
foundation. In some cases it is important to study press conferences in depth. For this, the 
press conference from the beginning of 2008 is used as an illustrative example. At the 
time, the situation was fairly normal. The tensions on the credit market, which later would 
lead to the credit crisis, were already present. But there was no (perceived) uncertainty 
comparable to that during the credit crisis. Moreover, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the 
ECB since 2003, had built up some experience in communicating with the public. The 
question of whether press conferences create transparency is answered by studying 
whether the press conferences meet the transparency demands as formulated in academic 
literature. Also, we look for additional ways in which communication in press conferences 
may create transparency. This means we will be following these questions: 
 
- Is there visibility, as defined in academic literature, in the ECB press conferences? 
Do the ECB press conferences provide additional insights in situating visibility in 
communication? 
- Is there predictability, as defined in academic literature, in the ECB press 
conferences? 
Do the ECB press conferences provide additional insights in situating predictability in 
communication? 
- Is there instrumentality, as defined in academic literature, in the ECB press 
conferences? 
Do the ECB press conferences provide additional insights in situating instrumentality 
in communication? 
 
The first question in each of these three pairs is answered by comparing the criteria, 
circumscribed in the next section, to the ECB communication. For the second question we 
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take the communication by the ECB president as starting point. We look for ways in which 
words create visibility and predictability, and how they are used instrumentally. 
The ECB press conferences can be studied well because they have been used 
since the ECB’s foundation, and because they have been well documented. Since June 
2008, these press conferences can also be viewed live or afterwards on the site.15 
 
2.4 Results of the literature study 
In the following section we look at the relation between transparency and visibility, 
between transparency and predictability and between transparency and communication. It 
is striking that in most central bank literature on transparency the monitoring power of 
transparency, when it comes to providing accountability, is not disputed. Attention is 
mostly given to the possibility for transparency to anchor expectations.  
 
Specification of visibility 
The work of Geraats is used as a starting point in answering the question: ‘How can 
visibility be specified?’ The choice is based on the extensive research Geraats has done on 
this transparency and CB speech (see 2002, 2006, 2007). Geraats makes the link between 
transparency and visibility by mentioning that the physical perception of transparency is 
‘that which one can look through’ (Geraats 2002). It is logical to see transparency, based 
on this analogy, as something that does not hide anything, but makes visible what lays 
behind. This creating of visibility is done by central banks by informing. If we continue 
this line of thought, it could mean a ‘[…] full, unlimited disclosure of all information’ 
(Issing 2006). Geraats, however, defines transparency differently. In her work transparency 
is seen as the presence of symmetric information (Geraats 2002, see also Berardi and Duffy 
2006, Reeves & Sawicki 2006, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007c, González-Páramo 2007): 
an approach that fits mainstream economic theory (e.g. Stiglitz 2002). This is also an 
approach that points to the importance of communication (in this case, the central bank 
president informing the public). It is stressed by Geraats that symmetric information does 
not mean that all the parties know everything (that they have perfect information). It does 
mean that all parties face the same knowledge and have the same uncertainties (Geraats 
2002). So, for Geraats and those authors who subscribe to this point of view, uncertainty 
                                                        
15 Transcripts of the press conferences can be found at: http://www.ecb.int/press/html/index.en.html 
(retrieved June 8, 2010). 
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does not exclude transparency. ‘For instance, in case of monetary policy the central bank 
and the private sector could both face uncertainty about the structure of the economy: but 
as long as both have the same information, and are aware of it, transparency prevails’ 
(Geraats 2002, p.534). 
This view differs from the view of Poole (2008)16. He says it is possible to be 
transparent about both the objectives of monetary policy and about current monetary 
policy actions. But the existing commitment to transparency requires central banks to 
publicly explain the assumptions about future policy that are implicit in such projections 
(Woodford 2005). This transparency about expected future monetary policy is highly 
complicated. Poole (2008) gives the following reason:  
 
I know that market participants are hungry for insight into the FOMC’s (Federal Open 
Market Committee, LNE) thinking and into the likelihood of future adjustments in the 
target federal funds rate. My judgment is that, most of the time, the committee cannot 
provide what the market wants because the committee itself is not clairvoyant.17 
 
Following this criticism means accepting that transparency is limited by uncertainty, it is 
frustrated when the speaker does not know what to say (Kohn 2005). According to this 
view transparency and uncertainty do not go hand in hand. 
Uncertainty is not the only way in which transparency is limited. Cruijssen e.a. 
(2008) mention the presence of complexity and profusion as limits to transparency. Call it 
‘the not being able to see the bigger picture’ problem. This point is subscribed to by 
Papademos (2008) and Mishkin (2004). In his article ‘Can transparency go too far’ 
Mishkin (2004) questions the desirability of transparency. Mishkin and Papademos doubt 
the possibility (as well as desirability) of being transparent when it comes to the publishing 
of forecasts including projection of the future path. Mishkin also questions the formulation 
and publication of the objective function (how they care about output and inflation 
                                                        
16 President of the Federal Reserve of St. Louis, and former member of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC). 
17 The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) consists of twelve members: the seven members of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York; and four of the remaining eleven Reserve Bank presidents, who serve one-year terms on 
a rotating basis. The FOMC holds eight regularly scheduled meetings per year. At these meetings, 
the Committee reviews economic and financial conditions, determines the appropriate stance on 
monetary policy, and assesses long term risks of price stability and sustainable economic growth 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm; retrieved July 2, 2010). 
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fluctuations). Transparency on these subjects is complex and can turn out to be 
counterproductive (Mishkin 2004, p.63): 
  
[…] increased transparency […] will complicate the communication process and weaken 
support for a central bank focus on long-run objectives.  
 
According to Mishkin (2004) speaking about output fluctuations is so complex that it 
would frustrate the KISS (Keep it Simple Stupid) principle. This accessibility is actually a 
requirement Mishkin places upon transparency. Hämäläinen (2001) on the other hand 
notices the tension between the expectation (of the public) that the ECB uses a very 
simplistic strategic and communication framework in a complex world.  
Summarising, transparency is seen in part of the academic literature as realising a 
situation of symmetric information (e.g. Geraats). What that symmetric information is, is 
unclear however. There are different views on uncertain information: ‘should things be 
said about it?’, ‘should things not be said about it?’, or ‘should be said that there is 
uncertainty?’. There are also differing views on the complexity of the information. 
According to part of the literature simplicity is important, while according to some 
literature simplicity does not do justice to the message. 
 
Specification of predictability 
Visibility is closely connected to predictability, the second pillar of transparency. Because 
making things predictable means that light is shed on the future (and therefore made 
visible). The expectation is that making future policy known leads the public to act in 
accordance with this information. We use Geraats here as well, to elaborate on the point of 
predictability. In her work, Geraats defines five transparency domains. For each domain, 
she indicates which information should be disclosed in order for central banks to be 
transparent. If central banks do so, their behaviour becomes predictable for their public. 
The public then does not only know the inflation target, but also the objectives, strategy, et 
cetera. The five domains with corresponding criteria are as follows. 
 
1. Political context: openness about policy objectives, such as explicit inflation 
targets. 
2. Economic context: disclosure of economic data, models and central bank 
forecasts.  
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3. Procedural context: providing information about the monetary policy strategy and 
internal policy deliberations, for instance through the release of minutes and 
voting records.  
4. Policy context: communication of policy decisions, such as changes in the interest 
rate, and statements about likely future actions.  
5. Operational or market context: concerns the implementation of monetary policy 
actions, including a discussion of control errors for the operating instrument and 
macroeconomic transmission disturbances. 
 
Carpenter (2004) deems this division of five too extensive and provides his own division 
of three. He distinguishes transparency ‘in instrument, goals and implementation’. In 
instrument transparency, predictability is created because ‘the public knows the current 
policy instrument and the current targeted level for that instrument’. In goal transparency, 
predictability lies in the fact that the public knows ‘the objective of the central bank, 
including the relative values placed on each goal when there are multiple objectives’. And 
in implementation transparency, predictability comes from the fact that the public ‘knows 
the manner in which information about the economy is translated into policy actions’. 
At first sight, the authors seem to assume that making information visible to the 
public (show) causes the public to know what to do (act). It has the knowledge to correctly 
incorporate the information (know). The predictability then is at two connected levels. On 
the one hand, there is predictability related to what the central bank president is going to 
say, and on the other hand there is predictability in the behavioural response of the public 
to the central bank president’s remarks. Although one could arise from the other in an ideal 
situation, this does not always happen. According to Geraats, the final effect depends on 
the ‘transparency context’. A short summary of the arguments presented by Geraats (2002, 
2007) indicates that it does not always pay to be transparent: in certain contexts it does, in 
others it does not.18 Carpenter here wonders if effective communication is not more 
                                                        
18 To be able to interpret it, Geraats distinguishes uncertainty effects from incentive effects. These 
effects do not always relate to each other in the same way. According to Geraats, the ultimate effect 
depends on the ‘transparency context’. Uncertainty effects are ex post effects, directly related to the 
disclosure of information. The moment the central bank reveals the information it has, it no longer 
has the opportunity to use the advantage that the information provides. At the same time the private 
sector obtains new information that it can act upon. Incentive effects, on the other hand, are the 
indirect ex ante structural changes in economic behaviour that result from the different information 
structure (Geraats 2006, p.114 and Geraats 2002, p.533). The source of the incentive effect is the 
desire of an agent with private information to influence the beliefs of others through signalling. The 
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important than transparency. That ‘how’ something is said is just as important as ‘what’ is 
said. The discussions on implementing transparency confirm that point, according to him. 
 The point of uncertainty discussed earlier plays a role here as well. The question 
that arises is ‘What to do when communicating uncertainty?’. To place this question in 
perspective, we can refer to work by Morris and Shin (2002). They assume that the central 
bank information is double edged: on the one hand it conveys information on the 
underlying fundamentals, on the other hand it serves as a focal point for the beliefs of the 
group as a whole. The authors claim that public information – in this case information 
offered by CBs and CBPs – carries the danger of being too effective. An overreaction to 
public information – not unlikely to happen in this media-sensitive time – can magnify the 
damage done by ‘noise’. The damage is done if this focal point is based upon ‘faulty 
judgments’, situations where central bankers do not have the privileged position to judge. 
If they give clear signals at these times, private agents might underestimate their own 
judgments and overreact to the communication of central banks. So, private agents do not 
act rationally when confronted with uncertainty. If, on the other hand, central bank 
presidents give a variety of signals, they might increase understanding, but reduce 
predictability (Blinder e.a. 2008, Ehrmann and Fratzsher 2005b). This point puts the vision 
of Poole and Mishkin (2004), which was mentioned in the previous section, in a specific 
perspective. They point out, as do Morris and Shin, that the chance to make ‘faulty’ 
judgments and the need for a focal point is likely to grow in times of uncertainty. Or as 
formulated by Kohn (2008):  
 
But we cannot say more than we know, and we should strive to avoid giving people the 
impression that we know more than we do. 
 
In short, when looking at the characteristics of predictability – the management of 
expectations – in central bank communication, we see that these characteristics differ. 
Geraats conceptualises predictability as openness about objectives, data, strategy, 
deliberation, decisions and implementation. Carpenter prefers to describe it as openness 
about instruments, implementations and goal(s). There are question marks to be placed 
here. Firstly there is effectiveness: ‘does openness always work as desired?’, or ‘does its 
                                                                                                                                            
response of the receiver of the signal could in turn shape the sender’s incentives and thereby affect 
the sender’s behaviour (Geraats 2002, p.536-537). 
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effect depend on the context?’ Secondly, there is overreaction: ‘does the public attach too 
much value to the words of central banks and their presidents?’ 
 
Specification of instrumentality 
Communication by central bank presidents is for an important part about one-way traffic. 
The central bank president, who knows more than the public, informs it. This way, 
information asymmetry is decreased. In communicating, a central bank president 
encounters things (uncertainty, overreaction, complexity) that hinder or disrupt this 
communication. This view of communication largely fits the process approach of 
information. This approach assumes a sender, a message and a receiver. If everything goes 
well, the receiver acts according to the intentions of the sender. If things go wrong, there is 
‘noise on the line’ and the connection has to be improved. In central bank communication 
the intentions of the central bank, and of the president who speaks, are unclear. What can 
be deduced based on the communication itself is that a central bank hopes that through 
communication (mainly done by the president) the expectations of the public are managed. 
It is desirable that the receiver of the information understands exactly what the sender 
wants to say. This might not be an easy task when talking about a complex economy with 
an evolving structure and which is constantly subject to unexpected developments (Kohn 
& Sack 2004, Issing 2000, Hämäläinen 2000). Simply informing the public is apparently 
not enough, there is ‘noise’ on the line. 
A form of noise is the fact that people are not ideal information processors. This 
means that a central bank should give thought to the question of what market participants 
most need to know and how best to express what it is trying to tell them (Woodford 2005, 
Winkler 2000, Rozkrut e.a. 2007). Geraats subscribes this critique by stating that simply 
giving symmetric information is not enough to be transparent; the parties must actually 
have the information (Geraats 2002). And ‘having information’ then also requires 
‘understanding information’ (Winkler 2000, Woodford 2005 [Italics, LNE]). To actually 
understand information, it must be processed, structured and condensed, simplified and put 
into context in order to become comprehensible (Winkler 2000). Stressing the importance 
of understanding also points to the social phenomenon of transparency (Winkler 2000). 
People need to share a common interpretation device (‘language’) for encoding and 
decoding a message and/or enjoy an education that offers the means for understanding 
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(Winkler 2000, Berardi and Duffy 2006).19 Such education can be taken care of by the 
central bank – at least partly, if it accompanies the information given with the model or 
line of reasoning which it is based upon (Berardi and Duffy 2006).  
These critical discussions about communication place transparency in a 
remarkable perspective. They show that transparency does not always imply visibility. If 
‘transparency’ is to have the desired effects, information has to be selected and edited. 
Furthermore, it is desirable that the public is educated to interpret information from a 
suitable frame of reference. The table below contains an overview of the theoretical 
interpretation of transparency and the criticism/discussion that is brought up. 
  
 Visibility Predictability Instrumentality 
Definition of 
criterium 
Symmetric information Multiple openness Process approach 
Obstacles for 
transparency 
Uncertainty 
Complexity 
Effectiveness  
Overreaction 
Processor of information 
Education 
Table 2-1. Transparency in academic literature 
 
2.5 Transparency in press conferences 
In the previous section, transparency and communication have been discussed based on 
academic literature on the subject. In this section we elaborate on the connection between 
transparency and communication, using the monthly press conferences of the ECB. We are 
looking for ways in which transparency is created in these press conferences, in addition to 
those in the academic literature. In relation to visibility, we wonder how this form of 
communication adds to the creation of information symmetry. In relation to predictability, 
we wonder how this form of communication provides openness on certain topics or the 
process. And in relation to instrumentality, we wonder how the relation between sender 
and receiver is shaped and how possible ‘noise’ is handled. 
 We have chosen the press conferences, because they are an example of 
communication in which the central bank itself is in control. The central bank determines 
both the way and time to communicate. The central bank has chosen a communication 
method of which the press conference is a part – and thereby the confrontation with the 
                                                        
19 A connection can be made here with utterances and information. The ‘common interpretation’ 
affects which utterances are seen as information.  
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public. This creates an interesting opportunity to study communication, because the public 
can react to what is said. 
 
Visibility in press conferences 
When talking about visibility, we again point to informing in order to eliminate or mitigate 
information asymmetry. This asymmetry is advantageous to the ECB, which has 
information that the public does not. The day of the press conference is an information day, 
because the public is informed by the ECB throughout the day. This starts with the 
announcement of the monetary financial institution (MFI)20 interest rate statistics as well 
as the long term interest rates statistics, and the publication of the Euro area investment 
fund statistics. Then, a press release is distributed in which the interest decisions are 
announced. For an example of a press release, see table 2-2. 
 
Press release June 6, 2007 (PR1) 
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:  
The minimum bid rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be increased by 25 
basis points to 4.00%, starting from the operation to be settled on 13 June 2007.  
The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be increased by 25 basis points to 5.00%, with 
effect from 13 June 2007.  
The interest rate on the deposit facility will be increased by 25 basis points to 3.00%, with effect 
from 13 June 2007.  
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press 
conference starting at 2.30 p.m. (CEST) today. 
 
Press release January 10, 2008 (PR2) 
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB decided that the minimum bid rate on the 
main refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit 
facility will remain unchanged at 4.00%, 5.00% and 3.00% respectively.  
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press 
conference starting at 2.30 p.m. (CET) today. 
Table 2-2. ECB press releases (PR) 
 
                                                        
20 These are interest rates applied by monetary financial institutions to deposits and loans vis-à-vis 
households and non-financial corporations.  
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In the press release, the press conference is announced as well. This press conference 
consists of an introductory statement and a Q&A. The introductory statement has five parts 
in total: economic analysis, monetary analysis, cross check, fiscal policy, and structural 
reform. The information given in the first part of the introduction (economic and monetary 
analysis) is factual. These facts are based upon statistical-scientific research and clustered 
into an economic and a monetary analysis. They form the basis for the decisions that are 
made and explained in the final parts of the introductory statement. The introductory 
statement is in its turn input for the Q&A during the press conference. To get an 
impression of the introductory statement, see table 2-3. Both quotes are part of the 
economic analysis. 
 
Introductory statement January 10, 2008 (IS1) 
The latest information on economic activity suggests that quarterly growth at the turn of the year was 
at a more moderate pace than the quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.8% observed in the third quarter of 
2007 (revised upwards from 0.7%). This assessment is in line with indicators for business and 
consumer confidence which, while declining over the past few months, generally remain at levels 
that continue to point to ongoing growth. 
 
Introductory statement February 7, 2008 (IS2) 
The latest information on economic activity around the turn of the year points to a more moderate 
pace of growth in the Euro area than the quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.8% observed in the third quarter 
of 2007. This assessment is in line with indicators for business and consumer confidence which, 
while having declined over the past few months, overall remain consistent with ongoing growth. 
Table 2-3. Two fragments of the introductory statement (IS) 
 
Looking at the press conferences through the academic literature (table 2-2), we can say 
that the public is informed on these days. 
Visibility is not only created by giving the information mentioned. For example, 
comparing the two press releases (PR1 and PR2) and the two introductory statements, we 
see that they use the same words and the same structure. Both press releases (PR1) and 
(PR2) are structured in a similar way: they start with the decision and end with the 
announcement of a press conference. If the message is the same, the same words are 
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used.21 This similarity can also be found when comparing the introductory statements (IS1) 
and (IS2). Because of this, ‘small’ differences are easily observed. 
 
The president of the ECB uses this mechanism when on February 7, 2008, he says that: 
 
[…] And if you compare the introductory statement with that presented at the previous 
press conference, you will see we insisted much more on the risks, […]. 
 
This comparability is then used, on a different subject, by one of the journalists present: 
 
[…] In the past you’ve acknowledged that the word ‘vigilance’ has a certain predictive 
power, […]. Does that word have the same predictive power when rates might be going 
down as it did when they were going up?22 
 
Apart from making differences visible, comparability also makes confirmation visible. 
When comparing the facts of both introductory statements, the facts of the February 
statement (IS2) can be seen as confirmation of the facts of the January statement (IS1). In 
January ‘information suggests that...0,8%’, in February ‘information points to...0,8%’.  
 Visibility is not limited to what is said and the differences between statements. It 
is also about what could be said. The potential of the press conferences lies in the 
possibility for journalists to ask ‘all’ questions that they want; the questions are not 
screened beforehand.23 Here, a comparison with the panopticum can be made. It is not only 
about what is visible, but also about what could be visible: potential visibility. 
 Finally, we see that visibility is not limited to informing, it can also be interpreted 
literally. The journalists and the public not only receive the information that can be found 
on the website the next day, but they also see the president and the vice-president in action. 
They observe how the president gives information. Furthermore, there is online visibility, 
                                                        
21 This press release is exactly the same as the one presented on February 7, 2008: 
‘At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB decided that the minimum bid rate on the 
main refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit 
facility will remain unchanged at 4.00%, 5.00% and 3.00% respectively. The President of the ECB 
will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 2.30 
p.m. (CET) today.’ 
22 Trichet by the way, does not want to answer this question ‘[…] I will not comment on vigilance in 
the other direction. No comment. […]’ (see also chapter 3, section 5). 
23 Source: department of communication, ECB (personal communication, April 23, 2010).  
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because the press conferences are broadcast live.24 This offers the opportunity to see how 
the central bank president and his public interact. 
 
Predictability in press conferences 
If we look at the press release and the press conference from the perspective of 
predictability, we see that they are shaped by the nature of the information that is 
distributed. This information makes clear what will happen now and in the future. By 
studying this, it becomes clear how visibility and predictability go together. 
 The categories named by Geraats can be found partly in the press conference and 
the information supplied on that day. The ECB focuses on openness about policy 
objectives. The president of the ECB repeatedly makes clear that it is about anchoring 
expectations of inflation. That is an unambiguous goal, or as Trichet says himself: 
 
[…] We have only one needle in our compass, as I have always said, which is that we have 
to deliver price stability in the medium turn (press conference, February 7, 2008).  
 
The second form of predictability, predictability in the economic context, can also be 
found. On the day of the press conference, much data and many forecasts are published, 
something the ECB does at other times as well. These have already been mentioned in the 
previous section. 
There is less openness regarding the procedures. It has been established clearly 
and long beforehand when the Governing Council convenes, but about these meetings 
themselves little is clear. Contrary to for example the Federal Reserve, the ECB does not 
publish minutes of the Governing Council meetings.25 The reason for this is that the ECB 
does not want decisions by the Governing Council to become subject of political games. 
The Governors, who are presidents of national banks, must be able to speak openly during 
these meetings. During the press conferences as well, Trichet is reluctant to share 
information about these meetings (see also chapter 3, section 5). He provides indications as 
to the content of the meetings, but he does not comment on the individual voting behaviour 
of the members. 
                                                        
24 See: http://www.ecb.int/press/html/index.en.html (retrieved June 8, 2010). 
25 The Federal Reserve publishes the minutes of the Federal Opening Market Committee three weeks 
after the meeting. See: www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm (retrieved 
August 24, 2010). 
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Question: […] you said that some voices favoured a rate increase. Would you repeat that 
sentiment this month, and feel free to elaborate if you want to tell us who favoured a rate 
increase? 
Answer: As I said, we discussed the pros and cons of increasing rates and of not increasing 
rates, and finally came to the decision – by consensus – that it would be appropriate not to 
increase rates and to communicate the strong message that I just gave to you.  
 
Fourthly, there is the policy context. This is about changes in the interest rate, and 
statements about likely future actions. We see that changes in the interest rate are 
announced, as in the press release. The ECB is more reserved when it comes to statements 
about likely future actions. When asked for this, the president points to the higher goal 
(inflation target) and also makes clear that he does not give pre-commitments. 
 
Trichet: […] we are always alert at any time and always ready to take the decision that 
would permit price stability to be delivered. That’s as simple as that[…]. We never said we 
are pre-committing to whatever monetary policy stance in the medium term or in the two 
months’ time, three months’ time or four months’ time. So, again, remain alert to make 
sure that we deliver price stability. 
 
Fifth, there is the market context and operational openness concerning the implementation 
of monetary policy actions, including a discussion of control errors for the operating 
instrument and macroeconomic transmission disturbances. According to Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), who compared several central banks on transparency, there is no formal 
discussion of past forecast errors and no explicit account of the contributions of monetary 
policy in the informal evaluation of policy outcomes the ECB provides.  
Concluding, we can state that the press conference meets a number of the criteria 
for predictability as defined in the academic articles, but not all of them (also Eijffinger 
and Geraats 2006 for an overview). 
 
The press conferences themselves shed a slightly different light on predictability. At the 
press conference of February 7, 2008, the president of the ECB gives the following answer 
when asked about predictability. 
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Question: […] Since the end of 2005 you have won lots of plaudits for being predictable, 
for we always knew a month in advance when rates were going to change. Is that going to 
remain the case? 
Trichet: Again, predictability for us lies in the fact that, at the moment of the decision of 
the Governing Council, surprises have been extremely rare – and that will certainly 
continue in my opinion. We are very clear on our own strategy, we are clear on our goal, 
and we are clear on our monetary policy concept. Everybody knows that we have only one 
needle in our compass. We have an arithmetic definition of price stability which is clear. 
And so there are a lot of good reasons why we are predictable. 
 
Predictability for the ECB lies mostly in the overarching story that it wants to tell. It is 
clear on its inflation target, ‘its’ goal, a goal that is often mentioned in the introductory 
statement, both in the introduction of the introduction and in the cross check (‘Reflecting 
its mandate, such anchoring is of the highest priority to the Governing Council’, January 
10, 2008 and February 8, 2008). It offers a framework to situate all the acts and the facts of 
the ECB, it gives the ECB an instrument to manage expectations (Blinder e.a. 2008, 
Rudebusch and Williams 2006, Rosa & Verga 2006). During the Q&A as well, this goal is 
frequently repeated (see table 2-4, and chapter 3 section 5). 
 
In the press conference held on January 10, 2008: 
Trichet: […] Decision makers know, and everybody knows that we are here to guarantee price 
stability in the medium term. That is clear. 
Trichet: […] the role of a central bank is to solidly anchor inflation. […] 
Trichet: […] again, we make a clear distinction between what we have to decide in order to deliver 
price stability, be credible in the delivery of price stability and continue anchoring solidly 
inflationary expectations. That is the policy stance. […]. 
Trichet: […] We will contue to consider our monetary policy stance with our primary goal of 
delivering price stability and being credible, and therefore anchor inflationary expectations, […]. 
Trichet: […] we will do what we judge appropriate to preserve price stability. 
Trichet: […] It is our responsibility as central bankers to continue to solidly anchor inflation 
expectations. 
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In the press conference held on February 7, 2008: 
Trichet: […] it is our mandate to maintain price stability, our primary goal. 
Trichet: So this is extraordinarily important because it is the only way we have to avoid the 
disanchoring of inflation expectations, the only way we have to be able to deliver price stability in 
the medium run, which is our mandate, our primary goal. 
Trichet: […] So, again, we remain constantly alert to make sure that we deliver price stability. 
Trichet: […] will allow us to deliver price stability in the medium run. And that is the point because 
it is our mandate. 
Trichet: […] What is certain is that we have an anchor. We have only one needle in our compass, as I 
have always said, which is that we have to deliver price stability in the medium term. 
Trichet: […] Everybody knows that we have only one needle in our compass. 
Trichet: […] Our job is very important and we take our decisions on the basis of our mandate. And 
our mandate – price stability – permits us very clearly to contribute – precisely through price 
stability, […] 
Trichet: […] There is a good criteria, which is to see exactly what you do in terms of anchoring 
medium term inflationary expectations, […]. 
Table 2-4. Trichet repeating  the mandate in press conferences 
 
Predictability seems to go hand in hand with repetition in this case. Just mentioning 
something seems to be insufficient: it has to be repeated. 
By referring to the higher goal, the ECB also created the freedom not to be pinned 
down on short-term predictability. This is clear from the remarks by Trichet quoted before, 
in which he says that he does not want to commit to pre-commitments (January 10, 2008). 
 
Question: […] What is for you the trigger to deliver? 
Trichet: When the Governing Council so decides. But that is not new. I have always said 
that we are constantly alert. And I have always that at any given time we will do what we 
judge appropriate to preserve price stability. […].   
 
By doing this, he creates room for the Governing Council to decide, just as he does by 
limiting openness on how the Governing Council decides. This means that predictability 
goes together with alertness and appropriateness, and that for the ECB president 
predictability means something different than it does for a number of academics. In the 
same press conferences, the president also changes this alertness to cautionary language. 
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Trichet says in both introductory statements that the ECB will act pre-emptively in order to 
make this happen or to prevent it from not happening. 
 
As in the case of visibility, with predictability not just what is said is important, but how 
and when as well. The press conferences and press releases offer enough regularity. They 
take place every month, on a fixed date and at a fixed time (2.30 PM.), which are made 
public about two years in advance and can be found on the ECB website. The press 
conference always consists of a 15 minute introductory statement and 45 minutes of Q&A. 
The structure of the introductory statement is predictable as well, because it has not 
changed since May 2003. It resembles the structure that was used before, although 
different terms were used: ‘first pillar’ and ‘second pillar’ instead of economic and 
monetary analysis. The day of the press conference always has the same form as well. 
First, there is the Governing Council of the ECB (at 9.00 AM). Then there is the 
publication of the monetary financial institution (MFI) interest rate statistics together with 
the long term interest rate statistics, and the publication of the Euro area investment fund 
statistics (at 10.00 AM). At 1.45 PM the press release announcing the interest rate 
decisions is distributed. 
At the press conferences there is unpredictability as well. This unpredictability 
lies not, or at least not only, in the remarks made by the president of the ECB. It lies in the 
questions asked by the public. 
 
Instrumentality in press conferences 
The instrumentality of communication is the important third point in the relation between 
transparency and communication. The roles seem to be clear: the president is the sender, 
the public is the receiver. 
 The introductory statement, combined with the Q&A, is expected to contribute to 
an increase in understanding of what the central bank president is saying, and thereby 
reduce technical noise and the (semiotic) misunderstanding. Technical noise has to do with 
the transfer of information from sender to receiver. In a telephone conversation, this form 
of noise can (for example) occur if the line is bad. Because sender and receiver are close to 
each other in the case of the press conference, and they work with proper audio equipment, 
there is virtually no technical noise. Considering the relation between the parties, there is 
mostly a lack of (semiotic) understanding at the receiving end. (The president himself does 
not ask any questions, after all.) The existence of a lack of understanding is firstly clear 
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from the fact that questions are asked at all. These are necessary, because the public does 
not completely understand the president’s words. In a number of questions, this lack of 
understanding is made explicit. Examples are: 
 
 Question: I’m a little puzzled. […] (January 10, 2008). 
 Question: Can you help me understand […] (January 10, 2008). 
 Question: I just wanted to make sure I understood […] (January 10, 2008). 
 Question: There is something I do not quite understand […] (February 7, 2010) 
 
Looking at the answers to these questions, we see that sometimes the ECB president ‘just’ 
explains matters. An example is the following question. 
 
Question: […] In other words, do you have a rule in mind, a rule for wage increases which 
are consistent with price stability? […] 
Trichet: […] I always say there are three parameters essential in normal times. […] present 
level of competitiveness, […] the level of unemployment […]. The third parameter is 
productivity […]. (January 10, 2008). 
 
The president of the ECB here explains the rule that can be used. Not all questions produce 
such clear answers, however. As noted before, the ECB president is very reserved when it 
comes to answering questions about the Governing Council’s deliberations. The journalists 
on the other side want information about who said what. The next questions and answers 
from the Q&A of January 10, 2008 illustrate this tension between what the public wants to 
know and what the president wants to tell. 
 
Question: Mr. President, what policy options did you discuss today and did the Members of 
the Governing Council vote differently? If so, could you please elaborate on the arguments 
they made. 
Trichet: […] Today, we took a consensus decision […]. Our message is very clear […]. 
That being said, I would say that we had a very important discussion, […]. 
 
But the public still wants to know more. The next question illustrates this: 
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Question: […], last month, you said that some voices favoured a rate increase. Would you 
repeat that sentiment this month, and feel free to elaborate if you want to tell us who 
favoured a rate increase? 
Trichet: As I said, we discussed the pros and cons of increasing rates and of not increasing 
rates, and finally came to the decision – by consensus – […]. 
 
And right after that, another question: 
 
Question: […] Would you say then the support for a rise this meeting was stronger than in 
December? 
Trichet: The only way I would describe it is that first we discussed those different 
possibilities and we agreed by consensus on both the decision and the message. 
 
It is clear that Trichet in this case is not going to give insight into who said what during the 
meeting. The voting behaviour is not the only thing he keeps to himself, though. In other 
domains as well, the ECB president refrains from giving comments. 
 
 Question: […] Would you agree that a strong pound was in Britain’s interest. 
Answer: […] I do not give advice to colleagues, […]. And so I will not say anything on the 
US policies or on the UK policies. (January 10, 2008). 
 
Or another example from the press conference of February 7, 2008: 
 
Question: I wondered if you could comment on what you expect from the G7 this weekend 
in terms of its foreign exchange statement. […]. 
Answer: On the G7 you know, because I always say that I do not comment myself in 
advance on the meeting of the G7. I will have a press briefing after the meeting of the G7 
in Tokyo. […]. […] at this stage, no comment. 
 
And from the same press conference: 
 
Question: I would just like to follow up on what you said on banking regulation. Would 
you subscribe to the view that a possible route might be […]? 
Trichet: […] I do not want to launch into the discussions that take place in the Basel 
Committee chaired by Nout Wellink, the governor of the central bank of the Netherlands, 
and the work of the Financial Stability Forum, […]. 
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What we see here then is that the press conference is not only about giving information, 
but also about limiting the domains in which information is given. On certain topics, the 
bank president stays silent. Even when he does know something (in the case of voting 
behaviour) or can be expected to know things (in the case of UK, US and G7 policies, and 
regulation). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The transition from a silent to a speaking central bank (president) is based on the 
assumption that communication creates transparency, and that transparency gives the 
central bank control and allows it to manage the public’s expectations. This chapter makes 
clear that the relation between communication and transparency is based on three 
assumptions: communication creates visibility and predictability, and it is instrumental.  
In the academic literature on transparency, these concepts are given meaning. 
However, there is no consensus on what these concepts mean exactly. Visibility for 
example, seen as creating information symmetry, is influenced negatively by uncertainty 
and complexity. Predictability is hurt by overreaction and a lack of effectiveness. 
Instrumentality suffers from the fact that the public is unsure of how to interpret the 
information. The information first has to be simplified and the public has to be educated, 
before it really understands what is said. This puts into doubt the process approach of 
communication. In this approach, primacy of the message is with the receiver. But we see 
here that the interpretation of the message is just as, or even more important than 
formulating it. These critical remarks on the relation between communication and 
transparency not only cast doubt on the relation itself, they also show that transparency 
itself is not transparent. Experts have differing opinions on the meaning of the term 
transparency.  
Looking at the ECB press conference, we see that the relation between 
transparency and communication is not self-evident there either. On the one hand, there is 
information that decreases information asymmetry, that makes clear what to expect from 
the central bank now and in the future, and information that makes clear to the receiver 
what the sender actually means. The press conferences also show that visibility and 
predictability should not be reduced to giving information on monetary policy. They also 
lie in the way the information is presented to the public: scheduled and structured and 
through a live press conference. A remarkable point that the press conferences show is that 
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central bank presidents do not always reduce information asymmetry. There are questions 
they do not answer, even though we know that they could. This applies for example to the 
meetings of the Governing Council, other banks’ monetary policy and policy domains of 
other organisations. From the perspective of transparency, this is odd. Withholding 
information sustains the existing information asymmetry. Furthermore, we see that a 
message that is well-known – the mandate of the ECB – is repeated constantly. This seems 
to indicate that the ECB president uses the press conference not only to answer questions 
by the press, but also to convey his own message. This message provides stability, for him 
as well as for the public. It gives the president the opportunity to provide a frame of 
reference for current and future problems. Everything is and will be done to realise that 
stability. Possibly, the central bank president tries to convey the importance of his message 
by repeating it, to transfer his frame of reference to the public. However, repetition also 
shows a weakness, because something that is clear and self-evident, and on which 
everyone will act, should not require it. 
Where transparency assumes that openness allows communication to work, we 
see that putting limits on communication can be productive. How this happens, is studied 
in the next chapter. This chapter also presents an alternative for the process approach of 
communication. Concluding, it can be said that communication creates openness, but that 
this openness is very limited. That there is communication, and how this communication is 
done, cannot be explained by a wish for transparency. A first study of central bank 
communication indicates that communication has more goals than only transparency. If we 
want to understand central bank presidents’ communication, we have to look for another 
perspective than transparency. 
 
2.7 Epilogue 
Let us return to the building of the ECB in Frankfurt. To a certain extent, the new building 
shows what communication is about. The first congruence between the building and rest of 
the ECB communication is that the building, just like a speech, makes the ECB visible. 
Aiming to become a landmark, the ECB does not want to make its visibility dependent 
upon the position of other buildings: the ECB wants to speak for itself. But what does one 
see when looking at the building?  
The building is made from reflecting materials. So when looking at the building, 
one sees oneself and the environment in which the building is situated. This means that the 
image the building reflects will be dependent upon the circumstances (the weather, the 
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surrounding buildings, and the people looking at it). The building, just as the 
communication of the ECB, does not proffer transparency. It interacts with its environment 
and casts it into an ECB mold. And finally the entrance hall of the building makes a strong 
statement. Here, the press conference room is situated. This is most likely to express the 
link between the ECB and the outside world and to stress the importance of 
communication. But it also has a hidden function. Putting the press conference room in the 
entrance hall prevents press and other people from crossing the ECB. Communication, just 
as the press conference room, is a way to shield the ECB from the outside world. One can 
imagine that continuously responding to the quest for transparency – by people and press 
running through the building – would frustrate the work that is being done. In this case as 
well, the ECB has to limit communication – without denying its importance – in order to 
be productive. 
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CHAPTER 3: REVEALING THE RULES OF CENTRAL BANK SPEECH 
What ECB communication and soccer have in common, and what not 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, transparency was the central point. The statement studied there 
was: communication works, because it creates transparency. Research was done from two 
angles: academic literature, and ECB press conferences. Based on this research, a number 
of conclusions can be drawn. The first is that what transparency is, is itself not transparent. 
Transparency is given different meanings by different parties, and its desirability is not 
ubiquitous. The press conferences were studied, because they are considered to be 
moments when the ECB president brings ‘being transparent’ into practice. What stood out 
in studying the press conferences was that the president indeed answered some questions, 
he provided some openness. But the president also made clear that he would not comment 
on some topics. Furthermore, it was striking that the president answered many questions 
by relating them to the ECB frame of reference – its mandate. Repeating this mandate had 
an almost educational character; if the public itself saw the relation, a large part of the 
communication would be unnecessary. Transparency in itself cannot explain this 
repetition. Apart from transparency it is about organising openness and about determining 
what, when and by whom things are – or are not – said.  
The limited explanatory potential of transparency can also be found when slips of 
the tongue are discussed. In this introduction, two examples are presented. The first 
example comes not from the ECB, but from the American central bank president, Ben 
Bernanke. In a statement before the Joint Economic Committee (April 27, 2006) he 
announced that ‘in the future the Committee may decide to take no action at one or more 
meetings…’. The markets reacted to these words as if the Fed would not raise the interest 
rate further. NBNC journalist Maria Bartiromo: ‘[...] asked him whether the markets got it 
right after his congressional testimony, and he [Bernanke, LNE] said, flatly, no’. This 
conversation took place at the annual dinner of the White House Correspondents 
Association (April 29, 2006). Bernanke may have thought that this conversation took place 
‘off the record’, but Bartiromo made the confession public. By doing this, she moved the 
dollar, and Bernanke was criticised for saying things he should not have said. Afterwards, 
Bernanke regretted his words and promised that ‘In the future, my communications with 
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the public and with the markets will be entirely through the regular and official 
channels’.26 
Another example is an interview that endangered the position of the former 
president of the European Central Bank, Wim F. Duisenberg.27 In the interview, the then 
well-known financial journalists Kaletsky and Paterson asked Duisenberg ‘whether it 
would make sense for central banks to get into the market if a sharp change in currencies 
was caused by war in the Middle East’. Duisenberg replied ‘I wouldn’t think so’. After the 
publication of the interview the decline of the Euro accelerated, and media attention rose to 
extreme heights. The gist of the critical stories was that the president of the ECB had 
disclosed information that should not have been disclosed. The resignation of Duisenberg 
was asked for, and he received the nickname ‘Dim Wim’. Had he really said something 
wrong? ‘Every currency trader could have been thinking what Duisenberg said’ wrote a 
Dutch newspaper.28 The problem turned out to be not what he said, but that he said 
anything. According to the informal rule, a central bank president should not comment on 
these kinds of interventions. By giving information about them, their power would be 
diminished (the market would anticipate them). 
What we see in these examples is that two central bank presidents give relevant 
and correct information to the markets. They are transparent, but the remarks are qualified 
as mistakes. They should not have said what they said because it limited the effectiveness 
of monetary policy (Duisenberg) or because they should not have made the information 
public in this manner (Bernanke). Like the ECB press conference, these examples show 
that communication by central bank presidents is not only about transparency. It seems 
more about determining what can and cannot be said. It is also about choosing the moment 
to say things; sometimes a central bank president can say certain things, while at others he 
is expected to remain silent. There seem to be rules (boundaries) when it comes to 
communication. If these rules are acted upon, communication has the intended effect, but 
if they are not, it creates resistance and disapproval. The assumed presence of these rules 
allows us to study central bank communication as a game.29 The statement formulated on 
this basis is the following: 
                                                        
26 Washington Post, ‘Fed Chief Calls his Remarks a Mistake’, May 24, 2006. 
27 The Times, ‘Duisenberg and the Quest for Stability’, London, October 16, 2000. 
28 De Volkskrant, ‘Het spijt me’, October 21, 2000. 
29 This can be related to Homo Ludens by J. Huizinga (1938 [1952]). Huizinga shows the structuring 
effect of the game. 
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Communication is not about words, it is about the possible effects words can 
generate in the communication game. 
 
This statement is examined as follows. In the following section (2) the theoretical 
framework of this section is laid out, in which the work of philosopher Michel Foucault is 
taken as a starting point. His work offers opportunities to see communication as a game, a 
‘game of truth’. A game in which he gives express attention to the role of power, meaning 
distinctions are made between what players can and cannot do.30 In his work he shows not 
only that words can steer and control behaviour, and that the use of words is limited, but 
also that words can steer because their use is restricted. This theoretical perspective 
assumes, contrary to the concept of transparency, the layers inherent in communication. In 
this way, it makes clear how the distinction between utterances and information is 
perceived. In section 3 the research design is discussed. In this section we explain how the 
theoretical framework of Foucault is studied using central bank communication about 
communication. This meta-communication is provided to us by ECB board members who 
since the beginning of the ECB have regularly discussed communication in public. Section 
4 contains an overview of the data sources that are used. Section 5 contains the results. The 
press conferences studied in the former chapter are in this chapter accompanied by other 
ways of communication, such as press releases, publications, statistical information, 
speeches and interviews. Section 6 concludes that the game metaphor gives insight into the 
do’s and don’ts of central bank communication. It also shows that the game that is played 
is a vulnerable game from a central bank perspective, because the interactive division of 
power is not always in its advantage.  
 
 
 
                                                        
30 See Oosterling 1996, p.397. See also Foucault 1989, p.310: ‘Question: […] I think what is at the 
centre of your last books is what you call a ‘play of truth’. Michel Foucault: ‘I don’t think there is a 
great difference between these books and their precedents. […] I have sought to analyze how fields 
like madness, sexuality and delinquence could enter into a play of truth, and how on the other hand, 
through this insertion of human practice and behaviour into the play of truth, the subject himself is 
effected.’ First, Foucault does not speak of games of truth, but of epistemes. These are mostly about 
answering the question ‘What is true?’. Later he introduces the concept of dispositives, after being 
criticised for the lack of power in epistemes. Games of truth are also called discourses.  
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3.2 Theoretical framework 
Mapping not just the restrictive character of rules, but also their productive character (why 
they work) can be done using a game of soccer. This game could not be played without 
rules – like most games. The rules determine what can(not) be done on the field, what the 
field is, what the players are allowed to do, when a goal is made,et cetera. A keeper is not 
punished if he takes the ball by his hands (within certain limits), but a regular player is. If a 
good player is benched, he cannot do anything. These rules give meaning to what happens. 
To seeing 22 players on a field with a ball, the label ‘soccer’ is immediately attached. The 
public knows what it means if a player kicks the ball into the goal. A big difference exists 
between attributing a yellow card to a player by a referee, a player of the opposite team or 
the spectators. Only in the first case does he actually get one. Someone who scores often, 
but only in practice games, can never become the official top scorer. Most of the time, the 
rules are implicit in the interaction on the field. The rules become explicit the moment they 
are infringed. The game then stops, a player is punished and the game goes on. That the 
rules are invisible during the game does not mean that they are difficult to find. The rules 
of the soccer game are written down by the International Football Association Board 
(FIFA) and they can be looked up by everyone.31 That the game is played according to 
certain rules does not mean that we know the outcome. Millions of people watch soccer 
every week. This is because soccer is an exciting game: the results cannot be known 
beforehand. There are only expectations. The actual results are dependent upon the 
interaction between players and circumstances (field, weather, spectators, atmosphere in 
the arena, referee, et cetera). 
If central bank speech is looked at from a soccer perspective, or more generally, if 
communication is looked at from a game perspective, words get embedded. Putting words 
into a game is productive, doing this adds meaning to the words, distributes hierarchy, and 
selects what should and should not be said. This line of thought seems to offer possibilities 
as to why Bernanke’s and Duisenberg’s words where considered a mistake. Not because 
they were not transparent, but because they did not play in accordance with the rules of the 
game. The same goes for Trichet’s refusal to answer questions that are not in his domain 
(chapter 2). Related to the soccer metaphor: a soccer player is not allowed to play 
basketball when he is on the soccer field. Seeing communication as a game also implies 
                                                        
31 http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/81/42/36/lawsofthegame_2010_11_e.pdf 
(retrieved August 23, 2010). 
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that we do not know what the outcome will be. Even if we understand what the players on 
the soccer field are doing, that does not mean that we know what the final score will be. 
Transformed to central bank speech, understanding what a central bank president says, 
does not mean that we act in accordance with his expectations.  
 The problem with this perspective is that the rules of central bank communication 
are not written down (as clearly) as the rules of the soccer game. The aim of the theoretical 
framework is to offer guidelines on how to make the implicit rules explicit.   
 
Foucault: interaction between words and actions 
For the theoretical framework the work of Michel Foucault (e.g. Foucault 1966, 1972, 
1975, 1976) is used.32 The work of Foucault was chosen, because it studies the interaction 
between words (discursive practices) and actions (non-discursive practices). This 
interaction is relevant to central bank presidents, because they intend to change the 
public’s actions (non-discursive practices) according to their expectations through 
communication with it (discursive practices). On a high level of abstraction, Foucault sees 
this as interaction between power and knowledge. Three questions have to be answered 
here: 
 
What can I know? (knowledge) 
What can I do? (power) 
Who am I? (subjectivity as interaction between knowledge and power) 
 
These questions are not answered in a universal way by Foucault. He shows that answering 
them depends on the dispositive (game of truth) in which we find ourselves. Each 
dispositive has its own answers to these questions. To put it simply, these questions are 
answered differently for soccer than for basketball, and if we want to understand what is 
productive in each game, we have to go deeply into the answers given within these games. 
Throwing a ball at a teammate has different meaning in different games; a good soccer 
player is not always a good basketball player. For the soccer game mentioned above, these 
questions can be answered easily. Knowledge and power lie within the rules of the game. 
                                                        
32 Foucault applies this work in a large number of domains. Examples are: The Order of Things 
(1996 [1994]), in which he studies (among other things) the life sciences and economics, Discipline 
and Punish (1975), in which he studies the penitentiary system and the system of punishment, and 
History of Sexuality (1967) in which he studies sexuality.  
46 
These rules determine whether someone is keeper, player, referee, linesman or supporter. 
The knowledge and power are also in the insight into the game and physical capabilities of 
the player; not every striker plays like Johan Cruijff. 
 Foucault himself does not pay attention to either soccer or basketball, but he does 
study different dispositives.33 Two of these recur often in various forms: a divine 
dispositive and a human sciences dispositive. These are discussed briefly here to show the 
difference between the two, and because Foucault gives an economic variant of both. This 
offers possibilities for using it for communication by central bank presidents. In the divine 
dispositive, knowledge resides with God, and man knows only what God ‘allows’ him to 
know, the knowledge that God shares with man. How much and what knowledge God 
actually has, is unknown to man. Actions in this dispositive are determined by the relation 
between man and God (a relation that is seen in various ways by different religions). Man 
can shape this relation in various ways: by praying, by reading texts and by being thankful 
for the life given to him by God. In the human sciences dispositive, the body of man and 
his actions are subject of study, a source of knowledge. What man does and does not do is 
then not determined by his relation with God, but is disclosed by human scientific 
research. This research provides guidelines on how man should behave: for example, what 
is normal, and what is healthy. Using this knowledge, man can train himself; for example, 
knowing that fruit is good for his health, he can incorporate this knowledge and eat fruit 
each day. If research shows that exercise is good, it makes sense to incorporate this into 
school programmes, and if research shows that people need natural light to function 
properly, architecture is changed accordingly. If people do this, they start to behave like 
‘normal’ people should. 
 Foucault studied the divine and the human sciences dispositive in different 
contexts. One of these is the penitentiary system. Here, Foucault shows how the laws of 
God – executed by the monarch as his representative on earth – are guiding in the choice of 
punishment. Punishments are then different from if people live (and are perceived to live) 
in a human sciences dispositive. In the first case, the focus is on corporal punishment and 
the death penalty. In the second case, it is on re-education and rehabilitation through 
training. Temporary seclusion in a prison or psychiatric institution can contribute to this. 
To link this to the title of the book (Discipline and Punish) in which Foucault describes the 
                                                        
33 See footnote 32. 
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birth of the prison, we can say that the divine dispositive is about ‘punish’, and the human 
sciences dispositive is about ‘discipline’. 
 Foucault also studied the workings of both dispositives in the economy. Starting 
point here is the concept of value. In a divine dispositive, it is about the value of land and 
gold; the earth has been given to us by God, as have the riches buried in it. In a social 
scientific dispositive it is not about the value in the ground, but about the value in each 
human being. Or to put it in terms of Marx, a representative of this school: it is about 
labour. Central bank presidents add an interesting perspective to this. In their case it is 
neither about gold nor labour, but about managing – or rather training – expectations. 
Through these expectations, a CB(P) intends to influence behaviour, control and stabilise 
the value of money. We see that a new dispositive is created; one in which not land or 
labour is central, but information (see also Noordegraaf-Eelens 2004, 2002). 34 This 
valuing of information can not only be seen with central bankers, but also in the 
‘information economy’. 35 In this dispositive, information is valued for its own sake. It is 
not just a means of talking about other values. Brand clothes are a good example of the 
value of information. Their production costs are negligible compared to the value added by 
the brand (the information). Central banks and their presidents are examples of actors who 
create value by informing. Their words can make share prices go up or down. In addition 
to managing expectations information in this dispositive also shapes, or as Giddens (1991) 
says, colonises the future. In an information dispositive, welfare no longer depends on 
resources or labour, but on information given about the economy. The anchoring of 
expectations is expected to contribute to effective monetary policy. To make this 
successful, it is important that everyone participates (Achterhuis 1988, p.275). 
 In this chapter we study this information dispositive by seeing how central bank 
presidents play their role in it through communication. Interesting here is the distinction 
made by Achterhuis between possessional power and normalisational power. This 
distinction also shows why creating information symmetry is not sufficient to make 
communication effective. Information symmetry is about possessional power, which 
means there is scarcity (Achterhuis 1988, p.255).  In this case that would mean scarcity of 
information. Central bank presidents have information – on certain topics – that others do 
not. Power can be redistributed by eliminating scarcity; in this case, by sharing 
                                                        
34 In Cyberspace Odyssee de Mul (2010) makes a comparable distinction between: technology of the 
tool, technology of the machine and technology of information. 
35 Other works that refer to this are for example Castells (1996) and Rifkin (2000). 
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information. Looking at transparency, its logic seems to be based on this logic. 
Normalisational power can be connected to Foucault: the power in dispositives is what 
makes people behave ‘as normal people’. Here we want to pay attention to the intention to 
‘normalise’ expectations, and through that, behaviour. We want to gain insight into the 
game of power and knowledge in which it takes place. Parts of this game have been 
discussed in the first chapter, giving a press conference with a clear division of tasks 
between central bank presidents and the public, the continuous repetition of the central 
bank’s mandate, and the hope of central bankers to anchor expectations through 
communication (and to sell this as transparency). We map this dispositive by linking to the 
inaugural speech of Foucault. In it, he systematically describes the ‘rules of the game’. He 
distinguishes three types of rules: rules of exclusion, rules of inclusion and rules of 
qualification. These rules each show how the combination of power and knowledge can be 
made concrete. 
 
The rules of the game 
Rules of exclusion determine the domain of speech. That way, they determine what can be 
and cannot be said, the distinction between true and false and the distinction between 
reason and folly.  
 
Rules of inclusion are about how and when things should be said. This cluster is about 
internal organisation: it brings in hierarchy, a unity or a specific way of reasoning 
(Foucault 1972), p.220-224). Specifically, this cluster consists of: 
Commentary: this creates hierarchy by assuming a primary text and a secondary 
text. 
The author: not the author in the sense of the individual who wrote the text in 
question, but the author as a unifying principle in a particular group of writings or 
statements, lying at the origin of their significance, as the seat of their coherence (Foucault 
1972, p.221).  
Discipline: disciplines are defined by groups of objects, methods, their corpus of 
propositions considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and 
tools: all these constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, 
or whoever is able to make use of them, without there being any question of their meaning 
or their validity being derived from whoever happened to invent them (Foucault 1972, 
p.222). 
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A third cluster contains the rules of qualification. These determine who can and cannot 
participate: “[ …] none may enter into discourse on a specific subject unless he has 
satisfied certain conditions or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so” (Foucault 
1972, p.224). It consists of: 
Rituals: rituals define the qualifications required of the speaker; it lays down 
gestures to be made, behaviour, circumstances and the whole range of signs that must 
accompany discourse. Finally, it lays down the supposed or imposed significance of the 
words used, their effect upon those to whom they are addressed, and the limitations of their 
constraining validity.  
Fellowship or doctrine. The function of a fellowship of discourse is to preserve or 
to reproduce discourse, but in order to circulate within a closed community, according to 
strict regulations, without those in possession being disposed by its very distribution. 
Doctrine, on the other hand, tends to diffusion: in the holding in common of a single 
ensemble of discourse that individuals, as many as you wish, could define their reciprocal 
allegiance.  
Education may be the instrument for every individual to gain access to any kind 
of discourse. At the same time, education also is about power relations, it teaches how 
actors relate to each other and what and who should be listened to.  
 
These three clusters of rules indicate what does and does not matter, they are selective. 
They also attach meaning to words by embedding them in a broader framework, they 
literally make sense. They also indicate who speaks when, and who should be listened to: 
they create status, they indicate the room to manoeuvre for the players. The rules of the 
games always have two sides: they are limiting as well as enabling. In this research we will 
study how these rules can be found within central bank speech. The underlying assumption 
being that they can tell us when words are productive and when they are not.  
 
3.3 Research design 
The research in this chapter aims to provide insight into the assumed relation between 
communication and the managing of expectations. We intend to do this by studying how 
the aforementioned rules are given meaning by the central bank’s communication, or rather 
by the ECB president’s communication. Following on the previous chapter, the research 
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here is limited to the ECB’s communication. Since its foundation in 1998, the ECB has 
been a great proponent of communication, and has communicated quite often. This 
legitimises the study of this communication and makes it possible as well. In the table 
below, the ways to find the rules of the game are displayed. 
 
Main types of rules Empirical observations 
Rules of exclusion 
What is the topic of discussion What is the main topic of the ECB speech? 
What does the ECB not comment on, when asked for? 
Rules of inclusion 
Commentary: primary/secondary text How much attention do media pay to the words of central 
bank presidents? 
How much attention do markets pay to words of central 
bank presidents? 
How do the media react upon ECB communication?  
Author: unifying principle Does the ECB repetitively refer to ‘a statement’ when 
speaking? 
Does the ECB speak with one ‘voice’?  
Discipline On which kind of knowledge is the ECB communication 
based?  
Is there an underlying shared assumption? 
Rules of qualification 
Rituals How are ECB interactions organised?  
Fellowship or doctrine  Does the ECB use terminology that can be understood by 
everyone, or can it only be understood by a limited 
number of people? 
Education Does the president of the ECB offer a framework to 
understand what he says? 
Table 3-1. Research design 
 
3.4 Data sources 
Important in studying the central bank dispositive is the double role of communication. In 
the examples discussed here – a divine and a social scientific dispositive – communication 
played a mostly implicit role. Language was used as a steering mechanism, but this was 
not communicated. In the case of central bank presidents’ communication however, it 
becomes clear that they use language to manage expectations. Communication is then not 
just an implicit, but also an explicit steering mechanism. 
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 The ECB communicates in various ways. Different moments of communication 
can be distinguished: press releases, interviews and speeches, press conferences, monthly 
bulletins, statistics pocket books, annual reports, convergence reports, financial stability 
reviews, weekly financial statements, quarterly financial statements, and (research) 
publications (e.g. Hämäläinen 1999, Blinder e.a. 2008). A number of the communication 
moments are scheduled and recur every week, every month, every quarter, every six 
months or every year. Others are not embedded that way, but are recurring. To give an 
impression of how much is said, the communication moments for 2008 are presented 
below.36 These moments are more (like press conferences) or less (like publications) 
interactive. 
 
Types of communication Number of occurrences (2008) 
Press releases 118 
Interviews and Speeches 151 
Press conferences37 12 
Other publications38 83 
Publications 253 
Total 617 
Table 3-2. Types of communication 
 
Besides these information sources, the ECB website also contains information on the ECB 
and its communication. Not all of these communication moments can be attributed 
exclusively to the ECB. This is the case mostly when board members and especially the 
president speak ‘on behalf of the ECB’. If we count the speeches and interviews over a 
period of 10 years, we see both an increasing number of speeches, and an increasing 
number of times when the ECB president speaks. (The 12 press conferences of the 
president and the vice-president not included). 
                                                        
36 There can be overlap between the different ways of communication. For example a press 
conferences is also announced in a press release. But the different ways of communication relate in a 
different way to the public. Communicating with the public in press conferences differs from 
communicating with the public by a press release. That is the reason all the ways of communication 
are presented.  
37 See: Trichet (2008c-2008n). 
38 These other publications consist of: monthly bulletins (12), statistic pockets book (12), annual 
report (1), convergence report (1), financial stability review (1), weekly financial statements (52), 
quarterly financial statements (4), see www.ecb.int (retrieved August 24, 2010). 
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Year Number of speeches 
by ECB board 
members (president 
included) 
Speeches by ECB 
president J.C. Trichet 
Speeches by ECB president 
W. Duisenberg 
 
2008 151 62 -  
2007 135 49  - 
2006 111 34  - 
2005 109 42  - 
2004 111 45  - 
2003 72 6 16 
2002 66  - 22 
2001 78  - 26 
2000 77  - 21 
1999 109  - 32 
1998 46  - 23 
Total 1065 238 140 
Table 3-3. Number of speeches by the ECB president and other board members 
 
A special category in regular communication is meta-communication by ECB board 
members. In this communication, board members reflect on the ECB’s communication. In 
the period 1998-2008, 19 speeches were given about the concept of communication and/or 
the closely related concept of transparency. They can be used as an information source on 
how the board members reflect upon communication. As an example of the second type of 
communication, the reflection of central bank presidents and board members on these 
topics will be studied.39  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39 Members of the executive board who gave speeches about communication and/or transparency are: 
J.C. Trichet, L.D. Papademos, L.B Smaghi, J.M. Gonzaléz-Páramo, W.F. Duisenberg, S. 
Hämäläinen, O. Issing. 
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Year Number of speeches by ECB board members about communication and/or 
transparency 
2008 4 
2007 6 
2006 1 
2005 1 
2004 1 
2003 - 
2002 - 
2001 1 
2000 2 
1999 2 
1998 1 
Total 19 
 Table 3-4. Number of speeches on communication 
 
Another form of speaking which is given special attention is press conferences. These 
receive attention, because they allow live interaction between the public and the president 
and vice-president of the ECB. These moments are relatively rare. Throughout the year, 
they take place on a monthly basis. The press conference is used by only a limited number 
of central banks, but seems to be effective. The press conferences organised by central 
banks are relatively recent, and seldom used (see Ehrmann and Fratzsher 2008).40 They are 
unique because the journalists present have the opportunity to question the president and 
the vice president, and current research shows that the press conferences are effective.41 
 
The mentioned forms of communication all start from the ECB’s perspective. In this 
chapter interaction is important, so we also look at the way in which the media react to 
ECB communication. (Do they even listen to what the president says?). Special examples 
of this are the slips mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. But for the most part, this 
                                                        
40 Regular press conferences to explain monetary policy decisions are currently held by the central 
banks of the Czech Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
ECB (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2008). 
41 The scheduled as well as the semi scheduled communication moments of the ECB are comparable 
to those of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. For a more detailed comparison see Blinder 
e.a. (2008). 
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chapter focuses on the attention given to ECB communication in the media (‘Do 
newspapers refer more to CBPs in weeks of ECB press conferences?).42 
A final source to make the rules of the game explicit consists of an academic 
reflection on central bank communication. Here, two review articles play a leading role: 
firstly, ‘Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness’ by Woodford (2005), and 
‘Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence’ 
by Blinder e.a. (2008).  
 
Main types of rules Data sources 
Rules of exclusion  
Topic of speech  General study: all sources 
Detailed study: press conferences 
Rules of inclusion  
Commentary: primary/secondary 
text 
 
General study: media attention for ECB,  
ECB research publications about market reactions  
Detailed study: press conferences  
Author: unifying principle 
 
General study: speeches on communication 
Detailed study: press conferences 
Discipline 
 
General study: speeches on communication 
Detailed study: all sources 
Rules of qualification  
Data General study: All sources 
Detailed study: press conferences 
Data General study: speeches on communication 
Detailed study: press conferences 
Education General study: speeches on communication 
Detailed study: all sources 
Table 3-5. Data sources used to study rules of communication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
42 A more elaborate reflection on the interaction between central bank presidents and the media can 
be found in chapter 5.  
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3.5 Results 
In this section the rules of the discourse will be presented step by step. The aforementioned 
sources will be studied along these lines. 
 
Rules of exclusion 
Rules of exclusion determine the domain of speech: they determine what can be said and 
what cannot be said, the distinction between what is true and what is false and the 
distinction between reason and folly.  
 
General study 
Rules of exclusion can be found most clearly in the independency central banks aim for; 
they want to be independent democratic institutions that keep political intervention out. So, 
politics should not comment on central banking practices and central banks should refrain 
from doing politics.43 This rule is put down in the Treaty establishing the European Union 
(The Treaty of Maastricht, article 108), and the statute of the ESCB (article 7). The first 
ECB president (Duisenberg 1998) memorizes it by quoting it in his first speech on 
communication ‘neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their 
decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from community institutions or 
bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body’ (Hämäläinen 
2001). According to Gonzalez-Paramo (2007) this rule is one of the great advantages of 
central banking. Due to their independency they can ignore the political furore and 
concentrate on the welfare enhancing objective of keeping inflation under control.44 In the 
daily practice it becomes clear that independency is not realized by putting it in a treaty or 
a statute, in its communication the ECB continuously has to guard this independency. A 
good example is the decision not to make public the voting behaviour of individual 
members of the governing council.45 The ECB defends this decision – which is often 
criticised – by arguing that publishing this information could put central bankers under 
political pressure, which in turn would threaten their independent judgement regarding 
                                                        
43 See: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/mission.en.html (retrieved May 10, 2010). 
44 Smaghi (2007) points to the fact that European countries often ask central banks to express their 
views on their countries’ budgetary policies. According to him politicians should accept this 
asymmetry.  
45 The governing council consists of the executive board of the ECB and the governors of the 
national central banks of the 16 euro area countries. 
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monetary policy (Papademos 2008). In contrast to the ECB, the Federal Reserve does 
make its minutes public, but it operates within a different political context. 
 
If we look at what is said on a general level, we see that the speeches and interviews 
mostly deal with general and current topics. They are held by ECB board members. 
Examples are: ‘Monetary policy communications and effectiveness’ (Papademos January 
2008), ‘The successful entry of Cyprus into the Euro area’ (Trichet January 2008), ‘The 
international role of the Euro and its potential in Latin America’ (Bini Smaghi, March 
2008), ‘Fostering sound financial globalisation: the role of Europe’ (Trichet, July 2008), 
‘What is the role of central banks for banking supervision?’ (Tumpel-Gugerell, September 
2008), ‘The financial turbulence: Where do we stand?’ (Trichet, October 2008). We saw 
that as the financial crisis worsened during 2008, more and more speeches and interviews 
addressed that topic.  
The statistics contain more technical information: their task is to support the 
monetary policy of the ECB. Examples of statistical information are: ‘Latest harmonised 
long-term interest rate statistics (LTIR)’, ‘Latest monthly outstanding amounts of STEP 
labelled debt securities’, et cetera. This information is seen as staff projections and the 
ECB does not automatically accept it, but takes a position with regard to it (see also press 
conference March 2008). In the press releases, announcements are made regarding 
monetary policy, but also visits to and by the ECB. They inform the public on dollar 
liquidity and voting procedures, but also on the 10th anniversary of the ECB, the new 
premises, and visits by other presidents to the ECB, or visits by the ECB president. Then 
there are the ECB publications. This is the scientific source of information. The 
publications are done under the umbrella of the ECB, but do carry the name of the 
researcher. The publications all address monetary ECB topics. They show how the ECB 
produces its own knowledge, and have topics like ‘The topology of the federal funds 
markets’ and ‘government size, competition, volatility and economic growth’. All these 
forms of communication show on which topics the ECB speaks. They also show the topics 
it does not speak on, which is a lot. Apart from the fact that the ECB does not enter into 
political discussions, it naturally stays silent on other policy themes like health, safety, 
education, et cetera. It would be peculiar if an ECB board member did speak on such a 
topic. However, there are other things as well – within the ECB’s domain – about which it 
stays silent. 
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Detailed study 
This is why it is interesting to look on a more detailed level at why a central bank president 
does not speak within his own domain. What does a president not comment on regarding 
monetary policy? We were confronted with this question in the previous chapter as well, in 
dealing with transparency (see chapter 2, section 5). This question is answered by studying 
all the ECB press conferences in 2008. The press conferences differ from other forms of 
communication in that the ECB not only speaks to, but also with the public. With regard to 
the topics it does and does not speak on, the press conferences are interesting, because 
questions are asked during them that the ECB president does not answer. 
 
Date What the president does not speak about 
January 2008 Question about the weakened pound:  
[…] I do not give advice to colleagues, […]. And so I will not say anything on 
the US policies or on the UK policies. 
February 2008 Question about: the meaning of the word vigilance 
I will not comment on vigilance in the other direction. No comment. […]’ 
Question about: expectation of the G7 
On the G7 you know, because I always say that I do not comment myself in 
advance on the meeting of the G7. I will have a press briefing after the meeting 
of the G7 in Tokyo. […]. 
Question about: banking regulation.  
[…] I do not want to launch into the discussions that take place in the Basel 
Committee chaired by Nout Wellink, the governor of the central bank of the 
Netherlands, and the work of the Financial Stability Forum, […]. 
March 2008 Question about: staff projections 
[…] I always say when we publish the staff forecasts that these are the staff 
projections. They are made under the responsibility of the staff, with a 
methodology that you know, and we at the level of the Governing Council do 
not underwrite the staff projections. 
Question about: dollar weakness and commodity prices 
We are certainly living in a universe where the weakness of some currencies 
can be associated with the weakness of domestic features, but I will not 
comment on particular currencies. 
April 2008 Question about: concerns of the market about growth and inflation. 
As you know, I never comment on the day to day evolution of markets in 
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general, and much less so in real time at this very moment! 
Question about: exchange rate 
This is a matter for reflection and meditation, but as you suggested, I’m not 
particular eloquent on the exchange rates. And I will remain disciplined, 
because in this domain verbal discipline is of absolute essence.  
May 2008 Question about: forecasts/outlook 
But I do not want to anticipate what our staff will present next time. It is work 
in progress, and a number of new pieces of information are coming. 
June 2008 Question about: voting behaviour 
What counts is what the college decides and what the college thinks, not any 
individual, but the full body of the Governing Council. 
Question about: Euribor rate that hit another high. 
I will not comment now. 
Question about: price stability in the medium turn (18-24 months?). 
But I don’t give you a precise number of months. I give you a range from 18 
months to two years.  
Question about: market reactions. 
[…] I never comment. […] I think it would be totally absurd for me to 
comment in real-time on market reactions.  
Question about: voting behaviour. (Can you tell us how close the call was.) 
No.  
July 2008 Question about: future rate hikes 
We make no pre-commitment on the medium turn and we do always what is 
necessary to deliver price-stability in line with our definition in the medium 
turn. 
Question about: is the market right rates at the end of the year 
I never comment on future markets 
Question about: concern amongst politicians about ECB policy 
No, I have nothing to say on what you said about those who have given us 
advice. We are an independent institutions. Everybody knows we are an 
independent institution. 
August 2008 Question about: Sarkozy mentioning that the meetings should be published. 
I myself do not comment on rumours or leaks that are not confirmed. 
September 2008 Question about: a colleague’s declaration 
[…]. As you know, I’m the only one who speaks on behalf of the Governing 
Council 
Question about: the weight of the oil price in the calculations 
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I cannot give you at this state a position of the Governing Council as regards 
the degree to which we would consider that […] 
Question about: the inflation average in 2010 
I am not going to qualify the average. 
Question about: tendency among financial market observers 
As regards the assumption that market participants or traders or investors can 
make, I leave to them the responsibility of their assumption. 
Question about: the reaction of the US authorities. 
I don’t make any judgment on their fiscal policy and as you know certainly not 
on their monetary policy. 
October 2008 Question about: rate cut at the next meeting 
It will be a great pleasure for me to tell you at that point in time what we’ve 
done. 
Question about: the lucidity of financial markets 
[…] I never comment on the immediate reactions that the introductory 
statement could trigger in the market.  
Question about: a reasonable outcome from a meeting with EU leaders 
I don’t want to prejudge – as you know, I never say in advance when I 
participate in any meeting what the meeting will produce. 
Question about: decreasing the deposit facility interest rate 
I will not comment on any modification of the deposit rate. We confirm the 
present level of the deposit rate. 
October 2008 Extra meeting - rate cut. Together with other Central banks 
November 2008 Question about: markets expecting another rate cut 
I would only say, as you mentioned earlier, we never pre-commit: we always 
do what is appropriate to be able to tell our fellow citizens that we will deliver 
price stability in the medium term according to our mandate. 
Question about: markets are pricing in another rate cut 
On the future decision – again – we never pre-commit. 
Question about: would it make sense to go lower, or use other tools as well 
I expect you will ask this question again at our meeting in Brussels, and I will 
be delighted to tell you what we do next time. 
Question about: volatility with regard to the Swiss Franc 
[…] this is off course the main issue of our Swiss friends and colleagues. […] I 
have nothing to tell them and no particular advice to give them, but I’m sure 
that they are doing what is appropriate. 
December Question about: market expectations 
I will not comment in any respect on what we will do next time 
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Question about: rationale behind not laying out more clearly where you will go 
from now as other central banks have 
So let us not compare what is not comparable. We are all doing what we 
believe is appropriate. And we are not in exactly the same situations.  
Question about: quantitative easing  
[…] if new decisions are needed, we will take new decisions. But at this stage I 
cannot say anything else. 
Question about: confusion in the market 
Again, I will say at this stage I have no further indications to give. 
Question about: possible changes to the deposit facility 
As I have said, I will rule nothing out, but at the same time I’m not pre-
committing to anything. 
Table 3-6. What the ECB president refuses to comment on 
 
The president determines the topics on which he speaks as representative of the central 
bank. We see that these limitations of his own speaking not only happen if he enters the 
domain of politics. He is also reticent in giving comments about decisions by other 
authorities and other players (markets, staff projections). Furthermore, through these 
limitations, he tries to keep the future open and not give any pre-commitments. He also 
creates room for other players to play in their own way. 
The slips of the last ECB president and the Federal Reserve president (Bernanke) 
show the other side of the medal. They show that it is the public that silences the president, 
not the president himself. In both cases the president chose to provide openness, but in 
both cases the public was critical about his remarks. 
 
Rules of inclusion 
A second cluster contains the rules of inclusion, which is about how and when things 
should be said. This cluster regards internal organisation, it brings in hierarchy, a unity or a 
specific way of reasoning (Foucault 1972, p.220-224). Foucault adds three ways for this 
cluster to manifest itself: commentary, the author, and discipline. 
Commentary is about the hierarchy between texts. It consists of a primary, top-
heavy original text. This heaviness permits one to create new stories ad infinitum. But 
these endless stories seem to be guided by one final aim, to disclose what has been 
articulated deep down (Foucault 1972, p.221).  
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General study 
To get a general indication of the attention given to the ECB president’s speaking, we 
study the attention given to it by the media. Articles, in which the ECB president is 
referred to, have been collected over a period of two years. On average the ECB president 
is referred to 40 times in weeks with a press conference and only 17.19 times in weeks 
without a press conference. That there is much more attention for the central bank 
president in weeks with a press conference is also shown by the Mann-Withney U-test. We 
use this non-parametric test, because we do not know what distribution the number of 
articles has. Furthermore, we intend to compare the number of articles in two groups of 
non matched-pairs observations. We order all observations from both groups based on size 
and then assign ranks to them. The ranks of weeks with a press conferences are more than 
double the ranks of weeks without one, and this difference is significant. It also suggests 
the ECB president getting more attention in this week. The table below summarises the 
results. 
 
Mann-Whitney U-test 
 
Average attention per category 
Weekly averages Average ranks 
U-
statistic 
Standardized 
value (P- value) 
Weeks without 
press-
conference 
(78 in total) 
Weeks with 
press-
conference 
(24 in total) 
Weeks without 
press-
conference 
(78 in total) 
Weeks with 
press-
conference 
(24 in total) 
151.5 -6.19 (0.000) 17.19 40.17 41 84 
Table 3-7. Attention in weeks with and without press conferences 
 
Looking at the discussion around it, the kind of attention, we see that the articles varyingly 
use a selective, a factual and an interpretive approach for the press conferences (‘ECB 
verlegt focus naar groeirisico’s, Het Financieele Dagblad February 8, 2008, 
‘Aandelenmarkt reageert fel op ECB’ Het Financieele Dagblad February 8, 2008, ‘ECB 
stelt monetaire koers bij’ Het Financieele Dagblad February 8, 2008, ‘Een andere koers’ 
Het Financieele Dagblad February 9, 2008). 
 
Aside from the media, the markets react to the press conference as well. The conclusion 
drawn in many of ECB articles on communication is that ECB communication indeed 
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influences the market, and that the degree to which this happens depends on the 
circumstances: the markets do what the president says. However, words of central bank 
presidents might not be able to reach the general public (Ehrmann e.a. 2009), might be 
more effective in times of great uncertainty (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b), diversity in 
communication might frustrate effectiveness (Ehrmann and Fratscher 2005 a), et cetera. 
Put differently, under certain circumstances and within certain restrictions markets do 
behave more or less in accordance with the intentions of the central bank.46 From that 
perspective, the press conference is considered to be a valuable way of communicating 
(Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2008). It offers the opportunity to explain decisions and in that 
way increases the chance that the words of central bankers are incorporated by their public 
(Winkler 2000, see chapter 2 section 4). 
 
Detailed study 
On a small scale, we see this interplay between primary and secondary texts in the monthly 
press conferences. This can be seen mostly in the role division. The central bank president 
speaks: he gives an introduction and answers questions. Journalists are offered the 
opportunity to question the introductory statement. This Q&A lasts three times as long as 
the introductory statement and the journalists want to know what the ECB president really 
means. Questions posed at a press conference like ‘Given the clues you have given in the 
opening statement…would we be correct in saying that you changed your main scenario’ 
and ‘If things turn to the worst, who would be the lender of last resort […]’, […] if you are 
prepared to act pre-emptively […]. Why not act?’47 are about making clear what the 
president is saying (see also chapter 2). 
 
That there are primary and secondary texts, however, does not necessarily mean that there 
is one-way traffic. Central banks and their presidents also react to what happens in 
markets, and markets can ‘force’ them to take action. This interactivity can be seen in 
remarks by Trichet such as ‘Consequently, we (the Governing Council, LNE) will monitor 
very closely all developments. The Governing Council remains prepared to act pre-
emptively so that second-round effects and upside risks to price stability do not materialise 
and, […]. (Trichet, press conference, January 2008). 
                                                        
46 For a diversity of articles see for example the special issue of the European Journal of Central 
Banking (2007, 23 (1)). 
47 The questions are posed in the press conference held February 7, 2008. 
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Central bankers are aware of the power of commentary in the media as well. They 
acknowledge that a ‘bad’ perception by the media can be detrimental to their policy. 
Trichet (2008a) expresses this as follows: ‘European media and many other intermediaries 
play a decisive role in the process of disseminating information about the ECB’s monetary 
policy. Media coverage of the monetary policy actions is an important channel of the 
ECB’s communication strategy, and thus an important factor of our policy’s success’. 
It should be noted that the hierarchy between primary and secondary does not 
imply that the primary text is automatically the most effective one. Although this is what 
central bank presidents aim for, the slip of Bernanke mentioned in the introduction shows 
another relation between the two. When Bernanke said that ‘The Fed could decide in one 
or more meetings to take no action’, the markets assumed that what he really wanted to say 
is that the Fed was done with raising the interest rate. Bernanke did not agree with this 
secondary interpretation of his primary text, and disclosed that to a journalist.  
 
 The second rule of inclusion regards the author. Not the author in the sense of the 
individual who wrote the text in question, but the author as a unifying principle in a 
particular group of writings or statements, lying at the origin of their significance, as the 
seat of their coherence (Foucault 1972, p.221).  
 
General study 
The rule of the author is expressed in the quest for ‘one voice’. According to Blinder 
(2008) this one voice is required to enlighten the public. The president of the ECB is the 
one voice who speaks on behalf of the Governing Council, as he says himself when asked 
to comment on a declaration of a colleague ‘[…] as you know, I’m the only one who 
speaks on behalf of the Governing Council’ (Trichet, Press Conference, September 2008). 
Speaking with one voice reduces noise in the communication. If all the executive board 
members are speaking instead of one, ‘there is a danger that too many disparate voices 
might confuse rather than enlighten the public…especially if the messages appear to 
conflict’ (Blinder 2008).The ECB board realises this one voice principle by genuinely 
communicating collegially (Blinder e.a. 2008).48 The importance attached to the one voice 
principle is also related to the diversity of the public the ECB addresses (one voice-one 
                                                        
48 This is opposed to the Fed which according to Blinder e.a. (2008) communicates in an 
autocratically collegial way and the committee of the Bank of England which uses an individualistic 
style of communication. 
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ear). When one intends to reduce noise (uncertainty or confusion) it should be taken into 
account that central bank communication is also a two-way street: it must have both a 
transmitter and a receiver (Blinder 2008). Trichet (2005) considers it a challenge to speak 
simultaneously to so many cultures, and to make sure that you are understood in the same 
way by all of them. So the ‘one voice’ seems to be looking for ‘one ear’.  
Trichet also realises this is no easy job. He publicly doubts the possibility of this 
one voice, one ear principle when starting a speech on communication with this citation of 
Goethe: ‘Niemand würde in Gesellschaften viel sprechen, wenn er sich bewusst ware, wie 
oft er die anderen missversteht’ (Trichet 2008c). What shows up here is the reciprocity of 
communication: ‘communication changes reality and its perception, and in turn, the 
changed reality has an impact on the originator of the message’ (Issing 2006). So the 
unifying principle of the author is put under pressure by speaking. 
 
Detailed study 
Looking at the central bank president’s press conferences through this perspective, we see 
that the unifying principle can be found in the fact that Trichet is the one who is speaking 
on behalf of the ECB. It can also be found in the mandate. The ECB president keeps 
repeating this mandate. He starts every introductory statement with it, by using a variation 
like: ‘The firm anchoring of inflation expectations over the medium and long-term is of the 
highest priority to the Governing Council, reflecting its mandate’ (Trichet, press 
conference, February 2008). Another point often referred to is that the ECB has one needle 
in the compass, price stability or inflation (see also chapter 2 for situating this 
contextually). To give a better idea of how often it is mentioned, an overview of the 
numbers can be found below. In the case of the introductory statement, only remarks by 
the ECB president are counted. In Q&A we see that the ECB president does far more 
referring than his public. 
 
 Mandate Price stability Inflation One needle Total 
Introductory 
Statement 
14 133 162 0 309 
Q&A 
President ECB 
54 180 137 23 394 
 
Q&A 
Public 
8 27 98  0 133 
Table 3-8. Overview of references to the ECB’s mandate 
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A third rule of inclusion is discipline. Disciplines are defined by groups of objects, 
methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the interplay of rules and 
definitions, of techniques and tools: all these constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely 
available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without there being 
any question of their meaning or their validity being derived from whoever happened to 
invent them (Foucault 1972, p.222).  
 
Looking through this perspective at what the central bank president says, the table above 
can be filled in differently. 
 
Type of communication 
 
Discipline required to understand and situate 
what is said 
Press releases Monetary economics (most press releases) 
Common sense (f.e. visits of other authorities 
and the central bank) 
Interviews and Speeches General, high educated, public 
Monthly bulletins, statistics pocket books, annual 
reports, convergence reports, financial stability 
reviews, weekly/quarterly financial statements 
Statistics 
Monetary economics 
Financial economics 
Research Publications (Financial) Economics 
Press conferences Financial-economically educated public 
Table 3-9. Disciplines related to types of communication  
 
To position the information given by the central bank presidents, statistics, as well as 
monetary and financial economics are important. The introductory statements of the ECB 
president contain a monetary and an economic analysis, and relate to the (statistical) staff 
projections. 
 That speaking is mostly done in these terms does not mean that either speaking or 
the economic system can be reduced to these disciplines. The rules of these disciplines are 
guidelines to the behaviour of central bankers and their publics. But Greenspan also pays 
attention to other kinds of knowledge. By mentioning ‘human psychology’ and ‘inflation 
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psychology’ he shows that central banking is not only about monetary and financial 
economics, but also about psychology.49  
With regard to this section one assumption should be highlighted, the assumption that lies 
at the basis of the paradigm shift towards communication: the assumption that expectations 
can be managed by communication (see also Blinder 2008). This assumption is 
foundational and binding for the communication by central bank presidents, and finds its 
basis both in economics and in sociology.50 This assumption is not questioned, neither by 
academics, nor by practitioners. It is subscribed to by Trichet (2008a) when he states that 
‘academic research had (in the 90s) made important advances in permitting to understand 
better the decisive role of transparency in establishing credibility of central banks and in 
helping them to solidly anchor inflation expectations’ and by Woodford when stating that 
‘Thus the public’s understanding, not only of what the central bank is currently doing, but 
of what it can be expected to do in the future, is crucial for the effectiveness of policy’ 
(2005, p.4). It is for that reason that Otmar Issing (Issing 1999) considers communication 
to be the third (hidden) pillar of monetary policy (see also Gonzalez-Paramo 2007), and the 
numerous communication moments of the ECB seem to support this assumption. 
Paradoxically it is also with regard to the future that communication seems to fail, 
or to have the least potential. Central bankers themselves do not (exactly) know what to 
expect. Central bankers admit that they face uncertainty, that they can find it difficult to 
reach agreement about the appropriate path of future policy rates, and that they repetitively 
question whether the markets and the public will fully understand the conditionality of the 
announced future policy path as it is too complex to communicate (Papademos 2008, 
Blinder 2008, Woodford 2005, Hämäläinen 2001). They fear that if they do not live up to 
their own communicated expectations, they will lose credibility (and thereby the 
possibility to manage expectations in the future). 
 
 
                                                        
49 See for example two speeches referring to human psychology respectively investor psychology: 
Alan Greenspan (1998) ‘Question: Is there a new economy?’ At the Haas Annual Business Faculty 
Research Dialogue, University of California, Berkeley, California, September 4. And Alan 
Greenspan (2002), Economic volatility, At a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 30. 
50 In sociology this can be found in the work of MacKenzie (2006, 2007 ). He uses the concept of 
performativity to point to the relation between thoughts about reality and reality itself. Another 
sociologist related to this topic is Merton. In his Social theory and Social Structure (1949) he 
introduces the self fulfilling prophecy and relates it to a bank run (see also chapter 5, section 2). 
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Rules of qualification 
A third cluster contains the rules of qualification. These determine who can and cannot 
participate: ‘[ …] none may enter into discourse on a specific subject unless he has 
satisfied certain conditions or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so’ (Foucault 
1972, p.224). They consist of rituals, the distinction between a fellowship of discourse and 
doctrine, and education. 
Rituals define the qualifications required of the speaker; it lays down gestures to 
be made, behaviour, circumstances and the whole range of signs that must accompany 
discourse. Finally, it lays down the supposed or imposed significance of the words used, 
their effect upon those to whom they are addressed, and the limitations of their 
constraining validity. 
 The speaker in this case is the central bank president. He speaks on behalf of an 
institution mandated to control price stability. This institutional position distinguishes the 
ECB president from other players in the field, and it gives his words a different meaning. If 
the president says the interest is going up, then that is actually the case.51 The primary 
position of the president comes through in the significance of his words, the words of a 
central bank president are – compared to statements of other board members – considered 
to be most influential (Ehrman and Fratzscher 2007). Or as the ECB itself puts it: ‘By 
virtue of its monopoly, a central bank is able to manage the liquidity situation in the money 
market and influence money market interest rates’.52  
 On a detailed level we see those different positions in the way in which the ECB 
relates itself to the public. The ECB determines when speaking takes place, how long and 
by whom. In the discussion of primary and secondary texts it was already mentioned that 
the central bank president speaks and the public asks questions. However, the journalists 
attending the press conference are free to ask the questions they want. Which journalists 
attend the press conference is up to the medium to decide. Journalists who want to have an 
interview with Trichet hand in a proposal including a general outline. If they are selected 
to have the interview, they hand in the questions they have in mind. That however does not 
mean that only these questions can be asked; during the interview there is also room for 
                                                        
51 With a time lag of a six days, as announced in the press release. 
52 See: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/operational/html/index.en.html (retrieved June 8, 
2010). 
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unannounced questions. Before the interview is published, the quotes used in the interview 
should be authorised by Trichet.53  
 Remarkable for the ECB is that, contrary to many other central banks, it organises 
interaction. The American Federal Reserve communicates in a given way to its public. 
Until recently, the FED had never given a press conference, and its president did not give 
interviews. Since the financial crisis, there has been a call for change at the FED as well, 
possibly because of the assumption that interaction enables the president to more 
effectively manage the public’s expectations (see Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2008). 
 
Who and how many people are qualified to join the discussions? Is central bank speech 
reserved for a fellowship of discourse or is it a doctrine? The function of a fellowship of 
discourse is to preserve or to reproduce discourse, but in order to circulate within a closed 
community, according to strict regulations, without those in possession being disposed by 
its very distribution. Doctrine, on the other hand, tends to diffusion: in the holding in 
common of a single ensemble of discourse that individuals, as many as you wish, could 
define their reciprocal allegiance. Central bank communication seems to be a fellowship of 
discourse as well as a doctrine.  
 Striving for a doctrine can be seen in the wish to be transparent, but also in the 
many references by the ECB president to the EU citizens. ‘He is the president of 320 
million people’. In the press conferences (given in 2008) he does so 19 times. It is also 
clear in the speeches by Trichet: ‘In other words, it is the duty of the independent central 
banks to be transparent and to communicate not only with specialized publics, such as 
financial market participants, but also with the public at large’ (Trichet 2008a). Finally, the 
doctrine can be found in the mandate, which is repeated continuously as mentioned before, 
and which is understandable at a general level for a large public. 
 If, however, the dictionary is taken to hand, we see that it contains much jargon 
and presupposes prior knowledge. What is meant, for example, by sentences such as: ‘At 
the same time, the underlying pace of monetary expansion has remained strong but had 
continued to show further signs of declaration’ or ‘Turning to the monetary analysis, the 
annual growth rates of broad money and credit aggregates, while still remaining strong, 
continued to decline in September’ and ‘A closer examination of the money and credit data 
indicates that the recent intensification of financial tensions has already had an identifiable 
                                                        
53 Source: department of communication, ECB (personal communication, April 23, 2010).   
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impact, particularly in the form of outflows from money market funds and greater inflows 
into overnight deposits. However, the full impact of investors’ uncertainty on their 
portfolio allocation behaviour is still to be seen in the coming months’ (Trichet, 2008m).  
A tension exists between the complexity of monetary policy and the quest for 
simplicity. Hämäläinen (1999) remarks that the two-pillar monetary policy strategy has 
been criticised for being too vague and too complex. She also notices the expectation (of 
the public) that the ECB uses a very simplistic strategic and communication framework in 
a complex world (Hämäläinen 2001). Another problem is the quest for ‘hard’ targets when 
it comes to future policy combined with the fear that the conditionality of statements 
regarding the future is not understood (Blinder e.a. 2008), or that it puts central banks 
under pressure as they become reluctant to disappoint market expectations (Gonzalez-
Paramo 2007).  
 
Education is the third and last example of rule of qualification. It may be the instrument for 
every individual to gain access to any kind of discourse. Those who do not understand 
what is being said are excluded. An educational system does not only provide access, it is 
also a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the 
knowledge and the powers it carries. 
When it comes to central bank communication, both aspects of education show 
up. The point of access is most explicitly related to communication. Duisenberg (1998) 
started with it by stating that ‘in the future there will also be many speeches to the public 
and statements to the press – will clearly promote the understanding of monetary policy 
objectives, intentions and actions’. Trichet (2005) subscribed to the words of his 
predecessor by saying that ‘the central bank’s communication should ensure that markets 
understand the systematic responses of monetary policy to economic developments and the 
current assessment of the central bank […] and ‘perhaps the best a central bank can do is to 
‘teach’ the markets its way of thinking’ (Blinder 2008, Winkler 2000). The education 
contains education of monetary theory, as for example the course on inflation developed 
for students by the ECB. It also contains education on communication. The ECB also 
provides a course to journalists several times a year. During two days, the journalists are 
lectured by experts on monetary strategy, monetary instruments, statistics, the financial 
crisis, et cetera. They offer background knowledge for the journalists.54 A number of 
                                                        
54 Source: department of communication (personal communication, April 23, 2010). 
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speeches on how communication works, were addressed to a media public. The advantage 
for policy of both forms of education is that the public listens better to the ECB and 
behaves accordingly. By making it familiar with the ECB’s thoughts and by making sure 
that the journalists tell the ECB story in the ‘correct’ way.  
The following forms of education can be found at the ECB: explanation of the 
methodology behind the statistics, the development of a body of knowledge by the 
publications, the continuous repeating of the mandate and the development of an 
educational programme on inflation.55 We also see that the ECB extensively explains its 
statistical research.56 
  
Main types of rules Results 
Rules of exclusion 
Topics of speech What is the main topic of the ECB speech? 
Monetary – financial economics 
What does the ECB not comment on, when asked for? 
The ECB president does not comment on: 
politics 
authorities 
pre-commitments (future) 
Slips show that public can decide what should be said and what 
not. 
Rules of inclusion 
Commentary: primary/secondary 
text 
How much attention do the media pay to the words of central 
bank presidents? 
Media attention rises in weeks with press conferences.  
Do markets pay attention to words of central bank presidents? 
Yes, they do. And under certain circumstances they act in 
accordance with the words of the president. 
How does the public react to ECB communication? 
By questioning what the president says.  
The slips have shown that comments of the public can turn 
                                                        
55 see: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/html/index.en.html (retrieved May 10, 2010). 
56 see: http://www.ecb.europe.eu/stats/html/pcstats.en.html, and  
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/html/sqf.en.html (retrieved May 11, 2010). 
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around the hierarchy between texts.  
Author: unifying principle Does the ECB repetitively refers to ‘a statement’ when 
speaking?  
Yes, the mandate is repeated several times. 
Does the ECB speaks with one ‘voice’?  
Yes, by relating policy to the mandate and by limiting the 
number of people that may speak on behalf of the ECB (in fact 
it is only the president). 
But: speaking with one voice does not mean that the public 
listens with one ear.  
Discipline On which kind of knowledge is the ECB communication based?  
Mostly monetary economics, financial and statistical 
knowledge. 
Is there an underlying shared assumption? 
Yes, the underlying assumption is that communication can be 
used in order to manage expectations.  
Rules of qualification 
Rituals How are ECB interactions organised?  
The ECB regularly speaks to the public by publishing 
information (see table 3-8), but also with the public during the 
press conferences. 
Fellowship or doctrine  Does the ECB use terminology that can be understood by 
everyone or can it only be understood by a limited number of 
people? 
The ECB president addresses a large public. To understand 
what the ECB and the president really speak about a financial-
economic background is required.  
Education Does the president of the ECB offer a framework to understand 
what he says? 
The ECB speech contains some educational moments. And the 
ECB also has material – explaining inflation – that can be used 
in primary and secondary schools. 
Journalists get an introductory course.  
Methodology used to handle (statistical) topics is made public. 
Table 3-10. Overview of rules of central bank communication 
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3.6 Conclusion 
If communication by the ECB president is studied through the perspective of a game, we 
see that the rules of the game can be recognised. There are rules of exclusion, rules of 
inclusion and rules of qualification. These rules explain why and how a central bank 
president speaks, better than the concept of transparency can. It is interesting not to leave it 
at that, and to look one step further. At first sight, it seems that the ECB president decides 
what he says and how. The ECB determines the limits of the press conferences and its 
president answers the questions. If he does not wish to answer, the public cannot make 
him. Communication by the central bank president then seems to be mostly one-way 
traffic. Moreover, the ECB and its president communicate often, but not always in 
language that can be easily understood. A course in monetary economics is required to 
understand what the president is really talking about. In the case of statistics the 
methodology is provided, but to understand it, let alone criticise is, thorough knowledge of 
statistics is required. In this way communication can stress information asymmetry instead 
of reducing it. This could lead to the conclusion that the central bank president has much 
power and the public has little. To express it in terms of Foucault: the central bank 
president is someone who knows a lot, and can do a lot based on that knowledge. He 
would be a superior player in the game. Naturally, the central bank president has an 
exceptional position institutionally, and can do things that other players cannot, but this 
does not mean he is omnipotent. 
This chapter has revealed another perspective. The two slips in the preface already 
showed that even central bank presidents can make mistakes. Even they cannot say 
everything they want, and they have to follow the unwritten rules of the game. Trichet also 
pointed to the power of the media when talking about perception of the message. 
Furthermore, we saw that the rules of the game cannot always be followed. Often there is 
resistance to the interaction, continuous doubt as to whether the players are familiar with 
the game that the central bank president is playing. Do they know and understand what he 
is talking about? The suggestion then is to turn things around. The way in which the ECB 
president communicates is not a sign of power, but a sign of powerlessness. We see here 
how the postulate of manipulation is linked to the requirement of participation (section 
3.2). The ECB president has to do everything he can to get the 320 million citizens he 
addresses on the same page. For him, it is about making those citizens not just expect 
inflation of 2%, but to make them act on this expectation, as it can only be realised if they 
do. The ECB president is not in any position to force cooperation. One of the most 
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important means he has to realise it, is communication. This communication is a weakness 
as well as a strength. Because if the president only can and wants to communicate a single 
message, then what he can say is very limited, which makes him vulnerable. One who bets 
on communication makes every word charged. This is the reason that the ECB president 
says little, and limits his domain of speaking. Anything he says, could be used against him 
and against his policy. It is also the reason that he frequently repeats his mandate, because 
that is actually the only message he wants to convey. And it is a vulnerable message, 
because if it was self-evident, he would not have to refer to it so often. Making 
communication instrumental also makes it a strategic problem. 
Describing communication as a soccer game seems to be a step too far. How 
communication by a central bank president works out, depends on the public he relates to: 
is it a public which can place his words in context, a professional public, or is it a lay 
public. This dependence on the public makes central bank communication vulnerable, and 
it is an important difference with a game of soccer. In the latter, the public mostly plays the 
role of supporters. If a central bank president wants to manage expectations, he needs his 
supporters to play the game. 
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CHAPTER 4: DO CENTRAL BANK PRESIDENTS RECEIVE MORE 
ATTENTION IN TIMES OF CRISIS?57 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the ECB president’s communication has been studied. Particular 
attention was given to 2008. 2008 was a special year for central bank presidents: it was the 
year the financial crisis – which started in the United States – manifested itself in Europe. 
Policy wise, this can be seen in a decline in the interest rate. The European Central Bank, 
which for a long time kept the interest rate constant, lowered it by 50 basis points in 
October, later with another 50 and after that even 75. 58 This was the biggest interest rate 
decline in the history of the European Central Bank. With the words ‘We have never done 
that before’, Trichet made clear the exceptional situation (see press conference November 
2008). 
In this chapter the (rise of the) financial crisis is looked at from a communication 
perspective. The goal is to gain insight into a possible difference between communication 
in normal and in crisis times. The starting point here is the conclusion of the previous 
chapter. There the importance of interaction was shown, and the way it makes central bank 
presidents vulnerable. Formulated differently, the power of the central bank president is for 
an important part dependent on the public that listens to him, and acts on his words. 
Usually, the reaction to the words of the central bank president is mapped by looking at 
movements in financial markets (see Introduction, section 1). In this chapter a start is made 
in studying interaction in a different way. Not by looking at financial markets, but by 
looking at the role of the central bank president in the public debate, and the relation he has 
with his public.59 What is relevant is not only whether he reaches the financial public, but 
also which public he reaches outside of that. In relation to the financial crisis it means that 
we want to gain insight in the role of central bank communication in times of crisis.  
                                                        
57 This chapter was co-authored by prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses. The authors thank Raman Ahmed for 
his statistical support. 
58 http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html#fn5 (retrieved April 6, 2010). 
59 A comparison can be made here as well with Achterhuis (1988), as he stresses out the importance 
of participation for power to be effective. Power then has to do with organizing participation. Put 
differently, if a central bank president wants his words to be effective in times of crisis, he must 
make sure he is listened to. ‘Understanding authority, then, always demands an analysis of the 
relation between the maker of a claim and the public(s) that need to be persuaded. Authority always 
is a relational notion.’ (Hajer 2009, p.21). 
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 Our first expectation is that central bank presidents are given a lot of attention by 
the public. Central bank presidents (CBPs) are responsible for the monetary policy of a 
country or region (like Europe) and often they are directly and indirectly involved in 
supervising financial markets. Stability of financial markets is one of their main tasks. 
Because of this, central bank presidents have an important task in times of financial crisis. 
We can expect them to somehow contribute to stabilising markets and calming down 
potential panic responses, including those of the average citizen. This feature of crisis 
periods means that central bank presidents have to address a broader and more diverse 
public. This may make it more complex to deliver a message, that is, not only the 
professional financial markets have to be addressed. The average citizen needs reassuring 
information as well. From this perspective, it is not strange to see that during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 CBPs relied on (for central bankers) unorthodox methods of 
communication. The fact that Ben Bernanke considered holding a press conference was 
front page news with the header ‘Bernanke’s PR Push Rewrites Fed Script’. Also the fact 
that Bernanke actually entered into discussion with the public during a number of meetings 
can be considered quite revolutionary as well. His predecessor, Alan Greenspan, gave only 
a single interview during his entire career as president of the Federal Reserve, and this 
occurred at the start of his career. Likewise, the president of the Dutch central bank 
(DNB), Nout Wellink, gave his first live TV press conference ever during the crisis. This 
was on October 3, 2008, when together with the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Finance, he announced the take-over of Fortis Bank by the Dutch government.60 A press 
conference offers the opportunity to explain things to a general public. This brings us to 
formulating a first expectation: in times of crisis the relation between the central bank 
(president) and the public changes as well, he receives attention from a broader public. 
 The second expectation is related to the work of Morris and Shin (see also chapter 
2). Morris and Shin claim that too much value can be assigned to the speech of central 
bank presidents in times of uncertainty. In such a situation, the public devalues its private 
information and sticks to the words of authorities, like central bank presidents. If we 
continue this line of thought, we can expect the central bank president to generate more 
attention in times of crisis. Both in general and with regard to various publics. The 
combination of both expectations results in the statement studied in this chapter: 
 
                                                        
60 http://nos.nl/video/8391-persconferentie-balkenende-bos-en-wellink.html (retrieved July 1, 2010). 
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In times of uncertainty, such as a financial crisis, more attention is given to 
remarks by central bank presidents, and attention is paid by a broader public. 
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 contains the sub-questions that are 
based on the main question. They link to the theoretical framework set up in chapter 3. 
Section 3 deals with the institutional positioning of central banks and their presidents. 
Section 4 contains the research design. In this section we show how the sub-questions are 
answered, and which data are used. In section 5 the empirical results are presented, and the 
five sub-questions are answered. Section 5 contains the conclusion. In this conclusion, the 
statement is largely rejected. In times of crisis, central bankers do get more attention. But 
the increase in attention is much smaller than the attention given to the financial crisis. 
Their role in this debate is therefore modest. Moreover, central bank presidents receive 
more attention from a broader public, but this is limited as well. The increase in attention 
given to what a central bank president says is mostly found in the intellectual press, and 
much less in the popular press. 
 
4.2 Sub-questions 
In the previous chapter, communication by central bank presidents has been discussed by 
using the framework of Foucault (see chapter 3). Here, three clusters of rules were 
distinguished regarding communication, which all answer different questions: 
 
- Rules of exclusion: ‘What is talked about?’ 
- Rules of inclusion: ‘What is being said?’ 
- Rules of qualification: ‘Who takes part in the conversation?’ 
 
For an extensive description of these rules see chapter 3 (section 2). In this chapter, we 
turn the perspective around by taking the discussion of the financial crisis as a starting 
point, instead of the words of the central bank president. The goal is to gain more insight 
into the attention given to the central bank president within this discussion. For that, we 
will not elaborate on all the rules as in the previous chapter, but only use the rules relevant 
to generating attention and participation. 
 
We start with the rules of exclusion. These are about which topics are talked about, and 
which are not. Adjusting it to the financial crisis, the question becomes the following: 
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 How did the attention given to the financial crisis develop in 2007-2009?(1) 
 
By answering this question we hope to gain insight into the moment in which the financial 
crisis became the topic of conversation. 
 Rules of inclusion are about the internal organisation of the discussion: ‘What is 
being said?’. Because we mostly look at the share of attention given to the central bank 
president, this question is not discussed here, but in chapter 5. 
Finally, we turn to rules of qualification. These are about the public that pays 
attention to the central bank president, and about the question: ‘Who takes part in the 
discussion?’. The expectation is that central bank presidents generate more attention 
among the regular public. The first question in this cluster of rules regards the role of the 
central bank president in the discussion about the financial crisis. The question asked here, 
is: 
How much attention is given to the central bank president in the discussion about 
the financial crisis?(2) 
 
To answer this question, we compare the attention given to the financial crisis with the 
attention given to central bank presidents. 
Based on Morris and Shin, the expectation is that central bank presidents, being 
authorities, will receive more attention when there is more uncertainty. To position this 
question we want to compare attention in times of crisis to attention in normal times: 
 
Does a central bank president receive (relatively) more attention in times of crisis 
than in normal times?(3) 
 
Next, we want to specify the attention given to the central bank president by looking at 
which public gives him more attention. Below, we show that we distinguish three groups 
within the public: the professional public, the intellectual public and the popular public. 
The question is: 
 
From which public does a central bank president receive (more) attention in 
normal times, and from which in times of crisis?(4) 
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Because the attention that bank presidents generate can depend on the position that the 
central bank president has, three bank presidents are discussed that have similar, but also 
different roles. The bank presidents discussed are the president of the Federal Reserve 
(Ben Bernanke), the president of the ECB (Trichet) and the president of De Nederlandsche 
Bank (Wellink). 
 
Which central bank president receives (more) attention from which public in 
normal times, and which central bank president receives (more) attention from 
which public in times of crisis?(5a&5b&5c) 
 
Linked to this question is the importance of having insight into the institutional positioning 
of the central bank presidents. A discussion of this can be found below. 
 
4.3 Institutional positioning of central bank presidents 
Central bank presidents more or less have the same task, that is, the monetary policy for a 
defined area (country or region). But when looked at in detail, we see that there are 
differences between the competences of central bank presidents. In this section we focus 
on three central bank presidents. We look at their institutional similarities and differences. 
By mapping this, we intend to work out what central bank presidents have a formal say 
about and whether it is reasonable for the public to listen to them. The central bank 
presidents that are discussed in this chapter are the president of the Federal Reserve (Fed) 
(Ben Bernanke), the president of the European Central Bank (ECB) (Jean-Claude Trichet) 
and the president of the Dutch central bank (DNB) (Nout Wellink). The three CBPs were 
closely involved in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
  
Central bank presidents all have a geographically defined domain to which their policy 
applies. The president of the Federal Reserve (Fed), Ben Bernanke, is in charge of the 
United States. The president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Jean Claude Trichet, 
has authority in Europe and the president of the Dutch central bank (DNB) has it in the 
Netherlands. If we translate this to the number of inhabitants, we see that the public of the 
Fed is 307 million people, that of the ECB concerns 328 million people, and that of DNB 
is 17 million people. The Fed and the ECB have a different policy, and the policies of the 
ECB and DNB are harmonized. This means that the ECB and DNB share some 
competences. 
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 If we look in detail at the tasks of the Federal Reserve, it has four main objectives, 
see table 4-1. These are conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the 
monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates; supervising and regulating banking 
institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation's banking and financial system 
and to protect the credit rights of consumers, maintaining the stability of the financial 
system and containing systemic risk that may arise in financial markets; providing 
financial services to depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign official 
institutions, including playing a major role in operating the nation's payments system61.  
The main objecties of the ECB are the definition and implementation of monetary 
policy for the Euro area; the conduct of foreign exchange operations; the holding and 
management of the official foreign reserves of the Euro area countries (portfolio 
management); the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. The ECB also 
has tasks related to its specific position within Europe. These are: financial stability and 
supervision; contribution to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the authorities in 
charge related to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system; and International and European cooperation: the ECB maintains working 
relations with relevant institutions, bodies and forums both within the EU and 
internationally in respect of tasks entrusted to the Eurosystem62. Finally, the Dutch Central 
Bank is responsible for safeguarding financial stability, defining and implementing the 
single monetary policy of the countries which have introduced the Euro, promoting the 
smooth operation of the payment system, supervising financial institutions and the 
financial sector. DNB acts as an advisory body to the Dutch government. 
 The main similarity between the three central banks concerns monetary policy. 
Both the ECB and the Federal Reserve formulate a policy and implement it. DNB has a 
special position. It contributes to monetary policy as a member of the board of the ECB 
(the governing council). In this board, the countries of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) determine the monetary policy of the Euro countries through majority voting. So as 
for monetary policy, DNB plays an important role, but it is secondary to the ECB. As for 
supervising financial institutions, the relations between the ECB and DNB are different. 
DNB supervises financial institutions in the Netherlands, like the other EMU countries do 
                                                        
61 See www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm (retrieved August 23, 2010). 
62 See http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/tasks/html/financial-stability.nl.html (retrieved August 23, 2010).  
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in their own territories. In this, the ECB plays a coordinating and advising role. Primacy 
lies with the national central bank, not with the ECB. 
 
 Federal Reserve ECB DNB 
Monetary Policy Yes Yes Majority voting 
within the ECB 
Stability Yes Yes Yes 
Smooth payment system  Yes Coordination Yes 
Supervision Yes Coordination Yes 
Region/geographic 
borders 
US Europe The Netherlands 
Table 4-1. Objectives of three central banks 
 
4.4 Research design and data 
To determine how the attention given to central bank presidents is distributed, this research 
looks at the number of times the central bank president is mentioned in the public 
discussion. This public discussion is studied by analysing newspapers. 
Newspapers are chosen for three reasons. First, newspapers are a medium in 
which there is space for reflection, and opportunities for the social debate (Chaffee and 
Franks 1996). Also, newspapers have a structure that is suitable for comparing normal 
times with crisis times. Daily, there is space in newspapers for financial and economic 
news, which each day relates to current events (McQuail 1994). Secondly, newspapers 
offer the possibility to compare different frames of reference. ‘We only have to see how 
different papers report the same event differently to realize how important is this 
understanding, this view of the world, which each papers shares with its readers. So 
readers with different social experiences or form different cultures may find different 
meanings in the same text’ (Fiske 1990). A third reason for choosing our design is that 
referring to a central bank president gives an indication of his media authority (Herbst 
2003, p.490). Central bank presidents have de facto authority (it is institutionally anchored) 
and epistemic authority (it is anchored in their expertise and in that of the organisation). 
Media authority is an alternative and additional form of authority. This form emphasises 
the importance of communication. This links to the importance of references in the 
academic world. Similarly, the position of a scientist is partly determined by the number of 
references to his work. 
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 Our sample frame covers January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2008. This period 
contains both normal times as well as crisis times. We take July 1, 2007 as the turning 
point, because then articles about the credit crisis started to appear. Over the entire period 
the number of references to the central bank presidents (Ben Bernanke (Fed), Jean Claude 
Trichet (ECB), Nout Wellink (DNB)) and the number of articles relating to the credit crisis 
have been counted. For the central bank president of the Federal Reserve, three American 
newspapers are studied, namely the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall 
Street Journal. For the president of the European Central Bank, nine European newspapers 
are studied; three French newspapers: Le Monde, Le Parisien and Les Echos; three 
German newspapers: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Die Welt and FT Deutschland; and three 
Dutch newspapers: NRC Handelsblad, De Telegraaf and Het Financieele Dagblad. The 
difference in the number of papers is because there are no exclusively European papers. 
For the president of the Dutch central bank three Dutch newspapers are studied: again NRC 
Handelsblad, De Telegraaf and Het Financieele Dagblad.  
 
 Professional Popular Intellectual 
Ben Bernanke (FED), 
United States 
Wall Street Journal  New York Times  Washington Post  
Jean Claude Trichet 
(ECB), Europe 
Les Echos  
FT Deutschland 
Het Financieele 
Dagblad  
Le Parisien 
Die Welt 
De Telegraaf 
Le monde 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
NRC Handelsblad 
Nout Wellink (DNB),  
The Netherlands 
Het Financieele 
Dagblad 
De Telegraaf NRC Handelsblad 
Table 4-2. Types of newspapers related to CB(P)s 
 
To determine the attention given to central bank presidents, we count the number of times 
their names are mentioned. That is, how often ‘Bernanke’, ‘Trichet’ and ‘Wellink’ occur. 
Determining the attention given to the financial crisis is done by counting the number of 
references to ‘credit crisis’ (EN), ‘kredietcrisis’ (NL), ‘Finanzkrise’ (DE), Crise Financiere 
(FR). 
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Related to the aforementioned sub-questions, we get the following overview: 
 
Questions Research approach 
1. How did the attention given to the financial 
crisis develop in 2007-2009? 
The number of times in the period of 2007-2009 
that the term ‘financial crisis’ or a synonym 
appears in newspapers. 
2. How much attention is given to the central 
bank president in the debate about the financial 
crisis? 
The number of times central bank presidents are 
referred to in times of crisis, compared to the 
number of references to the financial crisis. 
3. Does a central bank president receive 
(relatively) more attention in times of crisis than 
in normal times? 
The number of times central bank presidents are 
referred to in times of crisis, compared to the 
number of times they are referred to in normal 
times. 
(We analyse here whether the multiplier effect of 
the financial crisis applies to central bank 
presidents). 
4. From which public does a central bank 
president receive (more) attention in normal 
times, and from which in times of crisis? 
The number of times that newspapers refer to 
central bank presidents in normal times and in 
times of crisis. 
(We compare the composition of the attention for 
the CBP in normal times with the composition in 
times of crisis). 
5. Which central bank president receives (more) 
attention from which public in normal times, and 
which central bank president receives (more) 
attention from which public in times of crisis? 
The number of times that different newspapers 
refer to different central bank presidents in 
normal times and in times of crisis. 
(This comparison is done from two perspectives: 
the multiplier effect (question 3) and the 
composition of the attention (question 4).) 
Table 4-3. Sub-questions and research approach 
 
4.5 Research results 
This section contains the research results. The aforementioned questions are answered one 
by one. 
 
1. How did the attention given to the financial crisis develop in 2006-2008? 
In the period of January 2006 - December 2008, the 12 newspapers mention the financial 
crisis 26559 times. A turning point in the attention is found around July 1, 2007. 26011 
references of the financial crisis appeared after July 1. This moment was picked because 
from then on structurally more attention is given to the credit crisis. In the first period, on 
average 7.0 articles appear per week in which the financial crisis (or a similar term) is 
mentioned, after July 1 this is on average 342. The maximum is in the week of October 13, 
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2008, when 1431 articles appear. It is a period in which there is much attention for the 
crisis. This is caused in part by the collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers, and by 
the rescue plan of the American government. The graph below displays the attention for 
the credit crisis. 
 
Figure 4-1. Citations credit crisis 
 
What should be noted is that the attention for the financial crisis in different newspapers is 
correlated. The attention is based on the number of references to the credit crisis in 
newspapers from different countries. If American newspapers talk about the credit crisis, 
European newspapers do so as well. This can be seen in the correlations between the 
observations of the weekly data; they are all higher than 0.8, as can be seen below. For 
this, the total number of references to the credit crisis in the newspapers of each country 
has been determined. 
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 NE DE US FR 
NE 1 0.944 0.971 0.919 
DE  1 0.992 0.892 
US   1 0.922 
Table 4-4. Correlation between the attention for the credit crisis in various newspapers  
 
We can conclude that during 2008, the financial crisis received more and more attention. 
And this attention is spread over all newspapers. We can expect from central banks, which 
have to guard financial stability, that they play an important role in this discussion. 
 
2. How much attention is given to the central bank president in the debate about the 
financial crisis? 
To gain insight into the amount of attention given to the central bank president, we relate 
the number of articles in which a central bank president is mentioned to the number of 
articles in which the financial crisis is mentioned. The graph below illustrates this. 
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Figure 4-2. Attention for the credit crisis compared to attention for the central bank president 
 
From this comparison we can conclude that central bank presidents do get attention during 
the financial crisis, but that the attention for central bank presidents is much lower than for 
the crisis itself. At the first question we saw that the average attention for the crisis in times 
of crisis is 342 articles per week. The average attention for central bank presidents in times 
of crisis is only 55 per week. This means that the debate about the financial crisis is largely 
held without referring (explicitly) to the central bank president. This difference is most 
striking at the peak of references to the crisis. In this period, the attention for the crisis 
increases remarkably, but that for the central bank president only minimally.  
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3. Does a central bank president receive (relatively) more attention in times of crisis than 
in normal times? 
What can be expected, based in the proposition of Morris and Shin, is that a central bank 
president gets relatively more attention in times of crisis than in normal times. We do see 
that the average attention for the central bank president in times of crisis (55) is higher than 
in normal times (37), but that is not a sufficient answer. After all, we are looking for the 
relation between the change in context and the change in attention. Therefore, we analyse 
how the increase in attention for the central bank president relates to the increase in 
attention for the crisis. The question is if there is a multiplier effect due to the crisis. In 
other words, if there is more coverage of the credit crisis, does that also lead to more 
references to the bank presidents? We compute the number of all articles in the newspapers 
which deal with the credit crisis in table 4-2 (we search using the term “credit crisis”, 
translated into the proper language). In the next step we run the regression model 
 
t1ttt crisisonArticlesβCBPonArticlesρCrisisDummyαμCBPonArticles  
 
where “Dummy crisis” is a zero-one variable, with values zero until July 1, 2007, and 1 
afterwards. The variable “Articles on CBPt-1” measures the persistence of the coverage, as 
it is likely that the coverage of yesterday has an impact on the coverage of today. The 
parameter β is of our interest. We expect it to be positive. 
 
The regression gives the following results:
 
tcrisisonArticles0.041tCBPon Articles0.36tCrisisDummy*0.273.33tCBPon  Articles  
 
The relevant P-values are all smaller than 0.001, except for the credit crisis dummy 
variable, which is 0.46. All are significant, with the exception of the dummy. The 
parameter β is positive, as expected. We can conclude that if an extra article on the credit 
crisis appears, on average 0.04 extra articles on the CBP appear in the week thereafter. In 
terms of percentage, we can say that an increase of 1% in the number of articles on the 
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credit crisis corresponds to about a 0.24% increase in the number of articles on the CBP in 
total.63 
 
On the basis of these results, we can conclude that a central bank president generates more 
attention in times of crisis than in normal times, but that the attention for the central bank 
president increases more slowly than the attention for the crisis. The share of the central 
bank president in the debate about the credit crisis is therefore relatively modest.  
 
4. From which public does a central bank president receive (more) attention in normal 
times, and from which in times of crisis? 
First we take a look at the effect of the crisis for the different categories for all the CBPs. 
Do the central bank presidents receive more attention in the different categories? In the 
table below we can see that the crisis has lead to a statistically significant increase in the 
amount of articles on a CBP in each category as the P-value is lower than 0.001 in each 
category. Below are the test-statistics (P-values in brackets) of a comparison of the weekly 
articles about the CBP before and during the crisis. The specific test statistic used here is 
the Mann-Whitney U-test statistic, a non-parametric approach to see if the 2 series differ in 
location.64 
 
Category 
 
Test statistic: U-value 
(P-Value) 
Mean rank before 
the crisis 
Mean rank during 
the crisis 
Intellectual 4.111 (0.0000) 63.30 92.89 
Financial 3.814 (0.0001) 63.34 91.84 
Popular 4.495 (0.0000) 61.92 94.29 
Table 4-5. Comparison of amount of articles on CBP before and during the crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
63 1% increase of credit crisis articles is on average 0.01*(24,64 articles per day on average)=0.2464 
extra articles about the credit crisis. This leads to an increase of (beta) 0.04*0.2464 /(1-0,36)=0.0156 
extra articles about a CBP. This is equal to a percentage increase of 0.015/(6.57 articles about a CBP 
per day on average)= 0.24%. 
64 See section 3.5 for a more elaborate explanation. 
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Looking specifically at the central bank presidents we see that for Bernanke the increase in 
articles is statistically significant in every category except for the intellectual newspaper. 
 
Category 
 
Test statistic: U-
value (P-Value) 
Mean rank before 
the crisis 
Mean rank during 
the crisis 
Intellectual 1.880 (0.0601) 71.29 84.80 
Financial 2.411 (0.0159) 69.37 86.74 
Popular 3.911 (0.0001) 64.04 92.14 
Table 4-6. Comparison of amount of articles on Bernanke before and during the crisis 
 
For Trichet, the increase in articles is statistically significant in all the categories. 
 
Category Test statistic: U-
value (P-Value) 
Mean rank before 
the crisis 
Mean rank during 
the crisis 
Intellectual 4.202 (0.0000) 63.05 93.14 
Financial 2.741 (0.0061) 68.19 87.94 
Popular 3.179 (0.0015) 66.70 89.44 
Table 4-7. Comparison of amount of articles on Trichet before and during the crisis 
 
For Wellink the increase in articles is statistically significant in every category except for 
the popular newspaper. 
 
Category Test statistic: U-
value (P-Value) 
Mean rank before 
the crisis 
Mean rank during 
the crisis 
Intellectual 2.780 (0.0054) 68.88 88.12 
Financial 3.519 (0.0004) 66.15 90.85 
Popular 1.663 (0.0962) 72.86 84.14 
Table 4-8. Comparison of amount of articles on Wellink before and during the crisis 
 
The next thing we want to analyse is the composition of the public within which the central 
bank president generates attention. This fits the expectation that a central bank president 
speaks to a different public in times of crisis than in normal times. We answer this question 
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by seeing how the attention of the central bank president is distributed over the various 
publics, as represented by the various newspapers (see table 4-2). 
If we study the attention for central bank presidents in normal times, we see that 
this attention consists mostly of attention in financial newspapers. The composition of 
attention is as follows: 
 
Figure 4-3. Composition of attention in normal times 
 
The composition changes only slightly. In professional/financial newspapers there is 
slightly less attention for the CBP, in the category popular and intellectual there is an 
increase of 1, respectively 2 percent. 
 
This leads to the following picture: 
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Figure 4-4. Composition of attention in times of crisis
 
To see if the difference in attention is significant, we test for equality of attention for the 
CBP in the various categories. For this we use weekly data, to make the difference clearer. 
If the data is normally distributed or similar to a normal distribution, you can perform an 
ANOVA. However, this is not the case, so a non-parametric test is performed to see 
whether the attention differs between the categories. In a non-parametric test there are no 
assumptions as to the distribution of the observations, in this case the number of references 
to a CBP. The only assumption is that the observations come from populations with similar 
shapes, but different locations, in other words, that they are shifted. 
 
The non-parametric test used here is the Kruskal-Wallis test for comparing the locations of 
distributions of the 3 categories. This test method ranks the observations according to size, 
and the rank increases with the size of the observation. The null hypothesis is that the 
distributions of the various categories are equal, and the alternative hypothesis is that the 
distributions of the various categories have been shifted. The relevant test statistic H has 
approximately a χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. 
 
The results of these tests are displayed below:  
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Period Test statistic (P- value) Average rank per category 
  Professional Popular Intellectual 
In normal times 69.9 (0.000) 170 90 92 
In times of crisis 65.4 (0.000) 166 92 89 
Table 4-9. Ranking of the newspapers using Kruskal-Wallis 
 
From this, we can conclude that in normal times the attention in professional newspapers 
differs significantly from the attention in popular and intellectual newspapers. In times of 
crisis the same can be found. Then, the attention in professional newspapers differs 
significantly from the attention in popular and intellectual newspapers.  
 
So, the CBP receives most attention from the financial category. The categories popular 
and intellectual give the CBP about the same amount of attention. To see whether these 
differ, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is performed. 
 
Period Test statistic (P-value) Average ranking per category 
  Popular Intellectual 
Normal Times 0.317 (0.752) 77.35 79.65 
Times of crisis 0.334 (0.738) 78.71 76.29 
Table 4-10. Ranking of popular and intellectual newspapers 
 
This shows that they do not differ from each other, since the test for equality of the 
distributions gives P-values of 0.75 and 0.74. The crisis then does not change the 
composition of the attention for central bank presidents.  
 
5. Which central bank president receives (more) attention from which public in normal 
times, and which central bank president receives (more) attention from which public in 
times of crisis? 
 
Answering this question can provide insight into the central bank presidents and their 
institutional context. This question will be answered, related to the previous questions, in 
three steps. 
 
93 
5a. Is the attention that bankers receive attention for their story? 
We have seen that there is a strong correlation between the newspapers that write about the 
financial crisis in times of crisis. If an American newspaper writes about the financial 
crisis, a European newspaper does so as well. What we wonder here is whether there is 
such a correlation between the central bank presidents. So when American newspapers 
write about Bernanke, do European newspapers write about Trichet and Dutch newspapers 
about Wellink? The answer to this question is that there is virtually no correlation (see 
table 4-8). 
 
 Specifically covering their own words 
 Bernanke Trichet Wellink 
Bernanke 1 0.010 0.145 
Trichet  1 0.166 
Wellink   1 
Table 4-11. Correlations between articles on each CBP and those on other CBPs 
 
Apparently, when the words of one president are covered, the words of the others are not 
included too. Articles on the credit crisis occur at the same time across all newspapers, but 
the coverage of the CBP’s words is almost uncorrelated, meaning that mainly one CBP at a 
time is heard. The attention that central bank presidents generate then is attention for their 
own stories. 
 
5b. What is the difference in composition of attention in normal times versus times of crisis 
for the various central bank presidents? 
That central bank presidents generate their ‘own’ attention offers us the possibility of 
looking at the composition of the public and asking the question how the attention is 
distributed per central bank president. 
 
We saw in answering question 4 that for all bank presidents in normal and crisis times, the 
following composition applies: 
Normal Crisis 
1. Professional 1. Professional 
2. Intellectual, Popular  2. Intellectual, Popular  
Table 4-12. Attention for CBPs general 
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If we look at the attention per central bank president and the shifts therein, we see (small) 
differences between the presidents. (The significance of these results can be found in the 
Appendix).65 
  
Period Bernanke Trichet Wellink 
Attention in normal 
times 
1. Professional 
2. Intellectual, Popular 
1. Professional 
2. Intellectual, Popular 
1.Professional, 
Intellectual, Popular 
Attention in times of 
crisis 
1. Professional 
2. Intellectual 
3. Popular 
1. Professional 
2. Intellectual, Popular 
1. Professional 
2. Intellectual, Popular 
Table 4-13. Division of attention between CBPs in normal times and times of crisis 
 
We see a shift in attention with Bernanke from the professional public to the general 
public. This general public is in this case the ‘intellectual’ public. With Trichet, the 
composition of attention stays the same. With Wellink, there was about as much attention 
from the various categories before the crisis and more attention from the financial public 
during the crisis. If we then look at the institutional roles, we see that all central banks 
concerned are responsible for stability. From this perspective, the crisis is equally 
important to all central banks. At the same time, there is a clear difference between the 
central banks when it comes to policy, supervision and the payment system. In normal 
times the Federal Reserve and the ECB have the same distribution of attention. They both 
have a supervisory role. In times of crisis, the attention for remarks by Bernanke is 
composed differently than that for Trichet. It is possible that this is because Bernanke has 
more tasks than Trichet. Contrary to Trichet, Bernanke is responsible also for the payment 
system and supervising. That Bernanke has these three responsibilities could be an 
explanation for the composition of his attention. From this perspective, it would be 
interesting to see what happens to the composition of attention if Trichet and Wellink are 
put together. Then their tasks more closely resemble those of Bernanke. Combining this 
attention gives the following results: 
 
                                                        
65 Again the Kruskal-Wallis test is used to compare the three newspapers and the Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test to see if there consists a difference between attention in popular and intellectual 
newspapers (see Appendix A).  
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Period Composition 
Before the crisis 1. Professional 
2. Intellectual, Popular 
During the crisis 1. Professional 
2. Intellectual  
3. Popular 
Table 4-14. Taking together the attention for Wellink and Trichet 
 
This shows that the combined tasks generate the same composition of attention that 
Bernanke does. 
 
5c. Do the various central bank presidents receive more attention from the various publics 
in times of crisis than in normal times? 
Answering this question, like answering question 3, has to do with the multiplier effect. 
Like with question 3, we could expect that it applies here as well – in line with Morris and 
Shin. 
 
To answer this question, we first look at the attention given to the various central bank 
presidents in the various newspapers. This is again done using the following regression 
model: 
 
tttt crisisonArticlesCBPonArticlesCrisisDummyCBPonArticles 1  
 
Where “Dummy crisis” is a zero-one variable, with values zero until July 1, 2007, and 1 
afterwards. The variable “Articles on CBPt-1” measures the persistence of the coverage, as 
it is likely that the coverage of yesterday has an impact on the coverage of today. We are 
interested in the parameter β. Based on Morris and Shin we expect it to be positive. 
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CBP Newspaper Effect 
previous 
week. i.e. ρ 
(P-value) 
Extra articles. i.e. 
β (P-value) 
Weekly 
percentage 
increase in 
the 
specific 
week 
Weekly 
percentage 
increase 
eventually 
Bernanke  Wall Street 
Journal  
0.373 
(0.0000) 
0.182 
(0.0000) 
0.162% 0.258% 
  New York 
Times 
0.279 
(0.0000) 
0.074 
(0.0000) 
0.193% 0.267% 
  Washington 
Post 
0.275 
(0.0000) 
0.117 
(0.0000) 
0.266% 0.367% 
Trichet   Les Echos   0.121 
(0.0001) 
0.045 
(0.0000)  
0.182% 0.206% 
  Le Parisien  0.083 
(0.0058) 
0.019 
(0.0000) 
0.274% 0.299% 
  Le Monde  0.171 
(0.0000) 
0.045 
(0.0000) 
0.194% 0.234% 
  FT Deutschland 0.040 
(0.1794) 
0.024 
(0.0000) 
0.160% 0.160%* 
  Die Welt 0.098 
(0.0013) 
0.006 
(0.1241) 
0.046% 0.051% 
  Frankfurter 
Algemeine 
-0.015 
(0.6220) 
0.011 
(0.0002) 
0.210% 0.210%* 
  Financieele 
Dagblad  
0.165 
(0.0000) 
0.027 
(0.0000) 
0.198% 0.237% 
  De Telegraaf 0.050 
(0.1010) 
0.014 
(0.0340) 
0.117% 0.117%* 
  NRC 
Handelsblad 
0.032 
(0.2860) 
0.023 
(0.0000) 
0.322% 0.322%* 
Wellink Financieele 
Dagblad  
0.163 
(0.0000) 
0.045 
(0.0000) 
0.566% 0.677% 
  De Telegraaf 0.218 
(0.0000) 
0.056 
(0.0000) 
0.433% 0.554% 
  NRC 
Handelsblad 
0.090 
(0.0022) 
0.065 
(0.0000) 
0.530% 0.582% 
Table 4-15. Overview of extra attention in different newspapers for different CBPs 
 
* means that the eventual effects are the same as the effects in the specific week because the 
autoregressive component is not significant. 
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The current coefficient can be interpreted like this: if an extra article on the crisis appears 
in a specific newspaper, then on average ‘beta’ articles appear on the specific CBP in the 
following week. The estimated betas are given in Table 4-15.66 First, it is evident that all of 
these are positive. So, more coverage of the crisis means more attention for presidents. The 
second part of our expectations is not confirmed. The multiplier is smaller for popular 
newspapers than it is for professional newspapers in 4 of the 5 cases and smaller than those 
for intellectual newspapers in all 5 cases. It is remarkable that the attention for Wellink is 
high compared to the extra attention for the other central bank president. This could be 
explained by the role Wellink played in the rescue of Fortis.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Using the results, we can look back at the problem statement: 
 
In times of uncertainty, like in a financial crisis, more attention is given to 
remarks by central bank presidents, by a broader public. 
 
This research has shown that in times of crisis, more attention is given to the remarks, but 
this attention increases far more slowly than the attention given to the crisis in general. So 
the attention for central bank presidents increases, but the attention for the crisis increases 
far more. This means that in the debate about the crisis there is attention for far more views 
on the crisis than that of the central bank president. This casts doubt on the proposition of 
Morris and Shin that in uncertain times the attention given to authorities is larger, because 
they offer grip. Rather, the opposite seems the case. If times are as uncertain as during a 
crisis, people seem to give less attention to the words of the central bank president. What 
we also saw is that the attention from the non-professional public increases only 
marginally. This was also the case for the three central bank presidents. Despite the 
changes in communication methods mentioned in the introduction, during a crisis the 
central bank presidents still receive most (half) of the attention from professional media. 
                                                        
66 The eventual weekly percentage increase is calculated as follows. To make it concrete for 
Bernanke and the Wall street Journal, we see that 1% increase of credit crisis articles is on average 
1.214 article (that is 0.001214 articles, as there are on average 1.214 per day). This leads to an 
increase of (beta/(1-ρ)) 0.182/(1-0.373)*0.01214=0.00352 extra articles for Bernanke in the Wall 
street journal. Compared to the attention Bernanke receives on average 1.364 per day this is a 
percentage of 0.2583% (0.00352/1.364). So if there is 1% extra attention for the financial crisis, there 
is only 0.26% extra attention for the Central Bank president. 
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The intellectual media and the popular media both provide (approximately) a quarter of the 
attention. 
The relatively limited attention in general and the similar composition of the 
public casts doubt on the opportunities for central bank presidents to manage the public’s 
expectations. The public only gives a limited amount of attention to the remarks, and the 
central bank president does not succeed in reaching the larger public. And of this larger 
public too, we expect a contribution in bringing stability in times of crisis. The next 
chapter provides a more detailed view of how central bank presidents attempt to manage 
expectations in these times.  
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CHAPTER 5: SILENCING SPECULATION 
Contested communication in times of crisis 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter communication by central bank presidents in normal times has 
been compared to their communication in times of crisis. Important results of the former 
chapter are that in times of crisis the attention central bank presidents receive is relatively 
limited, and the composition of the public paying them attention hardly changes. Chapter 4 
also started with another observation on central bank communication in times of crisis, 
namely that central bank presidents communicate differently in order to address a larger 
public in a different way. The example was given of American central bank president Ben 
Bernanke, who considered giving press conferences and even spoke with his public. The 
Dutch central bank president, Nout Wellink, gave his first live press conference ever. He 
also regularly appeared on television. In 2007 the president of DNB appeared six times on 
national television. In 2008 he appeared five times in a far shorter period (mid-September 
to end October). That he speaks so much in times of crisis does not mean that he likes to 
speak. Speaking is like ‘walking on eggshells’, he said on the TV show Buitenhof (October 
2008).67 He himself would prefer not to speak, seeing how the situation is too dynamic, but 
the public desires information. 
An explanation for all the speaking that authorities do in times of crisis, even if 
they would rather not, is that they are entangled in a contest for symbolic order. The 
symbolic order is ‘the symbolic frameworks that legitimate the pre-existing socio-political 
order’ and a crisis ‘entails the breakdown of symbolic frameworks’ (Boin e.a. 2005, 
p.70).68 The game described in chapter 3 provides the outline of this symbolic order. In the 
collapse of the symbolic order, authorities (such as central banks) have lost some of their 
authority. They are being criticised, because they were not able to prevent the crisis, 
despite the information and knowledge they had at their disposal. In this contest, different 
parties try to impose their definition of the situation on a broader public; they try to 
                                                        
67 Buitenhof is a weekly talk show, broadcast by a public network. 
68 Hajer speaks of ‘dislocations’: ‘[…] moments in which political in which political routines seems 
to be lifted from their solid institutional hinges, and where things occur that seem to disrupt a 
symbolic order’(Hajer 2009, p.5).  
100 
redefine the rules of the game. To maintain authority, or rather to reaffirm it, this is of vital 
importance, ‘if they do not get their message across to the public about the causes, 
consequences and cures, others will’ (Boin e.a. 2005, p.69). This is the reason for central 
bank presidents to speak in times of crisis: If they wait too long or do not speak, others will 
take control of the situation. So, ‘Policy makers can seldom afford to wait until they know 
what’s really going on before communicating about it publicly’ (’t Hart and Tindall 2009, 
p.4).  
Because of the collapse of the symbolic order and the contest to restore it, 
authorities communicate at a meta-level in times of crisis. Through their communication 
they have to win the contest and make sure they are listened to at all. Because the symbolic 
order is up for discussion, they cannot fall back on the normal functioning of the game and 
the position they have in it (Hajer 2009, p.74). This makes communication in times of 
crisis into power play. Viewing the changed central bank communication in times of crisis 
as a ‘contest for symbolic order’ puts communication in a meta-perspective – 
communication in order to communicate – and brings us to the next statement which we 
examine in this chapter:  
 
In times of crisis, a central bank president communicates to regain control of his 
communication. 
 
This statement is examined as follows. Section 2 elaborates the theoretical framework. In 
this section the ‘contest for symbolic order’ is worked out by linking it to the frustration of 
the assumption that communication will manage expectations. The Thomas theorem is 
used the explain this. That theorem – ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences’ – is the basis of managing expectations. Next, the contest is worked out by 
seeing how the ‘rules of the game’ (as discussed in chapter 3) are up for discussion. In 
section 3 the research proposal and the data are presented. In this section we translate the 
theoretical framework into concrete questions that are answered using the data. The data 
we use are related to the Northern Rock case and the Fortis case. Both are financial 
institutions that came to the edge of the abyss during the crisis. The central bankers of their 
respective nations were closely involved in saving the banks. In section 4 the results of the 
study are presented. The case of Northern Rock is studied mostly using the Thomas 
theorem. It is shown how perceptions and their consequences differed. The Fortis case is 
studied by discussing the rules of the game. Section 5 contains the conclusion that gaining 
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control on the contest for the symbolic order is not (only) a matter of what is said, but how 
things are said. The staging of communication is an important tactic in regaining control 
over communication (Hajer 2009).69 
 
5.2 Theoretical framework: the contest for symbolic order and the rules of the game 
In this section we work out the contest for symbolic order by first explaining its link to the 
crisis. After that we elaborate further on the concept by showing how the Thomas theorem 
is put under pressure in the contest for symbolic order and by presenting in what way 
uncertainty erodes the rules of the game. 
 
The contest for symbolic order 
In the introduction, the contest for symbolic order and the crisis have been linked to each 
other; here, we illustrate this connection further. A first step in this is defining the term 
crisis. Borstdorff (1994, p.5) does this by reaching for the etymological roots of crisis, 
‘crisis derives from the Greek word (κρίσις), which means a choosing, a dispute, an issue 
or a decision. One may think of crisis as the critical moment of decision in the life of an 
issue or dispute’.70 This description of crisis shows that a crisis is a situation in which 
something is at stake, choices have to made, and decisions have to be taken. Which choice 
is made is unclear, however, because a crisis is characterised by a perception of threat and 
uncertainty (Boin and ‘t Hart 2003). In the contest for symbolic order, elements can be 
found both of the uncertainty and of the decisions.  
The uncertainty is caused by the usual symbolic order being put into doubt. Or as 
‘t Hart (1993) and Seeger (2003) state, there is an interruption of the ‘everyday dramas of 
public life’ (‘t Hart 1993, Seeger 2003). Translated freely, we can say that this means a 
loss of direction in daily life.71 Direction that assigns roles and that is guiding for how 
people relate to each other: direction that assigns authority and expertise to people in 
certain positions (like central bank presidents, ministers and scientists), and direction that 
tells us what notions are dominant (like the workings of the market mechanism). Linked to 
                                                        
69 Hajer (2009, p.65-70) speaks of a combination of discourse and dramaturgy. 
70 For an elaboration of the concept of crisis, see also Koselleck (2006). 
71 In Hajer’s words, an ‘institutional void’ explicitly manifests itself in times of crisis. In an 
‘institutional void’ there are no clear and generally accepted rules and norms according to which 
politics is to be conducted and policy measures are agreed upon (Hajer 2009, p.34). The politics of 
multiplicity also manifests itself: multiplicity of meaning, of publics and of media (Hajer 2009, p.42-
47). 
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chapter 3, in which communication was seen as a game, it means that the game no longer 
works as it used to, the players are no longer confident on how to play the game. 
In the contest we find the decision element. After all, if the usual symbolic order 
is up for discussion, this creates room for a new symbolic order. This new symbolic order 
is at stake in the contest. For – what used to be – authorities this contest is of great 
importance, ‘if they do not get their message across to the public about the causes, 
consequences and cures, others will’ (Boin e.a. 2005, p.69), and others will become 
authorities. If we translate this to the game metaphor, it means that the new game that will 
be played is at stake in the contest, as well as the positioning of the players. 
In this contest communication plays an important role. By communicating, 
authorities can convince the public that it is better to listen to them. Or as ‘t Hart and 
Tindall (2009) put it: the key currency of crisis management in the political and policy 
arenas is persuasion.72 Borstdorff (1994, p.5), who did research on presidents in times of 
crisis, argues:  
 
To manage foreign crises, presidents use military or other means and, most importantly, 
attempt to persuade American citizens that their resolution was the most appropriate one 
available (Italics added, LNE). 
 
Authorities that have to communicate in a crisis situation find themselves in a difficult 
situation. Being ‘persuasive’ is then easier said than done. Their credibility is up for 
discussion, together with the symbolic order. They did not see the crisis coming, so why 
should we believe them if they say they can solve it. Authorities then are expected to 
communicate, but the question is if they are listened to. An additional problem is that those 
who do ‘listen’ to the authorities, the media, can place the remarks in a different 
perspective. This is unavoidable, as crisis is accompanied by media attention. Crises 
mobilise mass media which put an intense spotlight on the issues and the actors involved 
(‘t Hart and Tindall 2009, Seeger 2003). Below we show how the contest for symbolic 
order erodes the managing of expectations and the rules of the communication game.  
 
 
 
                                                        
72 See also Seeger ea (2008, p.65-82) for a specification of the reasons to communicate in times of 
crisis. 
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The contest: managing expectations 
In chapter 2 it was shown that rational expectations theory is an important theoretical 
motivation for communication by central bank presidents. This theory assumes that if 
actors incorporate (rational) expectations, they will act according to these expectations. 
The main point of this theory is then that one has to make sure these expectations are 
rational. The underlying mechanism of this theory is the Thomas theorem. This theorem 
goes as follows: ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. The 
theorem is brought to attention by Robert K. Merton in his book Social Theory and Social 
Structure (1968). Merton links the Thomas theorem to the self-fulfilling prophecy and 
illustrates it with a bank run. If people assume that a bank is in trouble, they behave in 
accordance with this expectation. A bank run starts, causing the bank to get in trouble. In 
that case the words ‘that the bank is in trouble’ have worked, they have become ‘true’. In 
managing expectations, someone, in this book a central bank president, makes sure that his 
view of the future is accepted ‘as real’. So, the policy maker communicates his view of the 
future to the public, the public believes the view of the future, the public behaves 
accordingly and it gets easier for the policy maker to control the future. 73  
 
What happens to the Thomas theorem in times of crisis? It has a conditional character: ‘If 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. In times of crisis this ‘if’ 
becomes problematic, because future scenarios can appear that are seen as highly unlikely 
and very threatening. The number of future scenarios that is perceived as real is much 
higher, and much more diverse. The future scenarios of normal times are put under 
pressure by future scenarios due to crisis circumstances. There are always multiple future 
scenarios and that means there is room for speculation. In remarks made to manage the 
expectations (future scenarios), there is therefore always an element of probability.74 
Authorities will try to communicate in such a way that their scenario is perceived as real. 
We saw before that authorities get into problems here because the crisis erodes their 
credibility. So if authorities say that the crisis is not as bad as expected, do we believe them 
                                                        
73 The self fulfilling prophecy is closely related to the concept of performativity, as presented by 
MacKenzie (2007, 2006). 
74 This distinguishes them from for example descriptive remarks, which are either true or false, like 
‘the cat is on the mat’, or ‘the door is open’. It also distinguishes itself from remarks that are true as 
soon as they are made. If for example a minister announces two people to be married, they are 
married. The distinction is based on the difference between a locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts (Austin 1975). 
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or not? And conversely, authorities have to try and make sure we listen to them, and that 
we see their future scenario as dominant. Linking this to the contest for symbolic order, it 
means that this contest takes place at two levels: which future scenarios are perceived as 
real, and whose future scenarios are perceived as real?  
A second vulnerability of the mechanism that plays out in times of crisis is the 
connection between ‘consequences’ and the ‘perception as real’. More than one connection 
is possible. Even if these consequences are perceived as ‘real’, the question is what the 
consequences are. A remark can be interpreted in different ways, like the most extreme 
example, the self-denying prophecy.75 In that case a remark undermines itself. For 
example, a teacher tells a student he assumes the student will pass an exam; the student 
becomes complacent and thinks he will be fine anyhow, studies too little and fails the 
exam. In the next section, we show that this is because the rules of the game are up for 
discussion. Because it is often the rules of the game that dictate how one should act in a 
certain situation. The question that arises is whether we still act according to the rules of 
the game in times of crisis. 
A third vulnerability, related to realising the Thomas theorem, is the problem of 
speaking itself. Clear example of this is a sketch by Monty Python. A pilot and his co-pilot 
are bored. To dispel their boredom they decide to shout that ‘there is no cause for alarm, 
the wings are not on fire’. At first sight, this is a descriptive remark that is also ‘true’. 
There is no cause for alarm, the wings are not on fire. Anyone on the plane looking out can 
see that. Still, panic breaks out in the plane. Just the report that there is no reason for alarm 
is troubling. Because, why would someone warn for something when there is nothing to 
warn for. In times of crisis the charge of the words is clear as well. 
Summarising, three vulnerabilities of managing expectations in times of crisis are 
shown: the hypothetical nature of the statement, the range of consequences that can be 
related to them and the meanings that can be attributed to the speaking itself. Illustrative of 
this is the quote (mentioned in the introduction) by John Kenneth Galbraith from The 
Great Crash, 1929 (1954 [1997], p.33): 
 
Always when markets are in trouble the phrases are the same: ‘The economic situation is 
fundamentally sound’ or simply ‘The fundamentals are good.’ All who hear these words 
should know that something is wrong. 
                                                        
75 The self denying prophecy is related to the concept of contra performativity (MacKenzie 2006). 
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The symbolic order: communication as a game 
Using the Thomas theorem, we can make the contest clear. The contest that is fought is 
about which perception is considered ‘real’ and which ‘consequences’ to connect to it. 
This contest can be analysed in detail by seeing how it relates to the symbolic order. The 
symbolic order is seen here as a game, as described in chapter 3. This game provided 
starting points to see what was talked about, how the words were given meaning and how 
the words’ effect depended on who spoke them. In the table below the rules as discussed in 
chapter 3 are displayed, each line showing how uncertainty erodes the rule in question. 
 
Rules Perception of uncertainty 
Rules of exclusion 
Topic(s) of speech:  
Subjects that are and are not talked 
about 
 
Uncertainty dominates the conversation, in the sense that in 
times of crisis it is the topic of conversation.  
Rules if inclusion 
Commentary:  
Hierarchy in the texts 
 
Uncertainty means that it is unclear who should be listened to. 
In times of crisis primary texts (like those of authorities) can 
lose their status.  
Author: 
Words are spoken by a voice, 
based on a clear principle. 
 
Uncertainty makes it so that it is unclear what should be said. 
Because of this, speaking with ‘one voice’ is put up for 
discussion.  
Discipline: 
A discipline organises the 
connections within a game. 
 
Uncertainty means that the usual disciplines do not provide a 
sufficient explanation for what is happening.  
Rules of qualification 
Rituals: 
These determine which players get 
to play, and how they relate to 
each other. 
 
Uncertainty in this case means that it is unclear how speakers 
relate to each other.  
Fellowship/doctrine: 
Who takes part in the 
conversation, a limited group of 
people or ‘everyone’. 
 
Who takes part in the conversation also depends on who is 
affected by uncertainty.  
Education: 
Here relations are taught that tell 
you ‘how the world works’, but 
also relations about ‘who is in 
control’. 
 
Uncertainty in this case means that the learned connections 
(disciplines) and relations (rituals) are not necessarily valid 
anymore. In communication, other ‘learning moments’ can be 
looked for. 
Table 5-1. Uncertainty eroding the rules of the game 
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In the next section it is made clear how the contest for symbolic order is looked for in 
central bank communication. 
 
5.3 Research design 
The contest for symbolic order is studied in this chapter from the perspective of the central 
bank president. This means that we will look each time for the way in which this 
perspective comes under pressure and in what way the relevant central bank president is 
involved in the contest for symbolic order. 
We will research this in two ways. The first is connected to the managing of 
expectations (via the Thomas theorem). To see how the contest takes place, we ask the 
following questions: 
 
What perception(s) and consequences can be found in communication and behaviour 
of the central bank president? 
What perception(s) and consequences can be found in communication and behaviour 
of other actors? 
 
The case study we use for this is that of Northern Rock. The data – reconstruction – of the 
collapse of Northern Rock by a parliamentary investigation makes this possible.76 
The second way in which we study communication by central bank presidents is 
by linking it to the rules of the game. The case study we use for this is the impending 
collapse of Fortis and the rescue of Fortis Netherlands by the Dutch government. The 
questions we ask are in the table below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
76 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-
2008, section 121. See also: Chick 2008. 
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Rules of exclusion 
Topic(s) of speech What does a central bank president talk about? 
What do others talk about? 
Rules of inclusion 
Commentary Do other parties refer to texts by the CBP and are they therefore 
primary? 
Do central bank presidents refer to other primary texts? 
Author Does the central bank president always have the same message? 
Do other actors always have the same message? 
Discipline Which discipline do the actions and thinking of the CBP fit? 
Which discipline do the actions and thinking of other actors fit? 
Rules of qualification 
Rituals Which rituals does a central bank president use when addressing 
his public? 
Which rituals do other actors use when getting involved in the 
crisis? 
Fellowship/doctrine What public does a central bank president address? 
Which authorities do other actors address? 
Education Can ‘learning moments’ be found in the communication by the 
central bank president? 
Can ‘learning moments’ be found in the communication by other 
actors? 
Table 5-2. The contest for symbolic order within the rules of the game 
 
Cases and data 
The two examples of communication in times of crisis discussed here are the British 
Northern Rock and the Belgian-Dutch Fortis. The central banks and their presidents are the 
Bank of England (BoE) and Mervyn King, and De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and Nout 
Wellink. The following reasons played a decisive role in the choice for Fortis and Northern 
Rock. To begin with, both are critical cases, they take place under unique circumstances 
(Yin 1989). These unique circumstances first of all concern the financial crisis. Often, 
comparisons are made with the 1930s, which was the last time that financial institutions 
were hit with such far-reaching consequences of a crisis. Moreover, the speed with which 
they were hit was high. Policymakers did not have much time to carefully prepare their 
support for the financial institutions. And thirdly, there is the question of putting forward a 
unique message. This is especially true for ‘Fortis’. A government in principle does not 
take over a bank.  
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As for the gathering of data, much research has been done on communication in 
normal times and its effects (for an overview see Blinder e.a. 2008). For communication in 
times of crisis, that is not the case. The cases we discuss here have to be reconstructed. For 
the reconstruction of the Northern Rock case a report published by the treasury committee 
of the British parliament is used. It gives a detailed overview of the events and decisions of 
the time. Moreover, all important players get to speak. This offers the opportunity to put 
different perceptions in perspective. 
For the Fortis case, such a reconstruction is absent. To begin with, the period of 
research has been defined: it concerns a little under three weeks (the period of September 
18, 2008 to October 5, 2008). Starting points are four press moments, because the 
president of DNB speaks explicitly to the public. The first press moment is the appearance 
by the president of DNB on Nova.77. An appearance in which he announces that Dutch 
financial institutions will be hurt by the crisis, but no banks will fall because of it. The end 
of the period is marked by an interview on the weekly (political) talk show Buitenhof. 78 
On that show, the president of DNB provides accountability of its actions over the past 
weeks (among which the takeover of Fortis Netherlands by the Dutch government). 
Besides these crucial two points, two other moments are important. These are the 
announcement of the participation in Fortis by the Dutch government (e.g. through a press 
release) and the announcement (with a live broadcast press conference) of the takeover of 
Fortis Netherlands by the Dutch government.  
To gain insight into the dynamics of the game, the appearances of the central bank 
president are compared to the reactions of other actors. This way, we can see whether the 
rules of the game are brought up for discussion. These four appearances are confronted 
with the reactions to those appearances. The reactions we focus on are twofold. There are 
reactions in the newspapers and reactions on the financial market. Newspapers are suitable 
for this, because they are a medium in which there is room for reflection, and room for 
social debate (Chaffee and Franks 1996). Also, newspapers have a structure that is suitable 
for discussing a financial crisis. Daily, there is room in newspapers for financial-economic 
news and every day that news relates to current events (see also McQuail 1994). To 
prevent tempering speculation by ‘one-sided’ reporting, three different newspapers are 
                                                        
77 Nova is a news programme. On average, it is watched by around 600,000 people. This particular 
broadcast was watched by around 700,000 viewers. 
78 Buitenhof is a weekly political debate programme. On average, it is watched by 400,000 to 
500,000 people. The broadcasts with Wellink were watched by around 622,000 people. 
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studied: financial-professional (Het Financieele Dagblad, FD), popular (De Telegraaf, T), 
and intellectual (NRC Handelsblad, NRC). These newspapers have been studied in chapter 
4 as well. This analysis therefore complements the one in chapter 4. 
 
To gain insight into the reactions on the market, we use financial indicators. This way, a 
link can be established between a specific remark about a financial institution and possible 
speculation it creates. These indicators are: 
The share price of Fortis. This is used as an indicator of the market value of 
Fortis. Moreover, it is an indicator with great social value because it is used by many 
media. 
The credit default swap ratio (CDS) of Fortis. This is used as an indicator to 
determine the (perception of) creditworthiness of Fortis. A credit default swap is a 
financial instrument which provides compensation in case a payment between parties does 
not occur. The higher the CDS ratio, the lower the credibility.  
The volume of trade, to chart the intensity of trade. If the volume level is high this 
points to much volatility (due to uncertainty). 
Although these indicators give a less ‘rich’ picture than the newspaper articles – 
they are merely numbers – they perform an important warning function for financial 
markets with respect to the struggle for the message. They show whether or not the 
financial markets share the public opinion (announced during the television show) of the 
president of DNB about Fortis.79 
 
5.4 Results 
In this section two cases of communication in times of crisis are presented: Northern Rock 
and Fortis. The Northern Rock case took place at the beginning of the crisis in September 
2007. The Fortis case took place in the middle of the crisis in September 2008.  
 
1. Northern Rock 
The Northern Rock case is used to study how the contest takes place on the level of 
perceptions and consequences. The case is split up into five parts. After each part the next 
two questions will be answered: 
                                                        
79 This can be related to the distinction between utterances and information; which words spoken by 
the central bank president are seen as informative, and which are not. 
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What perception(s) and consequences can be found in communication and behaviour 
of the central bank president? 
What perception(s) and consequences can be found in communication and behaviour 
of other actors? 
 
The British Bank Northern Rock is one of the first European banks that got into trouble 
during the credit crisis. Below, we discuss the rescue of Northern Rock in five parts. They 
are all written from the perspective of the central bank president. The description of each 
part is followed by the (conflicting) perceptions of the parties involved. 
 
Part I: Remaining silent 
The British central bank, the Bank of England, had kept quiet for a long time: ‘They have 
remained tight-lipped’, the British newspaper The Independent writes on August 11 
2007.80 It is a silence that goes hand in hand with unchanged monetary policy. While the 
European Central Bank and the American Federal Reserve take action by injecting money, 
the Bank of England (BoE) considers it best to do nothing. If the central bank starts 
solving the banks’ problems, it causes ‘moral hazard’ problems and it rewards the reckless 
behaviour of bankers, according to the BoE president (Mervyn King).81 He only wants to 
act if the system is in danger, if banks are ‘too big to fail’. 
  
Perspective Conflicting perceptions and (possible) consequences 
President BoE First of all the BoE remains quiet, after some time the president of 
the BoE says that they will not provide help (consequences). The 
reason he provides for this decision is that helping financial 
institutions means awarding bankers for their reckless behaviour 
(perception). 
Other central bank presidents 
 
Other central banks (Fed, ECB) do provide help to the financial 
markets (consequences). 
Table 5-3. Conflicting perceptions on ‘Remaining silent’ 
 
                                                        
80 Sean Farrell (2007), ‘MPs to grill Bank over credit crisis’, The Independent, September 4. 
81 David Prosser (2007), ‘How to prevent a stampede for the exit’, The Independent, August 11. 
House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008. 
Scheherazade Daneskhu e.a. (2007), British Banks scoop up ECB cash, Financial Times, September 
14 . 
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Part 2: Providing help to Northern Rock 
Northern Rock is a large British consumer bank. In September 2007 the bank experiences 
liquidity problems, causing the government and the central bank to step in. Negotiations on 
this issue are ongoing when the BoE president announces that banks should not be helped. 
The liquidity problems arise because banks are hesitant to lend each other money, because 
of the credit crisis. There is a fear that the bank they lend to has been contaminated, so the 
money will not be paid back. This is the case for Northern Rock as well. The Bank of 
England does not decide on its own to intervene, this is done by the ‘Tripartite 
authorities’.82 The Tripartite authorities consist of the president of the Bank of England 
(Mervyn King), the Chancellor of the Exchequer or finance minister (Alistair Darling) and 
the president of the Financial Services Authority (Callum McCarthy). 
  
Perspective Conflicting perceptions and (possible) consequences 
Financial institutions They do not lend each other money (consequence) fearing that the 
financial institution could be contaminated (perception) 
President BoE 
 
The president of the BoE, together with other members of the 
Tripartite, aims to provide help to Northern Rock (consequence). 
This is based on the idea that Northern Rock is too big to fail 
(perception). 
Table 5-4. Conflicting perceptions on ‘Providing help to Northern Rock’ 
 
Part 3: Making the rescue operation public 
The reports of the treasury committee show that the president of the BoE has a strong 
preference not to make the rescue public; he prefers a so-called ‘covert operation’, a secret 
operation. In such a case, the rescue would not be announced until it was completed. (It is 
not entirely clear though why the president of the BoE wanted a secret operation; possibly 
because it would keep the public from knowing that central banks help bankers. After all, 
he condemned their behaviour.) Despite the wish of the central bank president a decision is 
made against a ‘covert operation’ for two reasons. Firstly, because Northern Rock is a 
public company, that legally has to announce the rescue. Secondly, because Northern Rock 
itself opposes a ‘covert operation’. It believes that naming the government as a sponsor 
                                                        
82 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-
2008, section 121. 
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will restore confidence and prevent a run on the bank. 83 Northern Rock is proven right. 
The option of a secret operation is no longer desirable. This is because of the risk of a leak. 
If the public found out that Northern Rock had been saved by the Tripartite authorities, but 
that they decided to make it a ‘covert operation’, that could seem suspect (‘Why did it have 
to be a secret?). This can be counterproductive at a time when confidence is important. The 
treasury committee that studies the process around Northern Rock finds the choice for an 
open operation to be correct, stating the following on the subject: 
 
In the febrile and fevered atmosphere of that period media speculation would have 
followed. The leaking of news of a support operation that was intended to remain covert 
for a period of time would have been potentially as damaging as the premature disclosure 
of a covert operation. 84 
 
Perspective Conflicting perceptions and (possible) consequences 
President BoE The BoE prefers a covert operation (consequence) as it assumes that 
giving information about the support of BoE to Northern Rock 
would not be helpful (perception). 
Northern Rock Northern Rock prefers an open operation (consequence) as it 
assumes that giving information about the support of the BoE to 
Northern Rock would be helpful (perception). 
Table 5-5. Conflicting perceptions on ‘Making the rescue operation public’ 
 
Part IV: Media intervention 
After the decision for an open operation, it is up to the authorities and Northern Rock to 
announce it. On September 10, 2007 the parties agree. They decide to carefully handle the 
communication and take a week to prepare it. They intend to announce the decision on 
September 17. This decision is reversed three days later under pressure from the media: 
there has been a leak. On September 13 rumours spread on the market: ‘the fairly dramatic 
news that a fairly well-known bank had gone to the Bank of England.’85 That same day, on 
8.30pm the BBC (BBC News 24) makes public the outlines of the rescue plan for Northern 
Rock. Shortly after that, a bank run starts. The news that the central bank is working on a 
                                                        
83 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-
2008, section 126. 
84 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-
2008, section 141. 
85 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-
2008, section 149. 
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rescue operation for Northern Rock is not reassuring, but spreads panic. The authorities 
decide to move the press conference to Friday September 14, 7am. (That time is not 
coincidental. Important information is often spread before stock markets open or after they 
close to prevent (further) confusion).  
 
Perspective Conflicting perceptions and (possible) consequences 
President BoE/ 
Northern Rock/ 
Tripartite authorities 
The communication about the rescue should be handled with care 
(perception) and so the involved parties take a week to prepare the 
communication (consequences). 
Rumours The fairly dramatic news that the well-known bank had gone to the 
bank of England (consequence/perception). 
Media BBC announces the rescue plan for Northern Rock 
(perception/consequence). 
Customers Customers take their money and a bank run starts (consequence), 
which seems to support the assumption that Northern Rock is in 
trouble (perception). The knowledge that the help is provided by the 
BoE does not work out to be reassuring (perception). 
President BoE/ 
Northern Rock/ 
Tripartite authorities 
The press conference is advanced. There seems to be no time 
anymore to carefully prepare the communication 
(perception/consequence). 
Table 5-6. Conflicting perceptions on ‘Media intervention’ 
 
Part V: How to really rescue Northern Rock 
At this press conference, it is announced that the Bank of England allows the minister of 
finance to do a money injection. This increases Northern Rock’s possibilities to absorb the 
consequences of the crisis. Additionally, it is announced that the supervisor (FSA) is 
convinced that Northern Rock is a solvent bank that generously meets capital requirements 
and has a loan portfolio of good quality. In short, now that the government has provided 
liquidity, everything should be all right.86 The public does not believe in this solution; 
savers still fear for their money. The run that had started before the press conference is not 
halted by it. The run does not stop until Monday September 17, when it is announced 
explicitly that all savings are guaranteed. 
 
 
                                                        
86 See: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2007/090.htm (retrieved August 24, 
2010). 
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Perspective Conflicting perceptions and (possible) consequences 
Tripartite A money injection supports the liquidity of Northern Rock 
(perception) and makes it into a solvent financial institution 
(consequence). 
Customers The public does not believe the solution (perception), the bank run 
keeps on going (consequence).  
Tripartite Savers still fear for their money (perception), the savings are 
guaranteed (consequences). 
Customer The Bank Run stops, the bank is safe again 
(perception/consequence). 
Table 5-7. Conflicting perceptions on ‘The rescue of the Rock’ 
 
Conclusion on the contest and Northern Rock 
The Northern Rock case shows that in times of crisis there are conflicting perceptions, and 
the consequences linked to them differ as well. It also shows that communication in times 
of crisis is a matter of trial and error. Again and again the assumption on the effect of 
words is put up for discussion. The logic that seems to work in normal times therefore 
stops working in times of crisis. To put it in the terminology of chapter 3, the game is no 
longer played the way it is played normally. Below, we further elaborate on the game and 
the way it is played by studying the Fortis case. 
 
2. Fortis 
In this section the Fortis case is discussed. The Fortis case takes place in September-
October 2008, roughly a year after Northern Rock (September 2007). The case will be 
described using four appearances (press moments) starring the president of the Dutch 
Central Bank (Nout Wellink). The appearances are accompanied by the reactions to these 
appearances in the newspapers and on financial markets. After a description of 
appearances and reactions a study of how they put the rules of the game (i.e. the symbolic 
order) under pressure is presented.  
 
Appearance 1: The central bank president as guardian of financial stability 
 
Communication by the central bank president 
To map the communication around the Fortis case, we start with an appearance by the 
DNB president on the current events show Nova, on September 18, 2008. In the weeks 
before this conversation, awareness of the financial crisis has spread through the Dutch 
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society. In the US, investment bank Lehman Brothers has gone down (September 15, 
2008); Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan have been saved by the government. The general 
mood on financial markets is worrying and the same goes for Fortis. Rumours spread that 
Fortis needs more money and is planning an extra stock issue. Fortis denies the rumours, 
but unsuccessfully: its share price keeps dropping. 
Everywhere comparisons emerge between this crisis and the crisis of the 1930s.87 
It is under these circumstances that the president of DNB appears on Nova. He is in a 
difficult position: there is hardly anything he can say, but it is not possible for him to stay 
silent. He is after all the guardian of the financial stability that is now threatened. When he 
is asked on Nova about the severity of the crisis he gives a measured response: ‘Yes it is 
gloomy, but we should not dramatise it. We should be careful to compare the crisis with 
the 1930s crisis, as the interviewer suggests.’ According to the president of DNB 
something is going on, but we (the financial sector and the Dutch) are sturdy. When asked 
about the problems at Fortis, he gives the reply central bankers are expected to give: ‘he 
cannot and is not allowed to make any remarks about specific financial institutions’. The 
president of DNB does mention that he keeps a close eye on all financial institutions, and 
that according to him they will all suffer from the crisis. He continues to say that financial 
institutions have built up reserves in the past years. This was done under his watchful eye. 
This view of the economy in general and Fortis in particular is however not shared by 
others.  
 
The media 
The newspapers keep speculating about Fortis. Customers speak about their doubts with 
regard to the future of Fortis (NRC 19/09) and an extensive in-depth interview is published 
about the problems Fortis has to cope with (T). At the end of the week, newspapers 
speculate about a possible takeover of Fortis. Financial institutions like ING, BNP Paribas, 
Santander and HSBC are named (FD, T, NRC). The takeover is presented as a radical 
solution. Within the newspapers the central bank president is one among many participants 
in the discussion. A lot of newspaper articles appear about Fortis (131), but in only seven 
articles do the central bank president and Fortis appear together. So a lot of people are 
saying and writing things about Fortis without referring to the president of DNB. 
                                                        
87 For example: A financial crisis unmatched since the Great Depression, The Guardian, March 18, 
2008. 
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The market 
The market also seems to think differently about Fortis; the view of the CBP is not shared 
by those acting on the markets. Shortly after the television appearance the stock market 
price increases slightly, but soon after that the decline begins. It is presumably fuelled by 
rumours spread by speculators that the central bank has asked another Dutch financial 
institution (Rabobank) to lend money to Fortis. The CDS ratio, on the other hand, starts to 
rise. This is a sign that the credibility of Fortis is increasingly doubted. And last but not 
least, the volume of trading rises. In about a week it more than doubles. On the markets, as 
in the newspapers, the role of the central bank president is also limited. The numbers show 
that the rumour spread by speculators seems to be more influential than the comforting 
words of the president. 
 
Date Stock market price CDS  Volume 
18-9-2008 6.832 209.665 46057.9 
19-9-2008 8 167.986 78470.3 
22-9-2008 7.671 166.963 31999.9 
23-9-2008 7.441 219.724 28280.3 
24-9-2008 6.987 232.096 21100.2 
25-9-2008 6.55 297.682 82725.6 
26-9-2008 5.18 555.011 117192.1 
27-9-2008 Saturday no trade Saturday no trade Saturday no trade 
28-9-2008 Sunday no trade Sunday no trade Sunday no trade 
Table 5-8. Market reactions between 18-9-2008 and 27-9-2008 
 
The contest for symbolic order 
To determine how the rules of the game are put up for discussion, the appearances 
described above are linked to the rules of the game and the relevant questions. 
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The rules of the game How the rules of the game are contested  
Rules of exclusion 
Topic(s) of speech The central bank president does not choose his topics, but is asked 
to speak about the financial crisis and Fortis. He does not 
comment on individual institutions. 
Market and media do speculate about Fortis. 
Rules of inclusion 
Commentary It is not the CBP that sets the tone. He reacts to the financial crisis 
and to Fortis’ problems. A rumour about Fortis is, hierarchically 
speaking, also a primary source of information. We find reactions 
to this rumour with the CBP, in the market and in the media. 
In the media there is much talk about Fortis, but the central bank 
president is not mentioned often. 
Author The central bank president (still) sticks to his message as 
supervisor. 
In the newspapers, a great variety of opinions on Fortis arises, 
mostly with a negative tendency. 
In the financial markets there is much difference of opinion as 
well. This can be deduced from the large increase in trade. Here 
too, there is a negative tendency, as shown by the CDS ratio.  
Discipline The (implicitly) relevant discipline is the line of reasoning of the 
central bank president as supervisor. 
Based on his criteria, the organisation Fortis is not in trouble.  
Rules of qualification 
Rituals The president of DNB appears on Nova to give his vision. This is 
something he hardly ever does in normal times, if at all. 
Television appearances are rare. Newspapers offer various players 
a stage to discuss Fortis. 
Fellowship/doctrine The CBP addresses a larger public, as on Nova.  
Education In the communication by the CBP, hardly any learning points are 
made explicit. What could qualify as a learning point is the 
‘affirmation’ of his authority by saying that, as a supervisor, he 
understands the situation completely. 
Table 5-9. Contesting the rules of the game I 
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Appearance 2: How Fortis Bank was not rescued 
 
The Central Bank President 
September 26, 2008. In the morning, the CEO of Fortis claims that: ‘The bankruptcy of 
Fortis is no question’.88 But soon it becomes clear that Fortis has to be rescued. In 
Brussels, the Belgian ministers hold an extra meeting of the cabinet. The Dutch minister of 
finance travels to Brussels. The president of the Dutch central bank does so as well, as do 
the president of the ECB (Jean-Claude Trichet) and the European Commissioner for 
Competition (Neelie Kroes). Under their watchful eyes the decision is taken in an 
emergency meeting that the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg governments together take a 
49% interest in Fortis. In the middle of the night, the Dutch minister of finance, Wouter 
Bos, appears before the camera to announce this. He says Fortis ‘has been saved’, as does 
the press release by DNB and the Ministry of Finance that opens with the announcement 
that the ‘problems at Fortis have been resolved’.89 The money that ends up at Fortis 
through this partial participation returns it to a state of liquidity. 
 
The media 
In the newspapers, this notion is thought of differently and in many ways. In NRC 
Handelsblad, Arnoud Boot, professor in economics, considers the measure ‘vague and 
half-hearted’. In Het Financieele Dagblad, Sweder van Wijnbergen, another professor in 
economics (and a former high-level civil servant), assumes Fortis has been rescued; 
according to him, Fortis has at once been adequately capitalised.90 De Telegraaf notes that 
by acting in this way (i.e. the rescue) panic is sure to ensue. That is because such a radical 
solution makes clear that there is a crisis, which can cause producer and consumer 
confidence to crash. Looking at the role that the central bank president plays in the 
newspaper, we see that it is still modest, but growing. 212 Articles are published about 
Fortis, the central bank president figures in 18 of them. 
                                                        
88 See: http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2008-09-26/fortis-ceo-company-will-not-go-bankrupt 
(retreived August 24, 2010). 
89 See: http://www.dnb.nl/nieuws-en-publicaties/nieuwsoverzicht-en-archief/persberichten-
2008/dnb188604.jsp (retrieved August 24, 2010).  
90 The first professor mentioned is Arnout W.A. Boot (2008), ‘Oplossing voor Fortis is vaag en 
halfbakken; Ook na Fortis duurt crisis voort, pensioenfondsen moeten inspringen’, NRC 
Handelsblad, September 29, 2008. The second professor is Sweder van Wijnbergen (2008), ‘Bos 
vermijdt fouten Paulson’, Het Financieele Dagblad, September 30, 2008. 
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The markets 
The financial markets are not convinced by the rescue either, the reactions are ambiguous. 
The stock market price declines, as well as the CDS ratio. The former means that the 
valuation of Fortis has decreased, but the latter shows that its credibility has increased (but 
the CDS ratio remains high – and the credibility low – compared to what it was in the 
beginning of the year). The trade volume is lower than it was the week before. At the end 
of the week, the stock market price is slightly higher than it was a week before, the CDS 
ration is (only) about 60% of what it was a week before and the volume has declined 
significantly. 
 
Date Stock market price CDS  Volume 
26-9-2008 5.18 555.011 117192.1 
29-9-2008 3.96 410.787 95310.4 
30-9-2008 4.4 338.961 60517.8 
01-10-2008 4.89 316.75 44989.1 
02-10-2008 5.49 354.403 50746 
03-10-2008 5.41 304.589 34908 
04-10-2008 No trade No trade No trade 
Table 5-10. Market reactions between 26-9-2008 and 04-10-2008 
 
The president of DNB does not give the impression that he is pleased with the way the 
markets reacted. Questioned by Reuters (September 29, 2008) on the reaction of the 
markets he states ‘markets have lost sense of direction’.91  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
91 ‘Paniek en angst strijden om voorrang; Financiële crisis Wellink begrijpt de beurs ook niet meer’, 
Trouw, September 30, 2008. 
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The contest for symbolic order 
The rules of the game How the rules of the game are contested 
Rules of exclusion 
Topic(s) of speech The rescue of Fortis dominates the conversation. 
Rules of inclusion 
Commentary The law is an important ‘text’ in this part. European 
Commissioner Kroes – guardian of the European legislation in this 
area – represents this text. She is involved in the negotiations. 
After the rescue attempt ‘the rescue’ becomes something that is 
referred to (sometimes critically). Some think that there is a 
competitive advantage. 
The influence of the central bank president in the discussion is still 
limited.  
Author The message of the central bank president has changed. In the 
previous phase, there was an announcement that Fortis was 
capable of taking the consequences of the crisis, now the central 
bank announces a 49% participation in Fortis, in order to save it. 
We can find ambiguity as well in the message by the Fortis CEO, 
who announces ‘no bankruptcy’ on the day of the rescue attempt. 
Discipline The solution of the central bank and the Dutch minister of finance 
fits the economic thinking in which a bank with sufficient 
liquidity is seen as a healthy bank. 
In the newspapers, this belief is both supported and criticised. 
Considering the stock prices, it is doubtful whether the message 
got through. The remark by the CBP that the markets have lost 
their sense of direction seems to indicate that they responded with 
less agreement than he had expected.  
Rules of qualification 
Rituals The authorities involved withdraw to negotiate about Fortis. All 
other activities are temporarily suspended. The press is not present 
at the negotiations, but follows them from close-by. At the end of 
the day, a press conference is given in which the decision is 
explained.  
Fellowship/doctrine The solution is first looked for in a limited public. The authorities 
attempt the Fortis Bank healthy again. 
Next, this message is announced to a broader public.  
Education Professors bring forward various arguments for this solution. 
There is no clear judgement on the expected success. 
Table 5-11. Contesting the rules of the game II 
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Appearance 3: How Fortis Bank Netherlands was rescued 
 
The Central Bank President 
The fact that the market does not believe what the president of DNB and the minister of 
Finance claim is reason for further action. In deep secrecy, negotiations continue. Even the 
press has no suspicions (or does not publish them). On the night of the day that the 
minister of Finance explains his earlier rescue effort to the parliament, he starts negotiating 
a new, further-reaching rescue. There are no leaks, and on Friday October 3 a press 
conference is broadcast live. In the morning the negotiations have been finished and in the 
beginning of the evening, right after the markets close, the minister of Finance, the prime 
minister and the president of the central bank appear on television. They announce that the 
Dutch government will take over the Dutch part of Fortis.92 Asked about the new situation 
of Fortis, the minister of Finance speaks the ‘reassuring’ words that the Dutch part of 
Fortis is entirely healthy. The Belgian part is stuck with ‘toxic’ portfolios but has, thanks 
to the sale of the Dutch part, enough money to absorb the losses on it. 
 
The media 
The remark by the minister of Finance is criticised and becomes a topic of discussion. It is 
seen by the (mostly Belgian) press as a sign of troubled relations between The Netherlands 
and Belgium. This is also fuelled by the Belgian prime minister responding disapprovingly 
to the words. ‘Bos often makes unfortunate statements,’ he says.93 In the Dutch 
newspapers the discussion is not so much concentrated on the question whether the 
problems are solved or not (neither on the Belgian-Dutch issue). There seems to be an 
underlying consensus that this indeed is the case. It is the appropriateness of the solution 
that is questioned. It is argued that the ministers as well as the president of DNB should 
provide accountability for this solution; a solution that is ‘controversial’ and ‘alarming’. 
The unfairness of the solution is also pointed out. Fortis receives, in these difficult times, a 
competitive advantage. And political comments on the solution state that the government 
should not ‘be a banker’. Supporting comments stress the possibility that this take-over 
will be lucrative in the end, and consider it to be an excellent investment. In the 
                                                        
92 This part also contains ABN Amro, a Dutch financial institutions that had been taken over by 
Fortis a year before the failing of Fortis.  
93 Robbert de Witt (2008), ‘Leterme woedend: Bos doet vaker ongelukkige uitspraken’, Elsevier, 
October 6. 
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newspapers the role of the central bank president keeps gaining importance. The day after 
the press conference 62 articles are published about Fortis, the central bank president 
figures in 12 of them (about 20%). 
 
The markets 
Most remarkable however is that the markets do not have anything to say anymore: the 
storyline of the markets has gone. During the press conference an institutional change has 
been announced: from now on the government is the owner. Due to the takeover the 
speculations on markets are silenced or at least postponed. So no more rising or falling 
stock prices or Credit Default Swap Ratios. This subject is not picked up by the 
newspapers. The shareholders hardly get to speak, if at all. They will later try to speak 
through the courts. For now, their opinion on Fortis does not matter. They are expected to 
give a positive judgment in the long term, when the Dutch government decides to sell 
Fortis to the market. 
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Overview of the contest for symbolic order 
Rules of the game How the rules of the game are contested 
Rules of exclusion 
Topic(s) of speech The central bank president is quiet in public. 
The minister of finance defends the ‘previous’ solution to the 
parliament. 
The central bank president and the minister of finance speak in 
silence about the next solution. 
Rules of inclusion 
Commentary After the new solution has been announced, it is discussed 
heavily.  
Author The central bank president, who announced last time that the 
problems at Fortis had been solved, now presents a different 
solution. The Dutch minister of finance does so as well, as do the 
other parties involved. The first solution is defended in public, 
while another solution is worked out in secret. 
Discipline We see a change of ‘discipline’ that is an institutional change as 
well. The rules of the economy ‘sufficient liquidity = healthy 
organisation’ do not work. An economically healthy organisation 
gets into problems if the public thinks it is not healthy. A main 
point of the solution is that the economic judges, the markets, are 
disabled by the takeover. 
 
We also see a change in the newspapers in the way the solution is 
judged. The solution is judged in terms of ‘justice’ and there are 
calls for accountability. 
Rules of qualification 
Rituals The ritual used here is the live press conference. For the president 
of DNB this was unique, it was his first live press conference ever. 
Fellowship/doctrine Through the press conference, the president of DNB (as well as 
the minister of finance and the prime minister) address a much 
broader public, addressing and passing at the same time the 
journalists. 
In the newspapers, there is more and more attention for the 
president of DNB. 
Education A learning moment is the explanation of the takeover by the Dutch 
minister of finance. By giving this information, however, he 
discredits Fortis Belgium. 
Table 5-12. Contesting the rules of the game III 
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Appearance 4: The central bank president who is not ‘Our Lord’. 
 
The Central Bank President 
Two days after his first live press conference, the president of DNB appears on Buitenhof. 
There he tells about the events of the previous week. He also reflects on everything before 
that. For some time, he had been convinced we would get hit by the crisis, and he had 
warned about this. But he did not expect it to happen with this size and speed. I am ‘not 
Our Lord’, he says to describe his position. With this, he means that neither he, nor DNB is 
all-knowing. 
He is asked about his opinion of the communication. This is partly because of 
remarks by the minister of Finance (that Belgium is stuck with toxic loans). Asked about 
this remark, the president of DNB states that he agrees with the general line of the story, 
but that he would have phrased it differently. He does however show understanding for the 
position of the minister of Finance. As he says himself: speaking in times of crisis is ‘like 
walking on eggshells’. Before you know it, you’ve squashed one. He would most prefer to 
say nothing at all. At which point the Buitenhof interviewer asks why he came to the 
studio. Wellink’s response: he came to provide accountability. In times of crisis the public 
according to him needs information and this he can give by appearing on Buitenhof. 
 
The media 
The next day, the appearance is widely covered by the newspapers. The media 
(newspapers) are critical of the choice of medium (a television appearance). Before, they 
were not. Illustrative is the sceptical title of an NRC column ‘Providing accountability is 
done on Buitenhof’.94 Also, the television appearance is seen as a strategic move in the 
(power) relationship between the president of DNB and the minister of finance. Van 
Wijnbergen, the aforementioned professor in economics and former high-level civil 
servant, explicitly denounced the role of the medium. According to him, it is inappropriate 
for the president of DNB to call the minister of Finance to account on national television.95 
 
                                                        
94 Daan van Lent (2008), ‘Verantwoording leg je af in Buitenhof’, NRC Handelsblad, October 7. 
Financiële redactie (2008), ‘Kritiek Wellink op Fortis, Bos en collega’s’,  NRC Handelsblad, 
October 6. 
95 Sweder van Wijnbergen (2008), ‘Deze week was genant; met dank aan media-optredens Bos, 
Wellink en Kroes’,  NRC.NEXT, October 6. 
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Overview of the contest for symbolic order 
Rules of the game How the rules of the game are contested 
Rules of exclusion 
Topic(s) of speech The central bank president speaks about the solution for Fortis. He 
presents this as ‘providing accountability’.  
Rules of inclusion 
Commentary In the newspaper of the next day, the content of the solution is not 
discussed as much as the way of providing accountability. 
Author By putting the decisions into context, an explanation is given of 
the fact that it was not possible to speak with one voice. 
Discipline It is not primarily the monetary economics that is the issue, but the 
ethical question of ‘How does a CBP relate to his public’.  
Rules of qualification 
Rituals Providing accountability in a television show. This is unusual.  
Fellowship/doctrine By addressing the public the way he does, the CBP seems to – at 
least afterwards – want to involve the public in the decisions.  
Education The learning moments are mostly about the complexity of acting 
in times of crisis. 
Table 5-13. Contesting the rules of the game IV 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the symbolic order is contested, taking the communication by 
central bank presidents as a starting point. Looking at this from the contest, we see that the 
perception of the central bank president is not shared by others involved. The central bank 
president even plays a relatively limited role in the discussion (as shown in chapter 4). If 
we look for differences in perceptions, we can see it both in the Northern Rock case and 
the Fortis case. In the Northern Rock case the perception of the Bank of England was not 
shared by the other central banks. In the case of Fortis the central bank president made a 
reassuring announcement, contrary to what was being said in newspapers and on financial 
markets. These differences in perceptions can be found throughout the process. There are, 
however, two situations in which calm is created, at least from the perspective of the 
central bank president. With Fortis, this is the case when the central bank president is the 
only guest on programmes like Nova and Buitenhof. He is then the only one answering 
questions from the journalist, there are no other parties that question his perceptions. 
Something similar happened with the press conference given by the president of DNB, the 
prime minister and the minister of finance. United, they provide their view of the situation. 
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A live press conference also has the advantage of reaching a broad public with this 
unequivocal message. Edelman (1964, p.96) points to the importance of  theatricality, the 
way in which something is said is important: ‘settings have a vital bearing upon actors, 
upon responses to acts […]’ (Edelman, 1964, p.96). As one of the examples he uses 
Kennedy’s Press Secretary ‘who claimed that his chief moved even closer to the people by 
permitting live telecasts of press conferences’ (Edelman 1964, p.100). These kinds of 
media moments therefore enable a central bank president to directly address a broad public 
as the only expert. This is an important opportunity in the contest for symbolic order. This 
also shows that the symbolic order has not collapsed completely. The television 
opportunity after all flows from his position as central bank president, and as authority. 
A second time when the contest comes to a stop is at the end of each case. In the 
case of Northern Rock the speculation is suspended – at least temporarily – when savers 
receive guarantees. In the Fortis case, speculation disappears when the government takes 
over Fortis Bank Netherlands. This is an institutional change, a switch or rather mixing of 
symbolic order. The symbolic order of the financial world is exchanged or supplemented 
with the symbolic order of the government. 
 
We now look back at the main question of this chapter: 
 
In times of crisis, a central bank president communicates to regain control of his  
communication. 
 
We can say that central bank presidents gain control over communication mostly by 
adjusting their communication methods and less by changing their message. The ‘real’ 
control over communication is gained by introducing a different symbolic order in the 
conversation. A symbolic order that is not (yet) up for discussion.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this research, the following research question was leading: 
 
Why is communication between central bank presidents and their publics 
contested? 
 
The background for posing this question are observable changes in communications by 
central bank presidents. Until the 1990s, central banks hardly ever communicated with 
their public. The assumption was that monetary policy would be more effective if it was 
not announced beforehand. The financial markets reacted most effectively to surprises. If 
market parties wanted to know the policies, they were forced to deduce them from other 
market parties’ actions. Since the 1990s, central bank presidents are announcing their 
policies beforehand. The underlying assumption is that policy is most effective if the 
parties concerned are knowledgeable and can anticipate measures. 
This transition from silence to speaking fits the general trend of demanding 
transparency from public institutions. Being a public institution, the central bank faces this 
expectation as well. Transparency was always encouraged by academics, based on the 
theory of rational expectations. This theory recommends ‘rationalising’ the public’s 
expectations. If the public has correct, rational expectations, then policies will work be 
automatically effective. More specifically, the call for transparency and the communication 
that goes with it works in two ways. Central banks as independent institutions can be 
accountable, and are no longer a tool for politicians. Moreover, central banks want to 
manage the public’s expectations through communication. The European Central Bank 
even repeatedly talks about ‘anchoring’ expectations. If the expectations have been 
anchored, a more effective and stable policy is assumed possible (Blinder 2008, Woodford 
2005). 
In this concluding chapter we study the consequences of this transition from 
silence to speaking in the relation between central bank presidents and their public. What is 
relevant is then not only what is said, but also ‘who’ has ‘something’ to say. Does the 
public listen to the central bank president, or not? Do the central bank presidents words 
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work, or not? If we look at these questions at a higher level of abstraction, it is about 
divisions of power in the relation between central bank president and publics.96 In this 
chapter, therefore, the assumption that central bank presidents communicate with their 
public to manage its expectations is critically deconstructed. The results from previous 
chapters serve as input.  
 
6.2 Communicating with many silences 
To gain insight into communication by central banks and their presidents, the previous 
chapters paid much attention to the European Central Bank’s communication. The 
European Central Bank considers communication to be highly important, and says the 
following on the subject:97 
 
Today, most central banks, including the ECB, consider transparency as crucial. This is 
true especially for their monetary policy framework. The ECB gives a high priority to 
communicating effectively with the public. 
 
And next, on transparency: 98 
 
Transparency helps the public to understand the ECB's monetary policy. Better public 
understanding makes the policy more credible and effective. Transparency means that the 
ECB explains how it interprets its mandate and that it is forthcoming about its policy goals. 
 
A first critical question we ask is whether the European Central Bank indeed often 
communicates with the public. On studying its communication, it turns out that the ECB 
does often speak to, and sometimes with the public. In 2008, the ECB had 619 public 
communication moments (see chapter 3), in the form of press releases, interviews, 
speeches, press conferences, statistical bulletins and publications. To understand how this 
communication takes shape, it is best to study the press conferences. In chapter 2 and 3, 
these have been discussed. In these press conferences, there is direct interaction between 
the central bank (president) and the public. The central bank president speaks with the 
public; that is, he answers questions asked by the public. At press conferences, one of the 
                                                        
96 Through this power, the difference between utterances and information is made, and thereby the 
communication that follows. 
97 See: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html (retrieved May 3, 2010). 
98 See: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html (retrieved May 3, 2010). 
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most important decisions of the ECB is explained by its president. He is as it were the 
monthly highlight in the ECB’s communication. This is confirmed by an increase in 
attention given to the ECB by the media around the time of the press conference. During 
that period, the number of newspaper articles referring to the ECB president more than 
doubles (see section 3.5). 
 
One of the striking things in the press conferences is that repeating the mandate – ‘keeping 
inflation below 2%’ – is a theme throughout the communication. As was shown in chapter 
4, the ECB president referred to this mandate 394 times in 2008 (an average of 33 times 
per press conference). This happens for example in the Q&A of March 2006: 
 
Question : […]. Before this press conference started there were still expectations of rate 
cuts this year. With the mid-point of your 2009 inflation expectations at 2.1%, well above 
your 2% ceiling, are these expectations misplaced? Are rate cuts off the agenda?  
Trichet: On the first question, I would say that the words I used on behalf of the Governing 
Council speak for themselves. We were unanimous in deciding to leave interest rates 
unchanged. We restated that maintaining price stability in the medium term is our primary 
objective. This is our mandate. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations is, as I have 
said, of the highest priority for the Governing Council. We trust that this solid anchoring 
allows us to deliver price stability in the medium term, as well as making a major 
contribution to sustainable growth and job creation. 
 
This example shows how the press conference is both a reason and a starting point to 
manage and ‘anchor’ this expectation. The intensive repeating of the message also shows, 
without making it explicit, the trouble of managing expectations. If it happened by itself,  
this repetition would not be necessary. 
 
What is also striking when studying the press conferences is that there are many silences. 
By this we mean moments in which the ECB president does not want to give the 
information he is asked for. An example of this silence is the refusal to give personal 
information about the voting behaviour of the Governing Council. This Council, consisting 
of the presidents of the central banks in the monetary union, convenes before the press 
conference to decide on interest rate policy. At the press conference, the ECB president 
explains this decision by framing it monetarily and economically, but he does not provide 
information about how the presidents voted. Nor does he give information on which 
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president took which standpoint in the Governing Council’s meeting. This silence is 
justified by stating that making the voting behaviour and standpoints public would lead to 
political pressure. This carries risks for the independence of the central bank and its 
monetary policy. 
Otmar Issing (2006), a former member of the ECB board, illustrates the problem 
of making the voting behaviour public in this hypothetical dialogue: 
 
Let me ask you a few questions. 
Can it be assumed that a person’s voting behavior is (always) going to be entirely free from 
the influence of the knowledge that it will subsequently be published? 
Could it be that a person may even vote differently to how he/she intended because he/she 
knows that it will be disclosed afterwards.  
What motives could influence voting behavior? 
A desire to make a mark in general or against the chairman, for example? 
Or conformity so as not to appear as an outsider? 
 
In other words, this silence is desirable when it comes to the independence and 
effectiveness of policy. Making it public would create too many, and apparently too severe 
limitations. It is not the only silence in the conversation, however. The ECB president does 
not comment on the behaviour of financial markets or other central banks. Nor does he 
want to get ahead of big conferences that could influence monetary policy, such as the G7 
(see chapter 3 for an extensive overview). Here too, arguments can be given for the 
silence. By refraining from commenting, the central bank president allows his colleagues 
and other authorities the opportunity to develop their own policies. After all, it is not hard 
to imagine the ECB president’s comments on the Federal Reserve’s policies being seen as 
criticism, making it hard for the Federal Reserve to implement them. The reverse is of 
course also true for the Federal Reserve president, who refrains from commenting on the 
ECB. 
 
Much communication and many silences in times of crisis 
In this research not only speaking in normal times has been studied, but also speaking in 
times of crisis. In these times, we see that communication not only consists of much 
speaking, but also many silences. The president of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) was the 
focus here. As a supervisory central banker, he was closely involved in handling the crisis. 
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We showed that his communication both increased and changed. The president of DNB 
appeared on television many times in a short time period, and gave his first ever live press 
conference. In this way he addressed a large public and he communicated his vision of 
events. We also saw was that some things were kept quiet on purpose. A good example are 
the negotiations about the Fortis bank, which was about to topple. The governments of the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg had made a rescue attempt. By taking a 49% 
interest in Fortis, they hoped and expected to save the company. The Dutch central bank 
even said as much as this in a press release: ‘The problems at Fortis SA/NV have been 
resolved’.99 But the problems turned out not to have been resolved, and in silence the 
parties concerned searched for a new solution. This silence is understandable as well. The 
chances of a deal succeeding would probably have been much lower if the media had been 
allowed to follow the proceedings. By keeping things out of publicity, the parties had the 
opportunity to negotiate in relative peace. 
A final example of the ‘silence’ is the Northern Rock case. Northern Rock was 
one of the first European Banks to get into trouble. A rescue attempt was set up, and at a 
certain point there were discussions on whether to make public the assistance provided by 
the Bank of England. The Bank of England was against making the rescue operation public 
(and therefore in favour of silence), because it assumed that it would negatively affect the 
rescue attempt. Northern Rock was in favour of announcing the support of the Bank of 
England, because it assumed that it would actually have a positive effect (so it was against 
silence). Ultimately it was decided to make things public, but this did not have the 
intended effect. 
 
In sum 
In short, we can state that both in normal times as in times of crisis, a central bank 
president communicates with the public quite often, but there are many silences. The 
relation between a central bank president and the public can therefore not be reduced to 
merely providing information. The relation has other goals, such as managing expectations 
and bringing and sustaining financial stability. As far as these two goals are concerned a 
central bank president not just provides information; he also holds things quiet. ‘Real’ 
                                                        
99 See: http://www.dnb.nl/nieuws-en-publicaties/nieuwsoverzicht-en-archief/persberichten-
2008/dnb188604.jsp (retrieved August 24, 2010). 
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transparency could after all endanger the stability of financial markets, and distort 
expectations. 
 
6.3 Power equality 
That central banks have changed ‘from silence to speaking’, does not mean then that 
everything is said. In speaking there are many silences, which can be grounded – as was 
shown in the previous section. The silences are problematic, though, when looked at from 
a transparency perspective: the perspective that central banks and their presidents link to 
communication. In the academic literature on central bank communication, transparency is 
seen as information symmetry. In this case, this means that central bank president and 
public have the same information. 
In chapter 2 we saw that the concept of transparency is problematic if central 
banks are dealing with uncertainty (what should they say?). In a case of uncertainty, the 
transparency perspective tells them to communicate that they do not know. From the 
perspective of managing expectations however, it is often desirable that uncertainty is kept 
quiet and a future scenario is communicated. The ECB will for example not say it is 
uncertain about future inflation, but chooses to communicate its mandate of guarding 
inflation. Another problem is complexity. Information that a central bank president wishes 
to communicate can sometimes be very complex. By communicating this complexity, he is 
likely to shut out a large part of the public. The ECB press conferences show this: the 
analyses presented there are strongly simplified representations of the research they are 
based on. (And even then they are hard to understand for laymen). Finally, there is 
overreaction: the public reacts stronger to information from a central bank (president), 
because it comes from a central bank (president). All these issues put into doubt the 
possibility of being transparent. The aforementioned silences add to this; they cast doubt 
not just on the possibility of transparency, but also on its desirability. In many of the cases 
mentioned the central bank president could give the information asked for, but decides not 
to. The information asymmetry still exists. It also exists if a central bank does provide 
openness, but only in a certain domain. The central bank is then the one to decide. 
This discussion of transparency offers possibilities of describing the power 
relation between central banker and public. In the case of transparency, the power of the 
players lies in the information they have. If a party has an information advantage, it can 
manipulate another party (see chapter 2). The concept of power relevant here seems to be 
that of possessional power (Achterhuis 1988, p.255). The central bank president has 
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power, because he possesses information that the public does not. The goal of creating 
transparency is to more equally divide this power. Logic after all dictates that an equal 
amount of information implies an equal amount of power. We see that in the relation 
between central bank (president) and public, there is an unequal division of information. 
Based on the transparency perspective, we can criticise this inequality. This criticism is 
powerful, especially because central banks themselves promote transparency. Yet this 
criticism – justified as it may be – fails on one important point. The fact that central banks 
and their public have the same information does not make them equals. This is because the 
one to one relation between information and power is not valid. More information is not 
more power, and equal information does not imply equal power. Central banks have a 
different institutional position, which means that their information carries a different 
charge than the publics’. An extreme example of this is the announcement of the interest 
rate decision. If a central bank announces the rate is going up, it goes up. If anyone else or 
any other institution announces the same, nothing happens. 
To conclude, the relation between central banker and public cannot be seen 
merely in terms of information. The message of transparency is insufficient to interpret this 
relation. Because even if different parties have the same information, this does not mean 
there is power equality. We need to think about the relationship between power and 
information in a different way.  
 
6.4 Channelled power 
Based on this dissertation, an alternative for interpreting the communicative relationship 
between a central bank president and his public can be formulated. This is done mainly in 
chapter 3 by placing the communication between central bank president and public in the 
context of a game. An important difference between the transparency perspective and the 
game perspective is the attitude towards power. In the transparency perspective, 
eliminating power asymmetry through informing is central. A game, however, depends on 
differences in power. Power is channelled through the rules of the game. It is about 
enabling as well as about limiting opportunities for acting. Soccer, for example – the game 
with which communication is compared in chapter 3 – offers players the opportunity to 
make goals. But the game does not allow a player to score by throwing the ball into the 
goal. The game also shows that what someone can do depends on his position in the game. 
A goalkeeper can do different things than a regular player, and referees and linesmen have 
different roles altogether. Between central bankers and the public, there are asymmetric 
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relations as well. Central bankers have institutional tasks that are reserved for them. The 
public can listen differently each time to what a central bank president is trying to say. 
 
In chapter 3, communication by central bankers was studied using three clusters of rules 
(power channels): 
 
- What is talked about (rules of exclusion) 
- How and by whom things are said (rules of inclusion) 
- Who takes part in the conversation (rules of qualification) 
 
These rules describe the conditions that communication by central bank presidents has to 
meet in order to work. Here, it is made clear that the effect of words is not just in 
informing, but also in the ritual embedding and the institutional position of the central 
bank president. Another point that the game metaphor makes clear is the importance of an 
overarching goal. For central bank presidents, this is protecting financial stability. From 
this perspective, it can be logically explained that a central bank president keeps repeating 
his message and that there are silences. It is thinkable after all that information, especially 
when provided by the central bank president, is more likely to hurt than to work positively. 
For example, a central bank president expressing doubts in public can lead to a bank run, 
endangering other financial institutions and perhaps even the financial system. Silences 
can also provide room for other players (such as the members of the Governing Council, or 
other central bankers), which can help the game. 
Placing communication in a game context also shows that an asymmetric relation 
between central banker and public does not mean that a central banker has all the power, in 
the sense that he determines the effect of his words. A central banker in large part depends 
on his public for his success. The public has to understand his words (similarly to how he 
does) before these can have the intended effect. This also explains the problems in talking 
about transparency (see the previous section and chapter 2). A central bank president needs 
a well educated public – in this case with regard to financial economics – to make his 
words effective. For an optimal result it is desirable that central bank president and public 
are similarly disposed. 
 
In short, by placing the relation between central bankers and public in a game context, we 
get a picture of a power relation in which there is both asymmetry and dependence. Power 
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is not divided in a symmetric way, but is channelled by the rules of the game – it is 
‘channelled power’. This view of communication explains why there are moments of 
silence as well as of speaking. It also provides a different view of the vulnerability of this 
relation. It shows that transferring information is not enough to have the words be 
effective. Words only work when the players are familiar with the communication game 
being played. 
 
6.5 Deconstructive power 
There are limits to the view of communication as game. The power between a central bank 
(president) and its public is not always channelled power. In this book these limits were 
discussed by focussing on communication in times of crisis. Chapter four explored the 
change in relation between central bank president and public. This chapter illustrated that 
central bank presidents try to reach a larger and broader public in times of crisis. The 
research showed that in times of crisis a central bank president gets relatively little 
attention, most of which in professional newspapers, as in normal times. The attention in 
intellectual and popular newspapers is lacking. For a central bank (president) this is 
disturbing, considering that its (his) success depends on the public. Do the people that 
listen to him, understand him? Do enough people listen? Because the crisis hits everyone, 
stability not only depends on the financial sector. Any concerned citizen can cause a bank 
run.  
Chapter five studied the behaviour of a central bank president in more detail. 
Here, most attention was paid to the president of the Dutch central bank. He was closely 
involved in the rescue of the Fortis bank by the Dutch government. We saw that this bank 
president starts to relate to his public in a different way, and that he starts to address 
different publics. In times of crisis he appears on television (5 times) nearly as much as the 
whole year before (in 2007 he appeared 6 times on television). The programs in which he 
appears are aimed at a broader public than just the financial public. In live press 
conferences he speaks, past journalists, to a much larger part of society. 
The reason for a central bank president to start communicating in this way, is that 
he is involved in a contest for symbolic order. The crisis casts doubt on the game he 
normally plays. A central bank president is then forced to use other words than normally 
does. Or rather, the words that usually work, work differently or stop working altogether. 
An interesting example of this is the rescue of Fortis. The Dutch central bank announces 
after the 49% participation that ‘The problems at Fortis SA/NV have been resolved’. The 
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financial markets and Fortis customers, however, do not assume this to be the case. This 
brings the president of DNB to remark rather desperately that ‘the markets have lost their 
sense of direction’. This makes sense, because if even professionals do not understand the 
president’s words, what is he to say? The contest of symbolic order is illustrated by central 
bank presidents being unable to refute words of anonymous speculators (see chapter 5). 
Because the symbolic order is at stake, communication has multiple goals. It is 
not just about bringing stability to the financial system, but also about restoring the 
conditions under which the central bank (president) can bring stability again. The 
communication of the central bank president is ambiguous, it is in-between the two logics. 
 
When we look at the relation between a central bank and its president from this 
perspective, we see that there is still power in times of crisis, but it is no longer channelled 
by the game. In times of crisis power casts doubt on the words. Instead of streamlining the 
effects of communication, power deconstructs the carefully developed communication 
constructions. 
The goal of communicating is then not just to bring stability to the financial 
system, but also to (re)channel power by curbing its destructive tendencies. A different 
way of restoring this power relation is for the central bank president to appear on television 
alone. Just like at press conferences in normal times, it is the central banker that answers 
and the press that asks questions. Such television appearances are a means to speak to a 
broader public and to ‘cast’ it for the story the central bank president wants to tell. 
Conversely, such television appearances show traces of the position a central bank 
president has in normal times. The possibility of holding an exclusive interview in 
Buitenhof is open to few. 
 
In short, the effects of the words are eroded in times of crisis. The words lose the context 
that made them meaningful before. In this way, communication in times of crises tells us a 
lot about the hidden assumptions behind communication in normal times. It shows that the 
power ascribed to central bank presidents is precarious – it depends on structured 
interactions with their public(s). 
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6.6 Final words      
In this final section, it is time to present some speculative reflections on central bank 
presidents and their communicative acts, also to sketch (practical) implications. By 
speaking to publics – instead of remaining  silent – central bank presidents have redefined 
their relation with their publics. They account for their policies and try to manage 
expectations in order to enact effective policies. At first sight, this change underscores 
central banks’ independency from outside worlds. Our analysis has shown that it actually 
symbolizes an increasing dependency, albeit of a specific public – a professional public – 
that mediates between societal and financial spheres. Because of the preprogrammed 
nature of communication, this dependency does not really show, but the regulated and 
structured interaction with a (professional) public already indicates its vulnerable nature. In 
times of crises, this only becomes clearer. Shared vocabularies and frames of reference 
dissolve, the audience of central bank presidents becomes diffuse, and it might even 
become unclear whether central bank presidents have an audience at all. Indeed, central 
bank presidents prove to be dependent on broader external circumstances. 
 This study’s media analysis objectifies this dependency. The Dutch central bank 
president, media facts showed, was eagerly searching ways to communicate his message, 
amidst multiple messages and (political) voices.  This, in turn, affects our understanding of 
central bank presidents in normal times. If communication is vulnerable and central bank 
presidents depend on precarious relations with publics, we need to rethink these relations 
in order to limit vulnerabilities in normal times, as well as to anticipate on central bank 
presidents’ positions in times of crises. Firstly, it will be necessary to see relations between 
central bank presidents and publics in more reciprocal terms. In order to act in a powerful 
ways, central banks do not need to act upon a centralized notion of power, but upon a more 
dispersed notion that incorporates publics´ responses in central banker acts. The channeled 
nature of power and the potential deconstruction of well-established channels amidst 
uncertain times, explain why this is the case. Central banks do not ‘have’ a position; their 
position depends on socially accepted, stable communication rules that can be destabilized. 
When central bankers speak, they automatically speak to publics but also speak about 
themselves. 
Secondly, it is necessary to enact redundancy when relations are structured. 
Instead of merely serving professional publics, it is necessary to serve multiple audiences, 
even if mainly professional audiences are being served. In order to become really 
powerful, dispersed power is construed by enacting multiple channels of power. More than 
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ever, central bank presidents should send out multiple signals, actively mold stakeholder 
expectations, and manage the powerful dimension of apparent effect-based speech. Instead 
of focusing on mere effects (i.e. effective policies), the power of rules should be 
incorporated when central bank speech is improved – and also studied. When central 
bankers speak, they speak through and therefore about rules. The stronger these rules, the 
stronger their speech. They say a lot, even when they are silent. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Below are the test-statistics (p-values within brackets) of a comparison of the weekly articles about 
the CBP before and during the crisis. The specific test statistic used here is the Mann-Whitney U-test 
statistic, a non-parametric approach to see if the 2 series differ in location. (it is the same statistic as 
is used to compare the number of articles about Trichet in the weeks that he held speeches, compared 
to weeks when he did not hold any speeches). 
 
First we take a look at the effect of the crisis in the various categories for all the CBPs. In the table 
below we can see that the crisis has lead to a statistically significant increase in the number of 
articles on CBP in each category as the P-value is lower that 0.001 in each category.  
 
Comparison of number 
of articles on CBP 
before and during the 
crisis, for each 
category 
Category Test statistic: 
U-value (P-
Value) 
Mean rank 
before the 
crisis 
Mean rank 
during the 
crisis 
Intellectual 4.111 (0.0000) 63.30 92.89 
Financial 3.814 (0.0001) 63.34 91.84 
Popular 4.495 (0.0000) 61.92 94.29 
Table A-1.  Ranking of attention for all CBPs 
 
For Bernanke the increase in articles is statistically significant in every category except for the 
intellectual newspaper. 
  
Comparison of number 
of articles on Bernanke 
before and during the 
crisis, for each 
category 
Category Test statistic: 
U-value (P-
Value) 
Mean rank 
before the 
crisis 
Mean rank 
during the 
crisis 
Intellectual 1.880 (0.0601) 71.29 84.80 
Financial 2.411 (0.0159) 69.37 86.74 
Popular 3.911 (0.0001) 64.04 92.14 
Table A-2. Ranking of attention of Bernanke 
 
For Trichet, the increase in articles is statistically significant in all categories. 
 
Comparison of number 
of articles on Trichet 
Category Test statistic: 
U-value (P-
Mean rank 
before the 
Mean rank 
during the 
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before and during the 
crisis, for each 
category 
Value) crisis crisis 
Intellectual 4.202 (0.0000) 63.05 93.14 
Financial 2.741 (0.0061) 68.19 87.94 
Popular 3.179 (0.0015) 66.70 89.44 
Table A-3. Ranking of attention for Trichet 
 
For Wellink the increase in articles is statistically significant in every category except for the popular 
newspaper. 
 
Comparison of number 
of articles on Wellink 
before and during the 
crisis, for each 
category 
Category Test statistic: 
U-value (P-
Value) 
Mean rank 
before the 
crisis 
Mean rank 
during the 
crisis 
Intellectual 2.780 (0.0054) 68.88 88.12 
Financial 3.519 (0.0004) 66.15 90.85 
Popular 1.663 (0.0962) 72.86 84.14 
Table A-4. Ranking of attention for Wellink 
  
Significance 
 
Bernanke Trichet Wellink Wellink & 
Trichet 
Attention in 
normal 
times 
Difference all 
categories: 
0.0002. 
Null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Difference 
popular and 
intellectual: 
0.7524. 
Difference all 
categories: 0.0000. 
Null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
 
Difference popular 
and intellectual: 
0.2161. 
Difference all 
categories: 0.7124.  
Null hypothesis is 
not rejected. 
 
 
No significant 
difference between 
the categories 
exists.  
Difference all 
categories: 
0.0000. Null 
hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Difference 
popular and 
intellectual: 
0.1964  
Attention in 
times of 
crisis 
Difference all 
categories: 
0.0000. 
Null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Difference 
popular and 
intellectual: 
0.0230. 
 
Difference all 
categories: 0.0000. 
Null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Difference popular 
and intellectual: 
0.0848. 
Difference all 
categories: 0.0063. 
Null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Difference popular 
and intellectual: 
0.0742. 
 
Difference all 
categories: 
0.0000. 
Null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Difference 
popular and 
intellectual: 
0.0278. 
 
Table A-5. Overview of significances  
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH (NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING) 
 
Hoe sterker het belang van communiceren benadrukt wordt, des te lastiger is het om iets te 
zeggen. Dat is de centrale boodschap van dit proefschrift dat het spreken van centrale bank 
presidenten in normale tijden en in tijden van crisis bestudeert. Sinds de jaren ’90 van de 
20ste eeuw is communicatie voor centrale banken en hun presidenten een instrument 
(middel) om het monetaire beleid (doel) effectiever te maken. De achterliggende 
veronderstelling is dat centrale banken transparant worden gemaakt en dat het publiek 
geïnformeerd zal handelen.  
In het tweede hoofdstuk (Disclosing Transparency) laten we zien dat dit 
transparant maken in veel opzichten een illusie is. Om te beginnen zijn zowel academici 
als beleidsmakers het niet eens over wat transparantie precies is, en hoe het bereikt kan 
worden. Betekent transparantie bijvoorbeeld dat de complexiteit van situaties tot 
uitdrukking komt, of betekent transparantie dat de zaken zo eenvoudig worden voorgesteld 
dat iedereen ze kan begrijpen? We zien in dit hoofdstuk dat communicatie die transparant 
wordt genoemd vooral geënsceneerde transparantie is. Het is communicatie die op 
vastgelegde tijdstippen, volgens bepaalde regels, en met steeds terugkerende woorden 
wordt uitgevoerd. Centrale bank presidenten mogen niet te veel zeggen; versprekingen van 
centrale bank presidenten laten zien dat openheid een prijs kent.  
In het daarop volgende hoofdstuk (Revealing the Rules of Central Bank Speech) 
wordt communicatie vervolgens bekeken vanuit een spelperspectief. Op basis van het werk 
van de filosoof Michel Foucault wordt gezocht naar regels in de communicatie van 
centrale banken en hun presidenten. Het laat zien hoe communicatie werkt, en dat 
communiceren volgens de regels van het spel niet betekent dat de uitkomst vast ligt. Net 
als bijvoorbeeld bij voetbal is de uitkomst van het spel afhankelijk van de kwaliteit en 
interactie tussen de spelers.  
In het daarop volgende hoofdstuk (Do Central Bank Presidents Receive more 
Attention in Times of Crisis?) maken we een vergelijking tussen communicatie in tijden 
van crisis en normale tijden. Dat doen we omdat centrale bank presidenten in tijden van 
crisis veel aan het woord lijken te zijn en omdat ze anders lijken te communiceren. Het 
hoofdstuk toont op basis van een media-analyse aan dat centrale bank presidenten in tijden 
van crisis inderdaad meer spreken, maar ook dat hun aandeel in het debat relatief beperkt 
blijft. In tijden van crisis zijn er veel partijen aan het woord, en tegen al deze partijen moet 
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een centrale bank president zich verweren als hij wil dat de boodschap van de centrale 
bank overgenomen wordt.  
In het vijfde hoofdstuk (Silencing Speculation) analyseren we communicatie in 
tijden van crisis als een strijd om de symbolische orde. Gekoppeld aan het derde hoofdstuk 
kunnen we stellen dat het daarbij gaat om het bepalen van de regels van het spel. In tijden 
van crisis is de rol van de normale regels sterk gereduceerd en ontstaan er mogelijkheden 
om anders te spelen. Dat maakt het voor een centrale bank president zowel belangrijk als 
moeilijk om zijn boodschap over te brengen, vooral omdat er geen ‘normaal’ publiek meer 
is.  
In het slothoofdstuk (Conclusions and Implications) bekijken we de bevindingen 
vanuit een overkoepelend machtsperspectief. Communicatie door centrale bank 
presidenten veronderstelt dat bankpresidenten macht aanwenden. Doordat de centrale bank 
president vertelt wat hij weet, maakt hij het beleid transparant en deelt hij als het ware zijn 
macht met het publiek. Deze veronderstelling moet flink worden gerelativeerd. De macht 
zit niet zozeer bij de centrale bank president, maar in de relatie met een publiek. In 
normale tijden wordt de macht gekanaliseerd door de regels van het spel. Centrale bank 
presidenten spreken dan met name tot professionele publieken. In tijden van crisis zien we 
een deconstructieve macht aan het werk. Alles wat door de centrale bank president wordt 
gezegd, komt ter discussie te staan. Centrale bank presidenten zoeken naar publieken die 
zich laten overtuigen en vertegenwoordigen. Communicatie is er op gericht om relaties 
tussen centrale banken en publieken te reconstrueren.    
Dat laatste leert ons dat centrale bank presidenten ook in normale tijden relaties 
zullen moeten onderhouden met meerdere publieken, zelfs als professionele publieken 
voldoende lijken voor een effectief monetair beleid. Gegeven de dreiging van crisis zullen 
centrale bank presidenten redundantie moeten organiseren. Ze zullen via communicatie 
macht moeten verspreiden om ‘machtig’ te zijn.   
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l)CONTESTED COMMUNICATION
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL BANK SPEECH
The more important words become, the more difficult it is to say things. This is the
central message of this study on the communication by central bank presidents. Since the
end of the twentieth century, central bank presidents see communication as an important
means to influence expectations of their publics. In this book, we show how this happens:
central bank presidents rely on fixed settings, speak at specified moments, and repeat
certain words. Press conferences clearly illustrate this. This strict approach to communi -
cation, however, focuses attention on slips of the tongue and (speculative) interpretations
of statements, made at planned or unplanned moments.
In times of crisis, these communication ‘disturbances’ are enlarged – communication
becomes severely contested. A crisis casts doubt on the legitimacy of authorities. Must we
still listen to central bank presidents? Do central bank presidents say what they really
think? A detailed analysis of statements by central bank presidents on the British Northern
Rock and the Dutch/Belgium Fortis banks shows how central bank presidents communicate
by ‘trial and error’. Everything they say can be used against them. Remaining silent is
impossible, as silences can be dangerous as well. 
By combining philosophical and economic insights, this study not only sheds light on
how communication in financial markets evolves, it also explains why communication can
become contested. Instead of an instrumental understanding and usage of communi -
cation, this dissertation stresses the relevance of a critical-pragmatic perspective on
financial communication. 
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